Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated September 14, 2018, which ordered his detention at Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the Board erred in law or acted unreasonably in declining to impose a conditional discharge.

The appellant suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder with no insight into his condition, a pattern of medication noncompliance and substance abuse, and would not voluntarily return to hospital if requested.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's decision and upheld the detention order, noting that the need to supervise housing and permit quick readmission if necessary are relevant considerations in determining whether a conditional discharge is appropriate.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision dated October 5, 2016.

The Receiver sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the issues were complex and significant to insolvency practice and the mining industry, and that the appellant's allegations of improper conduct warranted such an award.

The Court of Appeal agreed the issues were complex and significant but declined to award costs on a substantial indemnity scale given the history of the proceeding.

The Receiver was ultimately successful on the appeal and was awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

This is a supplementary decision to the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing the appeal in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the respondent requested that funds paid into court by the appellants as security for costs be paid out to the respondent.

The appellants did not oppose this request.

The court ordered that the funds held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice be paid out to the respondent.

An appeal from a costs order against Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) as a non-party funder in a family law dispute.

The application judge found that LAO engaged in an abuse of process by failing to adequately monitor and assess the merits of the defence it was funding in a case involving a vulnerable individual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs award, holding that LAO's role as a statutory funder does not expose it to non-party costs awards absent evidence of bad faith or improper purpose, and that requiring LAO to monitor litigation would impermissibly invade solicitor-client privilege and frustrate the statutory legal aid scheme.

A senior vice president with 37 years of service was terminated without cause following a minor dispute over promotional sporting event tickets.

The motion judge awarded 30 months' notice and full bonus entitlements during the notice period.

On appeal, the employer challenged both the notice period and the bonus entitlement.

The Court of Appeal reduced the notice period to 24 months, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting a longer period.

However, the court upheld the bonus entitlement, finding that while the termination provision in the bonus plans was unambiguous and would have limited the employee's entitlement, the provision was unenforceable because it was not properly communicated to the employee by the employer.

This appeal concerns whether a court has jurisdiction to extinguish a third party's gross overriding royalty (GOR) interest in land through a vesting order in a receivership proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that while the court has jurisdiction under section 243 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to grant vesting orders, the motion judge erred in exercising that jurisdiction to extinguish the appellant's GORs, which constituted interests in land akin to ownership interests rather than fixed monetary claims.

However, the appellant failed to appeal within the prescribed 10-day period under the BIA Rules, and the justice of the case did not warrant an extension of time.

The appeal was dismissed, though the appellant retained the $250,000 payment it had received.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision ordering release of a cryopreserved in vitro embryo to the respondent ex-wife for her reproductive use.

The motion judge applied contract and property law principles to conclude the embryo should be released based on the parties' prior contractual agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and its regulations establish a consent-based model, not a contract-based model.

The parties remain "donors" under the regulations despite divorce, and the appellant retained the right to withdraw his consent under section 14(3) of the Consent Regulations.

The court found that consent cannot be frozen in time and that the statutory protections cannot be contracted away.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of assault following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial was unfair due to self-representation despite requesting counsel, and that the trial judge failed to provide proper limiting instructions on prior consistent statements and multi-count indictment evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements made to her family doctor, mother, and family lawyer.

The court determined this error was fatal given the centrality of credibility, the substantive details of the statements, and the Crown's closing address inviting the jury to infer truthfulness from consistency.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagee enforcement of a mortgage following the appellants' default in transferring and further encumbering the mortgaged property without consent.

The appellants argued that the mortgagee waived the default by accepting three months of payments after giving notice of default.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that accepting payments did not constitute waiver under the mortgage terms or at law.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a concession regarding pre-judgment interest on a line of credit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to annul the bankruptcy of Katherine Anne Fast under section 181(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondents were neighbours who obtained a Small Claims Court judgment against the appellants for water damage.

Mrs. Fast filed for voluntary bankruptcy shortly after the appellants attempted to enforce the judgment.

The application judge dismissed the annulment application, finding that despite the appellants' evidence that Mrs. Fast's property was worth significantly more than disclosed and that her assets exceeded her liabilities, she had a monthly income-expense deficit.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Mrs. Fast was not an insolvent person as defined by the BIA because her substantial assets were available to satisfy all her liabilities and there was no evidence she could not meet her obligations as they came due.

The appellants failed to appear at the appeal hearing and did not comply with the court's previous endorsement directing specific steps to be taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $21,234.33, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant, a teacher at a private school, appealed the dismissal of her constructive dismissal claim by way of summary judgment.

She alleged that the respondent school altered the terms of her employment by failing to protect her from a confrontation with a student's parents over a mark, undermining her authority by having another teacher read and mark assignments, and assigning passing grades to students who had not completed all assignments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding no evidence that the school altered the terms of employment or breached any policy, and that the school's response to the appellant's complaints was measured and reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism under s. 162(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for taking still photographs from a live video stream during intimate video chats with the complainant without her knowledge or consent.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the complainant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy since she willingly appeared nude on camera, and that he did not act "surreptitiously" because the complainant never explicitly objected to screenshots being taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and that the appellant acted surreptitiously with the intent that the complainant remain unaware of the recording.

A pedestrian was catastrophically injured when struck by a vehicle whose owners had applied for automobile insurance.

The insurer issued a one-year policy but subsequently purported to rescind it based on material misrepresentation regarding one owner's driving record, sending a letter stating the coverage was "void from the inception date" approximately two months before the accident.

The injured plaintiff obtained judgment against the at-fault driver and owner but was unable to collect.

The plaintiff then sued the insurer under section 258(1) of the Insurance Act, which permits innocent third parties to recover directly from the at-fault driver's insurer.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the insurer had validly rescinded the contract at common law, making it void ab initio.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an automobile insurer cannot rescind a contract at common law but must comply with the statutory scheme governing termination of automobile insurance contracts.

The appellant, Canadian Home Publishers Inc., appealed a judgment that dissolved the limited partnership upon the death of its sole limited partner, David Colville-Reeves, and awarded his estate a 50 percent share in the residual assets of the partnership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in importing the residual distribution provision from section 44 of the Partnerships Act into the Limited Partnerships Act.

The court held that a limited partner's rights are strictly defined under the Limited Partnerships Act and do not include participation in residual assets upon dissolution.

The limited partner is entitled only to their share of profits and return of their capital contribution.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault offences against his nine-year-old daughter.

The trial judge found the victim's evidence credible and reliable despite inconsistencies and contradictions, and rejected the appellant's denials and the defence theory that the victim had fabricated the allegations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and admitting of appellate review, with no error in her analysis of the evidence.

The verdicts were not unreasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave inadequate consideration to his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the trial judge gave proper and meaningful consideration to the Gladue Report and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The sentence of three and one-half years was fit given the age of the victim, seriousness of the abuse, and egregious breach of trust.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 26 months imprisonment, less four months credit for pre-trial custody, plus two years' probation for possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued the sentence was excessive given the small quantity of drugs, his addiction status, and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's addiction and rehabilitation attempts, but reasonably concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist.

The court noted the appellant had failed to complete a residential treatment program, continued using opiates, committed further offences while on bail, and failed to appear for sentencing.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The conviction arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, particularly the eyewitness testimony regarding the movements of the vehicles immediately before and at the time of the accident.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the mens rea component of the offence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 18-month custodial sentence and the 10-year driving prohibition as being within the appropriate range.