Frank Addario

The accused, former legal counsel to the Thunder Bay Police Service, was charged with obstruction of justice and breach of trust by a public official.

The Crown alleged she made intentional false or misleading statements during an Ontario Civilian Police Commission investigation regarding her knowledge of a criminal investigation into the police services board chair.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while some of the accused's statements were inaccurate, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally made false statements or material omissions.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) brought a motion for leave to intervene in a bail review application under the Extradition Act.

The proposed intervener sought to make submissions on whether the strength of the ultimate prosecution should be considered in assessing the primary ground for detention.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed arguments were consistent with those already advanced by the respondent and that the intervener would not bring a useful perspective distinct from the parties.

The applicants, a reporter and a newspaper, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision that upheld the refusal to disclose the names and badge numbers of police officers subject to misconduct complaints.

The applicants argued the IPC Adjudicator failed to consider their freedom of expression rights under section 2(b) of the Charter when applying the public interest override in section 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Adjudicator erred by dismissing the Charter argument solely because a formal notice of constitutional question was not filed.

The application for judicial review was granted, the IPC decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

This motion, brought by the Van Essen Companies and Wouter Van Essen, sought to strike evidence, grant judgment, and stay proceedings in a receivership, alleging unauthorized access to their privileged records by the court-appointed Receiver (FTI Consulting Inc.) and the appointing creditor (MBL Administrative Agent II LLC).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Van Essen Companies failed to establish that the records were intended to be confidential, as Wouter Van Essen knowingly used a Techlantic email account (a third-party entity he considered arm's length) for business and personal communications, including those with legal counsel, and shared emails with Techlantic's senior officer.

The court concluded that the prerequisite for privilege (confidentiality) was not met, and even if it were, privilege was waived by the knowing use of a third-party server and delayed notification to the Receiver.

The plaintiffs, a group of private companies, brought a motion seeking to find Dr. Saad Aljabri and his son, Mohammed Aljabri, in contempt of court for allegedly breaching a Mareva Order.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants used assets frozen under the Mareva Order to pay for legal and living expenses, arguing that a purported gift of assets from Dr. Aljabri to Mohammed before the order was a fiction.

The defendants contended that the Mareva Order did not clearly apply to the gifted assets and that the gift was valid.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding that they failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Mareva Order clearly and unequivocally applied to the purportedly gifted assets, or that Dr. Aljabri retained an interest in or control over them.

The court emphasized the high standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) required for civil contempt and that findings from prior civil proceedings (e.g., 'badges of fraud' on a balance of probabilities) do not shift the burden of proof in quasi-criminal contempt proceedings.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

A jury found the appellant, a private investigator, guilty of wilfully attempting to obstruct justice.

The trial judge sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The appellant appealed the conviction and sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions regarding intent or reasonable doubt, or the use of the Code of Conduct for private investigators.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence and imposed a disproportionate sentence.

The Court substituted the imprisonment with a two-years-less-one-day conditional sentence, including 12 months of house arrest followed by a curfew, recognizing the appellant's first-offender status and the collateral consequence of losing his private investigator's license.

Shahim Shokouh, convicted of child pornography offenses, applied for an exemption from Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration, an obligation declared unconstitutional but suspended by the Supreme Court in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The court granted the exemption, finding that Mr. Shokouh was at a low risk to reoffend based on an individualized risk assessment, and therefore, requiring his registration would be overbroad and would not further the SOIRA's purpose.

Granting the individual remedy would not undermine the Supreme Court's purpose for suspending the declaration of invalidity.

The accused, Shahim Shokouh, was found guilty of accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography.

The court considered aggravating factors, including active sharing and seeking more material, and mitigating factors such as his youth (19 at the time of offenses), first offender status, voluntary participation in therapy, expressed remorse, low risk of reoffending, and strong family support.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence proposed 90 days intermittent.

The court imposed a global sentence of 12 months' imprisonment followed by 3 years of probation, along with ancillary orders including DNA sample, forfeiture of devices, and a 10-year prohibition order regarding contact with persons under 16 and certain employment/volunteer capacities, and internet use conditions.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

D.M. appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The complainant had an intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal found several errors in the trial judge's conduct and jury instructions, including the Crown's improper use of expert evidence to bolster the complainant's credibility, misdirection on the W.(D.) rule regarding exculpatory evidence, improper cross-examination of the accused regarding motives for false allegations, and misdirection on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, was found guilty by a jury of wilfully attempting to obstruct the course of justice.

He was retained by a client's lawyer to gather information on a complainant, Cynthia Mulligan, but instead directly approached Mulligan and her associates, making implied threats to dissuade her from testifying against his client.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, which struck at the heart of the justice system, alongside mitigating factors such as Dubros' lack of criminal record, age, and mental health challenges.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3-3.5 years, while the defence sought a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month reformatory imprisonment term, followed by three years of probation, balancing the need for denunciation and general deterrence with the offender's rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that quashed four convictions and entered a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) infringement but declined to stay proceedings on the basis that the accused had not been prejudiced by the delay.

The Court of Appeal erred by entering a stay without re-examining the reasonableness of the delays, even though the record contained a detailed statement of admissions.

The Supreme Court held that a functional analysis of the trial judge's reasons showed he considered the relevant Morin factors and reached the correct conclusion.

The defence-caused delays, including multiple unsuccessful applications and insistence on conflicted counsel, must be subtracted, and the transitional exceptional circumstance under Jordan further supported the conclusion that s. 11(b) was not infringed.

The applicant, charged with offences under the Security of Information Act for allegedly attempting to communicate safeguarded information to a foreign entity, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The prosecution had been ongoing for over eight years, complicated by extensive litigation over national security privilege under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act regarding a CSIS warrant.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay and subtracting defence delay and discrete exceptional events, including the time taken for the national security litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the remaining delay of over 40 months significantly exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling and that the case was not particularly complex.

Consequently, the court held that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were breached and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed sentences imposed on two offenders convicted after a lengthy jury trial for leading a sophisticated criminal organization that imported approximately two tonnes of cocaine into Ontario over three years.

The sentencing judge imposed global sentences of 22 and 20 years’ imprisonment, relying heavily on the parity principle by comparing the respondents’ sentences to those of co‑accused who had resolved charges through joint submissions.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing parity, using joint‑submission sentences as comparators, and failing to adequately apply the proportionality principle or account for the respondents’ leadership roles and the unprecedented scale of the importation scheme.

Given the gravity of importing roughly 2,000 kilograms of cocaine and the respondents’ status as directing minds of the criminal organization, the court substituted life sentences for the conspiracy count.

The court also set aside a fine in lieu of forfeiture imposed on one respondent in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority.

The respondents sought to enforce a Utah default judgment against the appellant.

During discovery, the appellant refused to answer several questions, and an Associate Judge ordered him to answer them.

The appellant appealed the Associate Judge's decision, arguing the questions breached solicitor-client privilege or related to a coerced Stipulation of Fact.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal in part, striking one question that sought the content of legal advice, but upholding the orders to answer questions about the steps taken to secure legal advice, whether lawyers were paid, and which portions of the Stipulation of Fact were true, as the appellant had put these matters in issue in his pleadings.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application for extraordinary relief (prohibition and certiorari) seeking to prevent a judge from proceeding with a remote video trial and to quash a ruling for a remote trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant's request for a full in-person trial had been accommodated.

The court declined to hear the moot appeal on public interest grounds, citing an insufficient record, the issues not being evasive of review in normal appellate process, and no evidence of a systemic problem requiring immediate resolution.

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The applicant, charged under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from an undercover operation pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that the evidence was derived from a CSIS wiretap warrant that violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of candour by the affiant.

The court assumed a s. 8 breach had occurred but applied the Grant factors and concluded that the breach was not at the most serious end of the scale, the impact on the applicant's rights was diminished by several factors, and society's interest in adjudicating the serious national security charges on their merits was exceptionally high.

The motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed.