Lynda Morgan

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

The Crown appealed a decision staying charges against the respondents under the Occupational Health and Safety Act due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found a 23-month delay and concluded the Crown failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay in a complex case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown's failure to secure a trial date in a timely manner and its problematic case management fell below the standard required by Jordan.