Bradley Juriansz

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

She argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting her defence that she did not understand the officer's instructions due to a language barrier.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions—that the appellant understood the instructions and feigned her inability to provide a sample—were supported by the evidence, including the in-car video recording.

The trial judge's reasons were found to be adequate and her credibility assessments were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 ml.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the roadside screening demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was not breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the six-minute delay for the roadside demand was justified, the 1 hour and 45-minute delay for the breath samples was reasonable, and the appellant had a fulsome opportunity to consult with duty counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to report under a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

At trial, the Crown relied on unauthenticated copies of the original Information and SOIRA order, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in admitting the documents, as they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were not the best evidence available.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden to the appellant to prove a reasonable excuse without first determining if the Crown had proven the mens rea of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At trial, the Crown relied on a toxicologist's report that assumed the appellant had not engaged in bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The trial judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to disprove bolus drinking and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual inferences regarding the absence of bolus drinking.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath test evidence after finding a s. 8 Charter breach, concluding the officer failed to properly consider the possibility of fresh mouth alcohol before administering an approved screening device.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the governing legal principles regarding reliance on ASD results and the obligation to delay testing.

There was no evidentiary basis requiring the officer to suspect fresh mouth alcohol or delay the test.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction substituted, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in an impaired driving prosecution where the trial judge found that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had rejected several indicia of impairment due to inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony and concluded that odour of alcohol and poor driving provided only suspicion warranting a roadside screening demand.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by effectively conducting a full trial-level assessment of whether indicia actually existed rather than assessing whether the arresting officer reasonably believed an offence had been committed at the time of arrest.

Evidence of dangerous swerving combined with a strong odour of alcohol provided an objective basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The arrest was lawful and the trial judge’s analysis improperly conflated the threshold for arrest with proof of impairment.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application because the arresting officer relied on an approved screening device (ASD) fail result after several error messages appeared.

The appellant submitted that the officer’s misunderstanding of the device’s error codes undermined reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent breath demand, contrary to ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the Crown was not required to prove the ASD was functioning perfectly, only that the officer reasonably believed it was working properly.

The trial judge’s credibility findings regarding the officer were entitled to deference and supported the conclusion that reasonable grounds existed.

The respondent was arrested for impaired driving and placed in a police cell under video surveillance.

She was videotaped using the toilet, which she argued violated her s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge agreed and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of a s. 8 breach, concluding that the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the use of the toilet.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the remedy, finding that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as this was a case of first instance and the breach was not egregious enough to justify the ultimate remedy.

The stay was set aside.