Nader Hasan

In a prosecution for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the search warrants for a residence and cell phones under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a motion to adduce extrinsic misconduct evidence, including rap lyrics and videos of firearms found on the accused's phones.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter motions, finding the ITOs sufficient and admitting the evidence despite technical breaches regarding the timing of Reports to Justice.

The court partially granted the Crown's motion, admitting the rap lyrics and firearm videos as highly probative of animus and means, while excluding certain photographs due to prejudicial effect.

The defendants sought costs following their largely successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs, arguing divided success.

The court found the defendants were entirely justified in bringing the motion and were entitled to costs.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $12,500, finding the amount fair, reasonable, and consistent with the parties' expectations.

The accused, charged with murder, was released on bail.

A mandatory publication ban under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing.

Following misleading public comments by politicians and the police chief, the accused brought an application to partially lift the publication ban on the bail reasons to counterbalance the misinformation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 517 does not permit partial bans, and while the court has common law jurisdiction to vary the ban, doing so would likely cause more harm than good.

The court held that the accused's fair trial rights would be adequately protected by existing safeguards, including the passage of time, challenge for cause, and jury instructions.

The defendant, charged with first-degree murder in the death of a plainclothes police officer who was struck by the defendant's vehicle in an underground parking garage, applied for bail.

The court assessed the strength of the Crown's case, finding the case for murder weak due to a lack of motive and the availability of a rational alternative inference that the defendant panicked, believing he was being attacked by strangers.

The court found a reasonably strong case for manslaughter based on criminal negligence.

Concluding that the defendant met his onus under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, the court granted bail on strict conditions, including house arrest, electronic monitoring, a driving prohibition, and a substantial surety pledge combined with an exceptional cash deposit.

In a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce lay opinion evidence from a restaurant owner who recognized the accused in poor-quality security footage of the shooting.

The defence opposed the admission, arguing the witness was not in a better position than the trier of fact and could not point to specific identifying features.

The court applied the Leaney test and ruled the evidence admissible, finding that the witness's long-standing acquaintance with the accused and his interactions with him at the restaurant shortly before the shooting put him in a better position than the court to make a comparison.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request to remove a boundary tree, the successful respondents sought costs.

The respondents had made an offer to settle prior to the hearing, which the applicants did not accept.

The court awarded the respondents costs on a partial indemnity scale up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The court found the respondents' counsel's hourly rates and staffing choices reasonable, fixing total costs at $77,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants sought an order authorizing the removal of a mature boundary tree shared with the respondents to facilitate a home extension.

The applicants argued the tree constituted a nuisance because its protection zone prevented their proposed construction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the tree did not interfere with the applicants' current use and enjoyment of their property, but only with their desired enhancement.

The applicants failed to demonstrate that the tree was a substantial and unreasonable interference or that there were no reasonable alternative designs for their renovation.