Jean L. MacFarland

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim that he was hired by the respondent municipality for a fixed three-year term as CAO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was hired only as an 'Acting CAO/Clerk' on a temporary basis, noting that the documentary evidence, the municipality's past practice, and the appellant's own inconsistent positions supported this conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent municipality.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment finding he failed to pay rent and that the landlord's distraint, which included changing the locks, did not constitute a forfeiture of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record and that changing the locks does not alone render an otherwise lawful distraint a forfeiture.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order that granted the respondent father generous access to their children, arguing that the father had attempted to kill her during a vacation in Jamaica.

The trial judge had found the mother's allegations not credible, relying heavily on hearsay evidence from a blood expert who testified at the father's Jamaican criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence without threshold reliability, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through uneven scrutiny of the evidence, and failed to properly assess the best interests of the children, particularly regarding domestic violence.

A new hearing on custody and access was ordered.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's action against the owner of an all-terrain vehicle.

The driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle on farm property but drove it on a highway, resulting in an accident that injured the plaintiff passenger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the owner was vicariously liable under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act because he consented to the driver's possession of the vehicle.

In doing so, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal explicitly overruled its prior decision in Newman v. Terdik, affirming that an owner who consents to possession remains vicariously liable even if the driver breaches a condition restricting the vehicle's operation.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a law firm and its partner, as well as the associated costs order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the respondents and that the respondents owed no duty of care to the appellants, who were non-clients and opponents in litigation.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in principle by awarding partial indemnity costs equal to the full amount of actual costs paid, and reduced the costs award by one third.

The appellant, a 21-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle accident.

He appealed his convictions and his four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her conclusion that the appellant's driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence for a youthful first offender, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant sought to recover funds allegedly stolen by a fraudster and then paid as restitution to an earlier victim, advancing tracing, knowing receipt, and unjust enrichment claims against an individual respondent.

The Court of Appeal majority held there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s exclusion of substantive hearsay statements from the fraudster, and no palpable and overriding error in the finding that a CAD$150,000 restitutionary payment was not traced on a balance of probabilities to the appellant’s funds.

As to a separate CAD$40,000 payment, the majority held that even assuming tracing into the corporate respondent’s account, there was no basis for imposing personal liability on the individual respondent because the corporate tax debt paid was not his personal liability at the time.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, over a dissent that would have allowed the claim for CAD$190,000.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision regarding the effective date of an automobile insurance policy cancellation.

The parties agreed that if the broker was negligent in cancelling the policy effective July 26, the appellant was bound.

The arbitrator preferred the insured's evidence that she wanted full coverage until she left, and found the broker negligent in telling the insurer to cancel coverage effective July 26.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator's finding was supported by the record.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's analysis that the claim was utterly unmeritorious and found no error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to each appearing respondent.

The plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident and underwent a vocational assessment.

The defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a further assessment by a vocational assessor of its choosing.

The motion judge granted the order, and the Divisional Court upheld it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act does not occupy the field, and the Superior Court retains inherent jurisdiction to order an assessment by someone who is not a 'health practitioner' to ensure fairness and justice between the parties.

The appellant was terminated for cause after making violent threats to fellow employees.

He appealed, arguing his conduct was influenced by a mental disability and his termination violated the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer was unaware of the disability at the time of termination and fired him solely for workplace violence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the termination for just cause was upheld.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that its claim for breach of contract was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claim was discoverable when the appellant received an arborist report detailing the respondent's substandard work.

Because the action was commenced more than two years after the receipt of the report, the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral reasons released on April 24, 2015, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

On consent of counsel, the Court added a declaration that the appellant is the sole surviving spouse of the deceased and is entitled to receive all surviving spouse pension benefits from the respondent benefit administrators corporation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from an incident outside a bar.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his police statements under the W.D. principles and in assessing witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, correctly rejected the appellant's inconsistent statements, and was entitled to accept the consistent evidence of the key witnesses identifying the appellant as the assailant.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the Board Chair's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Board failed to recognize a treatment impasse with the hospital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the high burden for a bias claim was not met despite some disrespectful comments by the Chair.

The Court also found no treatment impasse, noting the appellant's refusal to engage with the hospital treatment team.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's third reason for disbelieving the appellant—that he perjured himself at a PSA hearing—was unsupported by the trial record.

Because this error greatly affected the credibility assessment, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought to enforce a settlement agreement between a developer and a municipality regarding public access to a woodlot, relying on section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no legal obligation for the developer to permit access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant should have first sought relief from the Ontario Municipal Board, which has the expertise to interpret the settlement agreement and its own orders, rather than applying directly to the Superior Court.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search of the respondents' home, ruling that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked objectively reasonable grounds and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in weighing the first Grant factor.

Given the trial judge's finding of good faith by the police, the lack of objective grounds alone did not justify excluding the evidence.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant condominium corporations sought a declaration that they owned a clubhouse within their development and that a mortgage granted by the respondent developer was void or subordinate to their interests.

The developer had retained legal title to the clubhouse, but the disclosure statements provided for its future conveyance to the appellants once the developer no longer owned any lands in the project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the disclosure statements did not constitute an executory contract of purchase and sale.

Consequently, the appellants did not have an equitable interest in the clubhouse capable of registration under the Land Titles Act, and the developer was entitled to mortgage the property.