Jean L. MacFarland

The Crown and Ontario Provincial Police appealed a disclosure order requiring production of a drug recognition expert's rolling log.

The rolling log documented all drug evaluations conducted by the DRE from training through certification.

The respondent was charged with drug-impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge ordered disclosure of the rolling log, and the motion judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rolling log was "obviously relevant" material subject to first party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime, and that disclosure was permitted under the exception in section 258.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code even when anonymized.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision upholding a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The applicants argued that because a British Columbia court of coordinate jurisdiction had denied a similar sending order involving the same parties and investigation, the Ontario court should be bound by principles of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The motion judge dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and rejecting the res judicata and issue estoppel arguments on their merits.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated November 16, 2017.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2012 for criminal harassment and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The Board found the appellant remained a significant risk to public safety due to his psychotic disorder, active substance use disorder, lack of prosocial behaviour and motivation, and continued use of marijuana despite clinical advice against it.

The Board imposed a conditional discharge with detention order provisions.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Board erred in finding he constituted a significant threat and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by unanimous opinion of the treatment team.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 15-year-old cousin.

The Crown relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's section 276 application seeking to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity that could account for her pregnancy.

The trial judge, who took over after the application judge became unable to continue, held that he was bound by the application judge's ruling.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in refusing the cross-examination and that the trial judge erred in holding himself bound by the prior ruling.

The court ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four sexual offences involving his 16-year-old daughter.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents of fondling, corroborated by explicit messages sent immediately after the first incident and a photograph showing an inappropriate cuddle.

The appellant's primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's rejection of his girlfriend's alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) test and was entitled to reject the girlfriend's evidence in light of her friendship with the appellant, the opportunities he had to be alone with his daughter, and her role in photographing the inappropriate cuddle.

A 51-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

His collection was one of the largest and worst ever encountered by the Ottawa Police Service, containing over 28,000 unique images and 1,144 unique videos, with 95% depicting explicit sexual activity including children as young as one year old.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less one day followed by three years' probation, reasoning that probation would ensure the accused received counselling.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by giving primary effect to rehabilitation rather than denunciation and general deterrence, which are the paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of breaching a regulation under the Conservation Authorities Act.

At trial, they were sentenced to fines of $5,000 each and a two-year probation order requiring reconstruction of a seawall.

The Conservation Authority appealed to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, seeking removal of a home addition as a sentencing term.

The POAC judge allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, remitted the fines, and ordered removal of the addition.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing the POAC judge exceeded the scope of appellate review by reversing factual findings without identifying palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the POAC judge impermissibly substituted his own findings regarding whether the conduct constituted a flagrant and deliberate breach of the regulations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, as well as a stayed charge of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from the appellant's deliberate use of his vehicle to dislodge a person hanging from the passenger side door.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, his inferences regarding vehicle speed and the appellant's knowledge of running over the victim, or his rejection of necessity and self-defence arguments.

The court also upheld the sentencing decision regarding the driving suspension.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, cocaine, and drug proceeds, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant possessed a Browning semi-automatic handgun, cocaine, and a scale that were discovered in the snow outside a bedroom window after the appellant fled a police-surveilled apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have inferred that he personally placed these items outside, contending that others could have thrown them or that a young person who also fled could have dropped them.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding that the trial judge's inference was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's clothing capacity, his crouching action near the items, and the lack of opportunity for others to have disposed of them.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action.

The respondents were entirely successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

West Face Capital Inc. sought $250,000 in costs while Brandon Moyse sought $149,905.18.

The appellant argued for reduced costs amounts.

The Court of Appeal awarded West Face $200,000 and Moyse $100,000, both inclusive of disbursements and HST, considering the respondents' complete success, the nature of the appeal involving a large record and detailed factual re-litigation, and costs thrown away due to an unnecessary adjournment.

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

The appellant mortgaged a golf course property to the respondent for $2,700,000.

After the appellant defaulted on the mortgage, the respondent obtained a default judgment for foreclosure and took possession of the property.

The appellant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment and sought relief from forfeiture.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable prospect of payment, no evidence of ability to redeem, and no special circumstances warranting equitable intervention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, distinguishing the case from Winters v. Hunking on the basis that the appellant provided no appraisal evidence of property value or equity, the property was investment property rather than a family homestead, and the appellant's delay was inadequately explained.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing its action for delay and awarding costs to the respondents.

The action, commenced in 2005 for negligent engineering work on natural gas turbines, had been dormant since 2009 following a successful appeal of a summary judgment dismissal.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 24.01 to dismiss for delay and recover costs.

The appellant argued that Rule 48.14, which mandates automatic dismissal of actions five or more years old without trial, should have applied without costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and costs award, finding that Rule 24.01 and Rule 48.14 operate concurrently with no hierarchy between them, and that the court retained jurisdiction to award costs under Rule 24.01 despite Rule 48.14's silence on costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence and occupiers' liability claim arising from a fall down stairs at a restaurant.

The motion judge dismissed the original claim based on the condition of the stairs but permitted amendment to plead an alternative theory based on failure to advise of an accessible washroom on the main floor.

A second motion judge dismissed the amended claim, finding it did not constitute a new cause of action and was therefore statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but found the motion judge erred in his reasoning.

The amended claim did constitute a new cause of action based on a different duty of care and was properly barred by the Limitations Act as it was raised outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed a family court order relating to a motion to change child and spousal support obligations under Part III of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because appeals from family court decisions under Part III of the FLA must be brought to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed on jurisdictional grounds.

Appellant suffered a traumatic brain injury and severe back injury during a company-sponsored event while employed by respondent.

Appellant was unaware of the permanent and disabling nature of the brain injury until after resignation.

Appellant subsequently applied for long-term disability benefits under the employer's policy approximately five years after the injury occurred.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that coverage terminated upon cessation of active employment.

The trial court upheld the denial.

On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the policy language, when read as a whole, provides coverage for claims arising from incidents occurring during the currency of employment, regardless of when the claim is subsequently filed.

The court also granted relief from forfeiture for the late filing of proof of claim and addressed the applicability of contractual and statutory limitation periods.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking out their negligence claim against the Toronto Police Services Board without leave to amend.

The appellants alleged the police owed them a duty of care in investigating a crime affecting their family.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the precedent in Wellington v. Ontario established that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime and their families in relation to police investigations.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments that their case was distinguishable based on their lack of certain victim remedies or their assistance to police in the investigation.

The appellant, a member of a not-for-profit corporation, challenged a bylaw that rendered members involved in litigation with the Board ineligible for nomination, election, or appointment to the Board.

The appellant had unsuccessfully campaigned for election in 2013 and subsequently engaged in litigation with the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the application under section 253 of the Canada Not-For-Profit Corporations Act, finding that the Limitations Act, 2002 applied and that the application was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's procedural approach and determining that the application was properly time-barred.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing her action and denying her motion to set aside the dismissal.

The lower court judge dismissed the action for failure to file notice of appointment of counsel or intention to act in person within 30 days of an order removing her former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found the dismissal order deficient because it failed to include the required text of the applicable rules, the appellant had not been properly served with the motion, and no reasons were given for the draconian remedy.

The appeal court set aside both lower court orders and imposed a 14-day deadline for the appellant to file notice of appointment of counsel.