Janet M. Simmons

On a motion concerning appellate jurisdiction, the court held that paragraph one of an order dated June 20, 2025 was interlocutory and did not prevent the respondents from relying on prior findings made in related proceedings.

Because the order was interlocutory, the appeal could not proceed and was quashed.

The court awarded costs of the motion to the moving party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

On a motion panel review, the moving party sought to overturn a single-judge order dismissing his stay and ancillary requests.

The court held the moving party failed to show any error in the finding that the appeal lacked merit and therefore failed to establish entitlement to a stay.

The court also rejected additional relief requested before the panel for lack of legal entitlement and admissible supporting evidence.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $1,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on other firearm charges, and appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the jury to find constructive possession of the fentanyl and one firearm while having a reasonable doubt about the other.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a youthful first-time offender.

The sentence for the drug offence was reduced from 13 years to 10 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to quash a vehicle search warrant and denying leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the ITO relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip and speculative police surveillance, and was drafted with gross negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the surveillance evidence sufficiently corroborated the tip to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, and that the alleged drafting deficiencies did not amount to bad faith or warrant cross-examination.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion regarding a $2.5 million defamation counterclaim brought by her former employer.

The motion judge had found the counterclaim had the hallmarks of a SLAPP and there was no evidence of a causal link between the appellant's expression and the respondents' alleged harm, but allowed the counterclaim to proceed because dismissing it would not meaningfully reduce the scope of the factual inquiry at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Supreme Court's decision in Hansman, the weighing exercise must be tethered to the statutory text, which requires evidence of likely harm and causation.

The overlap between the claim and counterclaim was an impermissible consideration.

The counterclaim was dismissed, and the appellant was awarded $5,000 in statutory damages and costs.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The mother appealed parenting-time and child-support rulings from a family change motion after prior child-abduction findings.

The court upheld supervised parenting and child-support determinations, with only a minor variation to one paragraph of the order.

The court found the motion judge erred by treating oppression-based personal liability too narrowly and set aside dismissal of claims against the personal respondents.

It declined to grant summary judgment for the appellants due to pleading and evidentiary gaps.

The appellant challenged an order striking the statement of claim as vexatious and abusive under procedural rules.

The court rejected all grounds, including complaints about evidentiary use and refusal of leave to amend, and upheld dismissal.

After repeated non-compliance with production and undertaking orders, including a peremptory and then last-chance order, pleadings were struck.

The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s discretionary determination and upheld the sanctions.

The appellants challenged orders striking a defence and dismissing a related claim for disclosure non-compliance.

The court found the motion judge gave thorough reasons, exercised discretion within a case-managed context under rule 37.15, and committed no error warranting intervention.

The appeal was dismissed with substantial costs.

Following a joint trial, both appellants challenged convictions for possession of cocaine for trafficking and related proceeds offences, largely on factual grounds.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial findings.

Leave to appeal sentence for one appellant was granted but dismissed on the merits.

The appellant appealed a judgment awarding over one million dollars in damages to the respondents for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge discharged the jury after finding that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross-examine the plaintiff on a significant piece of evidence regarding fluid leaking from his ear, which was later introduced through expert witnesses.

The trial judge found the breach irreparably tainted the jury and proceeded with a bench trial, ultimately accepting the plaintiff's evidence and rejecting the defendant's malingering theory.

The Court of Appeal upheld all aspects of the trial judge's decision, including the finding of a Browne v. Dunn breach, the discharge of the jury, the qualification of a treating physician as an expert witness, and the damages award.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment following conviction on three counts of sexual assault.

The offences occurred in 1989 and involved the appellant's 17-year-old niece whom he had sponsored to come to Canada from the Philippines.

The appellant threatened not to sponsor the complainant's mother and siblings if she revealed the assaults.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's dementia was rejected as insufficient to warrant sentence reduction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and breach of probation, as well as his sentence of 30 months in custody less 7 months credit for presentence custody, followed by 18 months' probation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the circumstances did not warrant a conditional sentence and that the sentence fell within the applicable range.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 11 months in custody followed by two years' probation for fraud over $5,000, forgery, and impersonation to gain advantage.

The appellant had fraudulently represented herself as a registered practical nurse at five care homes over 14 months, administered medication to residents, and received remuneration for work she was not qualified to perform.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors, that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the extended period of fraudulent conduct, and that the custodial sentence was well within the appropriate range for such serious offences.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court found that the trial judge properly considered planning and deliberation as an aggravating factor without requiring a Gardiner analysis, as defence counsel at trial did not dispute the Crown's submission on this point.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by holding that the conditions of the appellant's incarceration while completing his conditional sentence were not relevant in assessing Duncan/Marshall credit.

However, the court concluded that this error did not affect the fitness of the sentence given significant aggravating factors.

The appellant also complained about the failure to implement a plea deal, but the record showed the Crown was not prepared to proceed with it and defence counsel did not pursue it at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 42 months imprisonment (less 6 months Downes credit and 12 days presentence custody credit) imposed for possession of 450 grams of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The appellant alleged the trial judge made various errors in principle rendering the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was entirely fit and the Downes credit fell within the broad range of discretion afforded to the trial judge.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.