Eleanore A. Cronk

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked and brutal aggravated assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit and failed to give proper effect to denunciation and deterrence.

The sentencing judge had effectively imposed a low penitentiary sentence after giving credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing the principle of rehabilitation to give the respondent one last chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion regarding the respondent's rehabilitative prospects and seeing no basis for appellate intervention.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found he posed a significant threat to public safety and denied him an absolute discharge.

The hospital and treatment team supported an absolute discharge, noting that while the appellant suffered from schizophrenia, he was not violent and could be managed under the civil mental health system.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, as it relied on speculative correlations between drug use, mental illness symptoms, and risk to the public, while ignoring the unique circumstances of the index offence and the appellant's lack of violent history.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing her application to set aside an arbitral award regarding spousal support.

The arbitrator had previously found the appellant entered into a relationship resembling marriage, terminating her support entitlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the application was an abuse of process attempting to relitigate issues already decided, raised no genuine issue for trial, and was commenced outside the 30-day time limit under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The parties entered into a separation agreement in 2005 to share the children's special expenses equally instead of following the Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant father defaulted in 2008 and sought to terminate his contractual obligations, claiming a material change in circumstances due to declining income and an inability to liquidate capital.

The application judge dismissed his request, finding the circumstances were foreseeable when the agreement was signed.

The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that foreseeability is central to the test for varying contractual child support obligations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assaults, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and assault simpliciter involving his three daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence, particularly regarding credibility, demeanour, the application of the W.(D.) principles, and the reliability of child witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided comprehensive reasons, properly applied the burden of proof, and made credibility and reliability findings that attracted deference.

The appellants guaranteed a loan made by the respondent to a retirement residence developer.

When the developer defaulted, the respondent sued the appellants on the guarantee and obtained summary judgment.

On appeal, the appellants argued they were released from liability because the loan terms were materially altered without their consent, specifically by converting the fixed-term loan to a demand loan and entering a forbearance agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence regarding material alterations and applied the incorrect test for prejudice.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter referred to trial on the defences of material alteration and laches.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for an assessment of his former solicitor's bills under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge found no 'special circumstances' to justify assessing the 12 paid bills, which were rendered over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that payment indicated acceptance of the accounts.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault involving a teenage complainant.

The trial judge found that the appellant had cultivated a relationship of trust with the vulnerable youth, provided drugs and gifts, and engaged in grooming behaviour culminating in sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence supported the finding that the appellant occupied a position of trust and that a deliberate course of grooming conduct could amount to an invitation to sexual touching for the purposes of the sexual exploitation offence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s credibility assessments and found no reversible error arising from the limited adverse inference relating to cross‑examination.

The convictions were affirmed.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions regarding the costs of the forfeiture hearing.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the forfeiture hearing fixed at $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The young person appealed a custodial sentence of 300 days followed by 14 months' probation for the sexual assault of a friend.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his trial testimony as an aggravating factor and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of empathy and remorse, as evidenced by text messages sent after the assault, rather than his trial testimony.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft of a dwelling house and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by declining to grant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that enhanced credit was warranted.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed her conviction on Highway Traffic Act charges.

Due to a misunderstanding with her paralegal, neither attended her trial, which proceeded ex parte.

A subsequent appeal hearing also proceeded in her absence, resulting in a resolution she claimed she did not consent to.

The Court of Appeal found that the apparent unfairness at trial was not cured by the appeal hearing and ordered a new trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for non-compliance with the Limitations Act, 2002.

She argued the respondent should be precluded from relying on the limitation period defence due to fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations intended to induce her to forebear from enforcing her rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that fraudulent concealment was not pleaded at trial and the record did not support a conscious plan to deceive.

Furthermore, any oral acknowledgments of the debt could not revive it, as the Act requires acknowledgments to be in writing.

The appellants appealed an order that stayed their motion, transferred the proceeding, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court also noted that the appeal should be quashed due to the appellants' persistent failure to pay outstanding costs orders from previous proceedings.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment awarding a 20-year employee 22 months' pay in lieu of notice.

The employer argued the motion judge was bound by stare decisis to follow a similar Superior Court decision that awarded 13 months.

The Court of Appeal rejected the stare decisis argument, noting Superior Court decisions are persuasive but not binding on other Superior Court judges.

However, the Court found the 22-month notice period excessive and reduced it to 18 months, less 11 weeks of working notice.

The motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the employer's unreasonable conduct on the motion.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed the dismissal of its application for a civil forfeiture order regarding a property used for a marijuana grow operation.

The application judge found that the property was an instrument of unlawful activity, but declined to order forfeiture under the 'clearly not in the interests of justice' exception in s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The judge found that during the respondent's criminal proceedings, the federal Crown made representations that led the respondent to reasonably believe his home would not be forfeited if he pled guilty.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant property owner appealed a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property, a 12-unit apartment building, was the site of extensive drug-related criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the owner was not a 'responsible owner' because he knew of the criminal activity and failed to take meaningful steps to prevent it.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to establish that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice, given that the unlawful activity permeated the entire building.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of a residential property under s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The property owner's son had used the property for a marijuana grow operation and drug trafficking.

The application judge dismissed the forfeiture, finding an unexplained six-year delay by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his findings on delay and by ignoring the lack of a limitation period under s. 8(5).

However, conducting a fresh analysis, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that forfeiture would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was not complicit, did not profit from the crimes, and had made significant efforts to help his son overcome his drug addiction.