Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellants appealed a motion judge's declaration that a condominium corporation is a homeowner for the purpose of the warranty provisions of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellants argued that the definitions of 'home' and 'owner' in section 1 of the Act do not apply to a condominium corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that section 15(a) of the Act clearly deems a condominium corporation to be the owner of the common elements for the purposes of the warranty provisions.

The appellant tenant appealed a ruling that a commercial lease and its right of first refusal were properly terminated by the respondent landlord.

The landlord had unconditionally accepted a third-party offer to purchase the leased premises without first notifying the tenant or allowing it to match the offer, and then purported to terminate the lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the landlord was obliged to inform the tenant of the offer and afford it an opportunity to match before unconditionally accepting the third-party offer.

The court ordered the landlord to enter into an agreement of purchase and sale with the tenant on the same terms.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's contempt findings and the associated costs award of $40,000 on a full indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt findings, noting they were supported by the evidentiary record and adverse credibility findings.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding costs, reducing the $40,000 award to $25,000, as the original amount exceeded the respondent's claimed costs and was disproportionate to the appellant's costs.

Other costs rulings were confirmed.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge granting summary judgment and awarding costs to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons for summary judgment or the costs award, noting the costs award was not unreasonable or erroneous in principle.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision regarding the appointment of an umpire for an insurance appraisal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The court was satisfied that the appointed umpire was appropriately qualified and found no evidence of bad faith.

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant, a court-appointed receiver, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to approve the full amount of legal fees requested on behalf of its counsel.

The motion judge had reduced the fees, finding them disproportionate to the size and complexity of the receivership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the court must ensure compensation is fair and reasonable, focusing on the value provided rather than just the mathematical calculation of hours multiplied by hourly rates.

The motion judge's assessment of the fees as excessive was upheld.

The appellants advanced funds to Cash Store, a payday lending company operating under CCAA protection.

They appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their claim that they were the sole legal and beneficial owners of loan payments and accounts receivable from Cash Store's customers.

The motion judge found that the actual practices of the parties, including the payment of interest and commingling of funds, reflected a debtor-creditor relationship rather than the principal-broker relationship set out in their agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual determinations.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a master's dismissal of a motion to add the respondent insurer as a named party defendant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge erred by determining a novel question of law without notice to the parties and before relevant facts were determined.

The Court also found the master erred in concluding the proposed claim was untenable at law, as the claim was novel and not clearly impossible to succeed.

The appellant was granted leave to amend the statement of claim.

The appellant mother appealed an order changing the primary residence of her children to the respondent father unless she relocated to Waterloo.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change in circumstances due to the mother's failure to relocate as contemplated in a prior settlement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the lower courts failed to conduct the required analysis of whether changing the children's primary residence was in their best interests.

The respondents in the underlying appeal brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the order appealed from was interlocutory.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the motion, which the court denied as unnecessary for the adjudication of the motion to quash.

The court found that the order in question, which denied an adjournment and set a date for a motion to strike, was clearly interlocutory.

As such, any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The motion was allowed and the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether a leasing company's insurer is protected by the $1 million liability cap under s. 267.12 of the Insurance Act for bodily injury or death arising from the use of a leased motor vehicle.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that s. 267.12 precludes a lessee from coverage under a lessor's insurance policy beyond the qualified $1 million cap.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant bean sprout producer sued a public health inspector for negligence and defamation following a salmonella outbreak investigation that led to a product recall.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the inspector was protected by statutory immunity under s. 95(1) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act and there was no evidence of bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the appellant failed to provide any evidence of bad faith, recklessness, or gross negligence to displace the statutory immunity.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and related offences arising from two incidents involving a former friend and business partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi evidence, which included a time-stamped store receipt, and misapprehended evidence regarding contradictions between his and his wife's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, her reasons for rejecting the alibi were adequate, and there was no misapprehension of evidence that played an essential part in the reasoning process.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his foster child.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including reversing the burden of proof, misapprehending evidence, improperly using out-of-court statements as corroboration, and failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) principles, correctly admitted prior consistent statements as narrative, and made credibility findings that were fully supported by the record.

Following a judgment awarding the respondents their costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity scale, the court reviewed the parties' written submissions.

The court fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $45,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant pled guilty to eight offences related to a large-scale ephedrine exportation business, including money laundering and tax evasion, and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence instead of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the custodial sentence was fit for a sophisticated, large-scale fraud enterprise.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 17 months and 14 days' custody, along with a forfeiture order for his van, cellular phone, and cash.

He appealed the sentence and the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding it fit given the appellant's record and the fact he was on bail for the same offence.

However, the Court set aside the forfeiture order, concluding the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the van, phone, or cash were offence-related property, as there was no evidence linking them to the commission of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.