David Watt

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that conditionally discharged him rather than granting an absolute discharge.

The appellant, who had been found NCRMD for assault offences, had recently been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder and his recovery remained unclear.

The Court of Appeal held that the board applied the proper test for significant risk of harm and that its decision was reasonable given the appellant's partial insight and the short time since his new diagnosis and treatment regime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a long-standing history of mental illness, was found NCRMD on a charge of assault with a weapon after chasing his neighbour with a pick axe.

At his initial hearing before the Ontario Review Board, the Board ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit.

The appellant appealed, arguing for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board did not give adequate consideration to whether a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition in the circumstances, and directed the Board to reconsider its decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by considering a bathroom video as similar fact evidence and by curtailing his testimony based on the collateral facts rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the excluded testimony was solely to impeach credibility and thus barred by the collateral facts rule.

The Court also held the video evidence was properly considered as circumstantial evidence of identity rather than prohibited bad character evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years for criminal negligence causing death and impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The offences resulted in the death of a five-month-old baby and serious injuries to the mother.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, noting the appellant's prior record for impaired driving and the severity of the consequences.

The appeal was dismissed, and the seven-year total sentence was upheld as fit and not offending the totality principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his mother, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to put forward the defence of intoxication, inadequately instructing on discreditable conduct, and failing to properly instruct on the requisite intent for murder and the elements of manslaughter.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation for an intoxication defence and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-year parole ineligibility period was fit for a brutal second degree murder in a domestic context.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual offences and internet luring involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by focusing on evidence relevant to the accused's subjective belief about the complainant's age, rather than the objective steps taken to confirm that belief.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from sexual activity with a complainant under the age of consent and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that, given the significant age difference, the complainant's youth, and the circumstances of the first meeting, a reasonable person would have taken significant steps to ascertain age, and the appellant took none.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the consecutive penitentiary sentences, including for possession of child pornography, were upheld under the totality principle.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her motor vehicle insurer for income replacement benefits.

She argued the trial judge erred by excluding the medical reports of her deceased family physician and by misinterpreting the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the reports under section 52(2) of the Evidence Act, as they lacked necessity and reliability and would prejudice the respondent.

The Court also affirmed that under sections 4(1) and 5 of the SABS, an insured must establish eligibility for income replacement benefits within the first 104 weeks after the accident to qualify for benefits beyond that period.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned ownership of a strip of land between riverfront lots and the Ottawa River, and whether the relevant subdivision plan extended the respondents' lots to the water's edge.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of latent ambiguity and confirmed that extrinsic evidence could properly be used to interpret the deed and plan under the governing property law framework.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly focused on the original subdividers' intention, made a palpable and overriding factual error, or relied on immaterial evidence.

On the cross-appeal respecting costs, the court held that most individual defendants were properly treated as nominal parties, but found that one individual was sufficiently involved in the litigation to justify a costs award against him personally.

The appellants appealed orders arising from a franchise rescission dispute under the Arthur Wishart Act, 2000.

The respondents had obtained partial summary judgment on rescission-related claims, and a Master fixed compensation under s. 6(6).

The appellants also sought to amend their pleading to assert equitable set-off, but the appeal court upheld the interpretation that any such amendment was confined to the still-outstanding s. 7 claims and could not reopen the already-adjudicated s. 6 claims.

The court further held that the Master's factual findings attracted deference and disclosed no misapprehension, error in principle, or palpable and overriding error.

The appeals were dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

On an application under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code, the court suspended the application of an absolute discharge granted to an NCRMD accused and substituted a conditional discharge pending appeal.

Post-disposition evidence showed renewed illicit drug use, medication non-compliance, missed psychiatric appointments, decompensation, and re-hospitalization under mental health legislation.

The court held that the applicant had shown compelling reasons to doubt the soundness of the absolute discharge and that the fresh evidence would be admissible on appeal.

Applying the s. 672.54 factors, the court found the accused again posed a significant threat to the safety of the public and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing its unjust enrichment claim for disgorgement of the respondents' profits.

The appellant argued that if a settlement agreement between the parties was found unenforceable under section 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, it should be entitled to disgorgement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's deprivation could not exceed damages calculated under section 8, which do not include disgorgement.

Furthermore, the regulatory scheme provided a valid juristic reason for the respondents' profits, precluding the unjust enrichment claim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery while armed with an offensive weapon and carrying a concealed weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of identification evidence from two witnesses due to pre-suggestion, and erred by not expressing his own opinion on the identification after viewing the surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly treated the witnesses' testimony as recognition evidence and was not required to supplement it with his own observations.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission of 20 months and imposed a sentence of 5 years plus time served.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge erred by not allowing further submissions before departing from the joint submission and by failing to give it significant weight.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred procedurally, but found the 5-year sentence fit, as the proposed 20-month sentence would have brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed two orders dismissing and adjourning its application for an interpretation of an Ontario Regulation regarding the 2008 remuneration of Justices of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proper mechanism to challenge the government's response to a remuneration commission's recommendation is through judicial review on a standard of rationality, not by seeking an interpretation of the implementing Regulation.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a domestic attempted murder shooting and sought leave to appeal a 22-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly admitted prior discreditable conduct, delivered an unfair jury charge, and wrongly answered a jury question on reasonable doubt.

Although the recharge on reasonable doubt contained error, the court applied the curative proviso because the Crown’s circumstantial case was overwhelming and the alternative suspect theory lacked evidentiary support.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence was held to fall within the applicable range for domestic attempted murder involving significant aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police found guns in a duffle bag at his mother's house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a recanting witness's videotaped statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, by improperly using his pre-trial silence to reject his testimony, and by entering multiple convictions for the same delict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the convictions, finding the hearsay statement met threshold reliability and the trial judge did not rely on pre-trial silence.

However, the court applied the Kienapple principle to enter conditional stays on several duplicate counts.

The moving parties (class action plaintiffs) brought a motion to quash appeals filed by the respondent objectors.

The court found that the appellants did not have a right of appeal under s. 30(3) of the Class Proceedings Act because they were not parties to the class proceeding.

Furthermore, they did not meet the requirements of s. 30(5) as they had not obtained leave to act as a representative party for an appeal from a judgment on common issues or an aggregate assessment.

The appeals were quashed and the motion to act as representative plaintiff was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony on the basis that he tailored his evidence to fit arguments raised during a voir dire regarding his police statement.

The Court of Appeal held that this reasoning improperly turned the appellant's statutory right to be present at his trial against him, undermining his right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him to a medium secure all-male unit at Brockville Mental Health Centre.

Brockville also appealed the disposition, arguing the Board failed to make sufficient inquiries about the suitability of the transfer given its waiting list.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the Board had sufficient information to make its disposition and properly considered the appellant's history, including the facts underlying a recent sexual assault acquittal, to determine the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.