Charles William Hourigan

The appellant was convicted of importing 830 grams of cocaine dissolved in two bottles of ginger wine that she carried on a flight from Jamaica to Toronto.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and credibility assessments and gave unsupportable reasons for rejecting her evidence.

The appellant claimed she was an innocent dupe unaware of the cocaine in the bottles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, made reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, and that the value and manner of the cocaine smuggling supported an inference that the appellant was a knowing participant rather than a blind courier.

An appeal and cross-appeal concerning a contractual dispute between two friends and their respective companies regarding an employment agreement.

The trial judge found that an oral employment agreement was reached in October 2003 between Mark Couper and Vitaquest International LLC, and that Vitaquest repudiated the agreement in early March 2005.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that Couper was entitled to damages equivalent to base pay for the period October 2003 to March 2005.

The respondent cross-appealed on the issue of whether he was entitled to a US$5 million payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appellant appealed from convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Drugs and cash were found in the appellant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant obtained in relation to alleged criminal activity by the appellant's former roommate.

The appellant claimed he did not know the drugs were in his apartment and that the cash came from legitimate sources.

The Court of Appeal rejected three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient basis for the search warrant, that she erred in assessing the appellant's credibility, and that her reasons for conviction were insufficient.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the conviction for possession of marihuana, as the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear that count as a summary conviction offence.

A client appealed a decision confirming an assessment officer's assessment of a lawyer's fees and disbursements at $125,602.83.

The lawyer had been retained under a contingency fee agreement that provided for hourly billing if the retainer was terminated.

After the solicitor-client relationship broke down, the client retained new counsel and later self-represented.

The client settled a claim against Food Basics for $30,000, with the settlement agreement providing that costs be paid directly to the lawyer.

The assessment officer rejected the client's argument that an undertaking limiting recovery to $50,000 applied, finding that the undertaking no longer governed once the client self-represented.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error and confirming the assessment officer's jurisdiction and reasoning.

The appellant, a unionized employee of Lakehead District School Board, sought long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which administered the benefits under contract with the school board, denied her claim.

The appellant commenced an action against Sun Life seeking a declaration of total disability and an order for payment of benefits.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the dispute arose from the interpretation and administration of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective agreement and that Sun Life, as a mere agent of the school board, lacked standing to be sued directly.

The appellant's remedy lay in arbitration against the school board.

The appellant, a debt collector, was laid off when the respondent lost its contract with Capital One.

The respondent subsequently received a $6.675 million settlement from Capital One.

The appellant brought a class action alleging the respondent breached employment contracts by failing to pay commissions on the settlement payment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the class action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the motion judge did not err in interpreting the Commission Agreement as requiring employees to exceed a "breakeven" financial target to earn commissions, which laid-off employees could not satisfy.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and upheld the use of summary judgment as an appropriate procedure.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant had signed a Voluntary Recognition Agreement on behalf of his company with the respondent union in 2008.

He subsequently challenged the validity of the agreement before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, claiming he lacked capacity due to health issues.

The OLRB upheld the agreement's validity, and the Divisional Court dismissed his judicial review application.

The appellant then commenced a Superior Court action seeking damages, alleging misrepresentations by the union.

The motion judge struck out the claim as an abuse of process, finding that the OLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the validity of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The moving party sought to review and set aside a chambers judge's decision denying its request for security for costs against the respondent.

The security was sought for the main action, the appeal, and the cross-appeal in the Divisional Court, in the aggregate amount of $485,316.23.

The chambers judge had refused the order based on delay in bringing the motion, the fact that trial costs had not been determined, the respondent's construction lien judgment in its favour, and the excessive amount claimed for appeal costs.

The appellate panel upheld the chambers judge's decision, finding that considerable deference was owed and that the chambers judge had properly applied the law and reasonably concluded that the justice of the case required refusal of the security order.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that advancements of funds from his father totalling $157,414 were gifts rather than loans.

The advancements were invested in the matrimonial home held in the appellant's name.

The characterization of these funds as gifts or loans directly affected the calculation of the appellant's net family property in the family law proceeding.

The trial judge found the advancements were gifts and therefore included in the appellant's net family property.

The appellant argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and erred in fact and law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no reversals of the burden of proof and no palpable and overriding errors in the evaluation of evidence.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their summary judgment motion on the basis that the respondent's action was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The respondent had commenced an action for dental work defects after initially pursuing a consensual resolution with the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the appellants refused the respondent's request for repairs at no cost, as the respondent had reasonably relied on the appellants' ameliorative efforts to resolve the dispute without litigation.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that reversed a Small Claims Court judgment finding wrongful termination.

The respondent employer terminated the appellant, a probationary employee, before completion of six months of employment without just cause.

The trial judge had disregarded the probationary clause in the employment contract, finding it was not properly communicated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's reversal, holding that the probationary term was valid and unambiguous, and that probationary employees may be terminated without notice during the probationary period if the employer makes a good faith determination of unsuitability, provided the employee was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to demonstrate suitability.

The appellant received statutory notice as required by the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for damages based on negligence, nuisance, and the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.

The trial judge found that the appellant had dumped thousands of truckloads of material on his rural property, improperly constructed a swale, and obstructed a culvert, all of which caused severe flooding to the respondent's neighbouring property over more than 12 years.

The trial judge awarded general damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $125,000, totaling $390,000.

The appellant challenged only the damages awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable error in the general damages award and rejecting arguments that the punitive damages were excessive or unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing a motor vehicle negligence claim.

The motion judge found that the appellant made a left-hand turn facing a yellow light in front of an oncoming truck driven by the respondent, who did not run a red light as alleged.

The motion judge concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the respondent's responsibility for the accident.

The appellant argued the motion judge reversed the evidentiary burden and erred in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge correctly applied the burden of proof and the appellant failed to meet the onus that shifted to her to demonstrate contributory negligence.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and Detective Constable Andrew MacPhail for wrongful arrest and negligent investigation.

The appellant had been charged with threatening death and intimidation in connection with threatening letters and harassing phone calls made to a school, but was ultimately acquitted at trial and required to enter into a Peace Bond.

The motion judge found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge the appellant, and therefore granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment test and that ample evidence supported the finding of reasonable and probable grounds.

A motion to re-open an appeal in a child protection matter involving a nine-year-old boy who had been in care for over six years.

The biological parents sought to re-open the Court of Appeal's dismissal of their appeal from a Crown wardship order made by the trial judge.

The parents had previously appealed to the Superior Court of Justice, which dismissed their appeal, and then to the Court of Appeal, which also dismissed their appeal on its merits.

The motion was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The parents were prohibited from bringing further motions without leave.

The plaintiff was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and claimed soft tissue damages, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression.

The defendant admitted liability, and the sole issue at trial was damages.

The trial judge qualified a defence psychiatrist as an expert despite serious reservations about his methodology and independence.

The expert's testimony focused primarily on alleged inconsistencies between what the plaintiff told him and her medical records, essentially attacking her credibility rather than providing independent psychiatric assessment.

The jury awarded only general damages of $23,500 and rejected all other heads of damages.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to properly discharge his gatekeeper duty by not conducting a cost-benefit analysis at the qualification stage and failed to exercise his ongoing gatekeeper function when the expert's lack of impartiality became apparent during testimony.

The appellants Collins and Newton were convicted of murder and attempted murder following a five-week trial before a judge and jury.

Collins was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder; Newton was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder.

Both appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal issues the jury had to decide, instead presenting evidence in a witness-by-witness format.

This error deprived the appellants of a fair trial.

The court rejected Newton's argument that his verdicts were unreasonable.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.