Charles William Hourigan

The applicant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery related to a series of carjackings and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

He brought a motion for leave to appeal his sentence and for bail pending appeal.

The Crown did not oppose leave to appeal but opposed bail.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal but dismissed the application for bail, finding the applicant failed to demonstrate that his appeal had sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship if he remained detained.

Following a successful appeal against the respondent Samir Chhina, the self-represented appellants sought costs of $35,000 for the appeal and the motion below.

The respondent argued the appellants failed to establish they had forgone remunerative activity to justify a fee allowance.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants did not meet their evidentiary onus but awarded a lump sum of $10,000 all-inclusive for costs of the motion and the appeal.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The respondent had discharged the firearm during a shootout in a public parking lot.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by prioritizing rehabilitation over denunciation and deterrence, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

However, the majority dismissed the appeal and declined to incarcerate the respondent, citing his significant rehabilitative progress and the time already served under the conditional sentence.

The appellant estate appealed the dismissal of an application to rectify a will that lacked a residue clause.

The testator and her life partner had wills drafted by the same lawyer, but the testator's will omitted a residue clause, resulting in the residue passing on intestacy to her brother.

The application judge found that while the omission was an error, the evidence of the testator's intention was not so strong that no other contrary intention could be supposed, particularly given the lack of evidence from the drafting solicitor.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over parts of the respondents' neighbouring cottage property, which he had historically used to access Lake Erie.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's use of the lands was with tacit permission as an act of good neighbourliness, rather than acquiescence, and that the easement was not reasonably necessary given alternative access routes.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the adverse possession claim, as the appellant failed to establish an intention to exclude the true owners.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondents $605,000 in damages for the anticipatory breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in accepting the respondents' expert appraisal of the property's value and in not sending the matter to trial due to competing expert opinions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's preference for the respondents' expert, who followed accepted methodologies, nor in the determination that the respondents reasonably mitigated their damages by purchasing a comparable property on the assessment date.

The appellant, a former client of the respondent lawyer, posted unflattering comments about him on an online platform.

The respondent sued for defamation and other torts.

The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the action, arguing her comments were a matter of public interest and that the action was statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the comments related to a private dispute and did not constitute a broadcast.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the contextual inquiry showed no public aspect to the communication and that the appellant failed to prove the platform was a broadcast.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims for repayment of alleged loans and instead awarded the respondents unpaid wages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The trial judge found that the appellants had 'banked' the respondents' earnings and that the individual appellant acted as a common employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the banked wages or the common employer doctrine.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages and costs awards, noting the appellant's harsh, offensive, and reprehensible conduct.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal in 2020.

After exhausting all appeals up to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking Charter declarations and reinstatement of his license.

The motion judge dismissed the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the revocation decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant could not use section 24(1) of the Charter to seek a fresh hearing after exhausting statutory remedies, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including robbery with a firearm, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's DNA on a pry bar left at the scene and his subsequent arrest in a stolen vehicle containing items taken during the robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence, failed to consider alternative explanations for the DNA evidence, and erred in finding a real firearm was used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence was reasonable and the alternative explanations were speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a mortgage brokerage and a lawyer under Rule 21.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the brokerage, finding no factual connection pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the lawyer, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the lawyer immune from liability for allegedly participating in a fraud while acting on client instructions, and erred in concluding the claim was barred by res judicata without sufficient evidence that the same cause of action was previously argued.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for acting as the getaway driver in a premeditated murder-for-hire plot.

He was sentenced to nine and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was aware the shooter had a gun and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury's verdict.

The sentence was held to be fit given the appellant's significant moral culpability and the premeditated nature of the offence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting a screenshot of a text message exchange without independent authentication and by failing to give adequate limiting instructions to the jury regarding its reliability.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to Gladue and Morris factors relating to his Black and Indigenous ancestry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the complainant's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the screenshot and the jury instructions were adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in weighing the mitigating factors against the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his conviction and sentence appeal for firearm offences, including pointing a firearm, assault with a weapon, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, stemming from a drive-by shooting.

Despite the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal denied the application.

The court found the appeal grounds, particularly regarding the sentence, to be weak and determined that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest, given the serious nature of the gun violence and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought bail pending his conviction appeal.

The Crown opposed the application based on the public interest criterion.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, requiring the applicant to show the appeal is not frivolous, they will surrender, and detention is not necessary in the public interest.

While the surrender criterion was met, the court found the grounds of appeal weak, particularly the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Considering the gravity of the first-degree murder offence, its heinous circumstances (murder-for-hire), and the applicant's dangerousness, the court concluded that the reviewability interest did not outweigh the enforceability interest, and public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by release.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The applicant, C.G., sought release on bail pending his conviction appeal for two counts of sexual assault, for which he is serving a six-year custodial sentence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court applied the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code, requiring the applicant to establish that the appeal is not frivolous, he will surrender into custody, and his detention is not necessary in the public interest.

While the "not frivolous" threshold was met, the applicant failed to satisfy the court that he would surrender, given his history of non-compliance with immigration orders and the increased incentive to abscond due to potential removal from Canada and the lengthy sentence.

Furthermore, the court found that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest, concluding that the enforceability of the judgment outweighed reviewability due to the gravity of the sexual offence, the breach of trust involved, and the perceived weakness of the appeal grounds.

Consequently, the motion for release on bail was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a dispute over indemnification and escrow provisions in an asset purchase agreement, specifically whether an amendment to a Notice of Application was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision that the amendment was not statute-barred, despite an error in the application of s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, as it did not introduce a new cause of action or remedy.

The court also upheld the interpretation of the Escrow Agreement regarding notice delivery, finding that registered mail was not a valid method of delivery.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.