COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Hourigan, Wilson and Madsen JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Shawn Hamilton
Plaintiff (Respondent)
and
Joanne Vaughan AKA "J Vaughan", "Jo Jo Vaughan", "Dr. Vaughan", "Vaughan Joanne BSW"
Defendant (Appellant)
Joanne Vaughan, acting in person
Christopher D. Salazar, for the respondent
Heard: February 6, 2025
On appeal from the order of Justice Julie Richard of the Superior Court of Justice, dated January 13, 2023.1
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
1The appellant is a former client of the respondent, a lawyer. The solicitor-client relationship deteriorated, and ultimately the respondent sued the appellant in libel and slander. The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the respondent's claim. The motion judge's order dismissing the motion is the subject of this appeal.
2For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.
Background
3In 2018, the appellant made comments about the respondent on an online platform called "Justanswers.com". The comments involve an exchange between Ms. Vaughan and a person identified as "Debra, Lawyer" wherein the appellant shares details about her legal issues, names the respondent, and shares an unflattering opinion about him. The respondent discovered these comments and commenced an action against the appellant seeking damages for libel, slander, intentional interference with economic relations, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of mental distress.
4The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the "CJA") seeking the dismissal of the action. She also sought an order dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute barred by the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12 (the "LSA").
5On the limitations issue, the motion judge found that the LSA imposes two limitation periods: s. 5(1) requires notice to be given within six weeks of discovery if the comments were made in a newspaper or in a broadcast and s. 6 requires an action to be commenced within three months for comments in a newspaper or a broadcast. The appellant's comments were not published in a newspaper, so she had to establish that the comment constituted a "broadcast" to trigger ss. 5(1) and 6 of the LSA. The motion judge rejected the appellant's submission that her comments constituted a "broadcast". Relying on Levant v. Day, 2019 ONCA 244, the motion judge held that the comments were not a broadcast because the appellant had failed to present any evidence regarding the platform where she made the comments nor did she advance any policy reasons for justifying an extension of the word "broadcast". Therefore, the action was not statute barred by the LSA.
6On the anti-SLAPP motion, the motion judge found that the appellant failed on the first step of the anti-SLAPP test, which required her to establish that her comments related to a matter of public interest. Relying on Veneruzzo v. Storey, 2018 ONCA 688, at para. 24, the motion judge held that whether an expression is a matter of public interest requires a contextual inquiry that examines what the impugned communication is about. The motion judge did not accept the appellant's submission that while the comments were meant to be private, they were a matter of public interest because the comments promote access to justice by allowing legal advice to be obtained for free for self-represented litigants. Instead, she found that the comments were about a legal question relating to the appellant's personal legal issues, which was a private dispute. Therefore, the appellant did not discharge her onus of proving that the comments related to a matter of public interest and the respondent's action was allowed to proceed.
7The motion judge relied on s. 137.1(8) of the CJA to impose costs. Based on Levant, at para. 29, she held that since the appellant brought her motion approximately three and a half years after the action was commenced, imposing costs was warranted given the significant delay. Further, she found that costs were appropriate because the appellant's claim of public interest was meritless. Ultimately, the motion judge ordered the appellant to pay partial indemnity costs of $10,300.
Analysis
8The appellant submits that the motion judge erred by failing to give the concept of "public interest" a broad and liberal interpretation, by misapprehending the nature of the appellant's expressions, by misconstruing the appellant's submissions on the motion regarding the nature of the public interest engaged in the expressions, in disregarding the respondent's pleaded meaning of the expressions, and in making a qualitative assessment of the expression in determining whether it was on a matter of public interest. We disagree.
9The motion judge properly conducted a contextual inquiry that focused on what the impugned communication was about, as she was required to do pursuant to this court's direction in Veneruzzo. It is clear that the specific communication complained of related to the appellant's personal legal issues, which was a private dispute. There was no public aspect to that communication.
10The appellant further submits that the motion judge erred in finding that the action was not statute barred or otherwise prohibited pursuant to ss. 5(1) and 6 of the LSA. There is no merit in this submission. The motion judge correctly found that the comments were not a broadcast. The appellant had the onus to establish that the platform utilized constituted a broadcast and she failed to lead evidence to support that position.
11Finally, the appellant submits that the motion judge erred in her costs award. We see no basis to grant leave to appeal or interfere with the costs awarded. This court has made clear that tactical anti-SLAPP motions should be discouraged through costs awards.
Disposition
12The appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall pay the respondent his costs of the appeal fixed in the all-inclusive sum of $7,000.
"C.W. Hourigan J.A."
"D.A. Wilson J.A."
"L. Madsen J.A."