Charles William Hourigan

The appellant, convicted of kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, brought an application for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The court found that the appellant advanced arguable grounds of appeal, lacked the capability to effectively argue them without assistance, and demonstrated a lack of financial means to retain counsel privately.

The application for government-funded counsel was granted.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his convictions and sentence for dredging and filling shore lands without a work permit under the Public Lands Act.

He had been fined $3,000 for each conviction, placed on probation, and made subject to a rehabilitation order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal had no merit and did not meet the high threshold of raising a question of law essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal in the agreed upon, all-inclusive amount of $15,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking methadone after a fellow resident at a transition home fatally overdosed on methadone supplied by the appellant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and misapprehended DNA expert evidence regarding the transfer of the deceased's DNA to the appellant's methadone bottle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Jordan framework, properly excluded verdict deliberation time, and reasonably concluded that a mistaken trial estimate constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The Court also found no misapprehension of the expert evidence, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial decision determining the terminus of a lot line between two waterfront properties on a controlled lake.

The trial judge found that the term 'High Water Mark' on the registered plan unambiguously referred to the Normal Controlled High Water Level.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the term created a latent ambiguity and that the original subdivider intended to convey all the land it owned, which extended to the water's edge at the time of the 1902 Crown patent.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to determine the water's edge at the time of the Crown patent and the effects of any subsequent erosion or accretion.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms trafficking after his pre-trial application to exclude historical text messages obtained via a production order was dismissed.

On appeal, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea and argued that the production order provision was unconstitutional because it lacked an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that investigative necessity is not a constitutional requirement for wiretaps or production orders, and that the distinction between historical and prospective text message searches is not arbitrary.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant's land was expropriated by the respondent municipality.

After years of delay and litigation, the appellant rejected a settlement offer of $1.2 million.

The Ontario Municipal Board ultimately awarded compensation of $710,000 and ordered costs against the appellant from the date of the settlement offer.

The appellant appealed, arguing that 'amount offered' under s. 32 of the Expropriations Act refers only to the initial statutory offer under s. 25, and that costs cannot be awarded against an expropriated party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 32 encompasses subsequent offers and that the Board retains discretion to award costs against a claimant to encourage settlement and sanction unreasonable conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its application for summary judgment for possession and sale of the respondent wife's property.

The respondents had guaranteed the indebtedness of a corporation to the appellant, with the wife granting a mortgage on her property as collateral.

The motion judge found the mortgage unenforceable due to presumed undue influence by the husband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the nature of the transaction and the wife's significant interest in the corporation.

The Court held that even if the presumption arose, the appellant took sufficient steps to ensure the wife entered the transaction freely, and the presumption was rebutted by the wife's own evidence.

The appellant, a consultant who submitted a bid for a government standing offer, was investigated and charged with bid-rigging after a government contract manager reported similarities between his bid and another.

The charges were later stayed.

The appellant sued the government and the contract manager for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, seeking $2,000,000 in damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the government's answers to bidders were accurate and not misleading, and that the contract manager's statements to investigators were protected by qualified privilege without malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Bank appealed a summary judgment finding it negligently breached its contract with the respondents regarding a Canada Small Business Financing Loan and a HELOC.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motions judge erred by treating all respondents as one entity when the loan agreement was only with the corporate respondent, 1633092 Ontario Ltd. The Court varied the judgment to reflect that the Bank only breached its contract with the corporate respondent.

The Court dismissed the Bank's request for immediate judgment on the HELOC, referring the issue of set-off and the respondents' counterclaims to trial due to the pitfalls of partial summary judgment.

The appellant, a litigation financer, appealed a motion judge's order granting priority over settlement funds to the respondent, the debtor's former partner.

The debtor had signed a separation agreement promising to pay the respondent from any settlement, and later signed irrevocable directions assigning the settlement funds to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the separation agreement did not constitute a valid equitable assignment because it lacked a clear intention to assign the specific funds, whereas the irrevocable directions did.

The appellant was granted priority over the funds.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its motion to enforce a share purchase agreement.

The parties negotiated a $100,000 purchase price for shares, and the respondent sent an unexecuted share purchase agreement to the appellant.

The appellant executed it, but the respondent did not.

The motion judge found that the agreement contained an enurement provision requiring execution by both parties to be effective, meaning there was no intention to contract until formal execution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the parties intended to defer their obligations until a formal contract was executed.

The appellant, a secured creditor of a bankrupt renewable energy company, appealed the dismissal of its action against the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO).

The appellant argued that the IESO wrongfully treated a renewable energy contract as terminated upon the debtor's bankruptcy, thwarting the appellant's attempt to assign the contract to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the contract automatically terminated upon bankruptcy, that this termination did not violate the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act stay of proceedings or the common law anti-deprivation rule, and that the IESO did not breach its contractual obligations or act negligently.

Following an appeal where the appellant had mixed success on a summary judgment motion and was unsuccessful on a contempt motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court reduced the costs awarded to the respondents on the summary judgment motion from $35,000 to $10,000 due to the appellant's partial success.

The court also awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $3,500 for the contempt appeal and $1,500 for the summary judgment appeal.

The appellant, a university student who had been banned from campus, initiated over 20 separate legal proceedings against the university, student council, and others.

The application judge declared him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed the judgments but failed to identify any errors in the application judge's analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellant is a vexatious litigant.

The appellant mother sought continued access to her two-year-old child who was placed in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

The trial judge granted access at the society's discretion, applying a broad best interests analysis under the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The appeal judge overturned this decision, applying the restrictive test from the predecessor legislation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal and restored the trial judge's order, holding that the CYFSA fundamentally changed the access test to a holistic best interests analysis, which properly includes consideration of future benefits such as access to medical information.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.