Bradley W. Miller

The appellants were successful on appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs following the appeal.

Counsel for the respondent agreed that the appellants' claimed costs of $18,686.25, comprising $17,132.50 in fees on the partial indemnity scale and $1,553.75 in disbursements, were reasonable.

The court ordered that amount in costs, inclusive of HST, be paid by the respondent to the appellants.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a notice of default and dismissed her action against the Crown on the grounds of abuse of process and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant's action alleged that Ministry of the Attorney General employees misconducted themselves in relation to proceedings before the Landlord Tenant Board, Divisional Court, and Superior Court of Justice that had been decided adversely against her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the action constituted an abuse of process as it represented an attempt to question the legitimacy of unfavourable proceedings, and that the appellant failed to plead the necessary elements of malice or intent to injure for the tort of misfeasance in public office.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making a Crown wardship order with no access by either parent.

The child was apprehended at eight weeks old along with three older siblings due to expressed fears of violence by the appellant's then partner.

The child had been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents for approximately four years at the time of appeal.

The appellants sought to challenge the Crown wardship order and the no-access provision.

The appellants effectively abandoned the Crown wardship challenge and focused on the access issue.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence including a CAS worker's affidavit and video recordings of access visits, but also admitted an affidavit from Dr. Kathy Keefe regarding open adoption, though with reservations about its foundation and timing.

The Court upheld the no-access order, finding that the appellants failed to meet the statutory test requiring that the relationship be meaningful and beneficial to the child and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision in a family law matter concerning income imputation and asset division.

The trial judge found the respondent was unemployed and effectively unemployable based on medical evidence and refused to impute income.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's curtailment of cross-examination on the respondent's medical condition and the refusal to grant an adjournment for additional witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding no error in enforcing time limits, refusing the adjournment without reasonable explanation for late witness summoning, and finding that family assets were divided equally with the appellant purchasing Syrian properties from equalization proceeds.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was not required to provide a justification for requesting examinations under oath of statutory accident benefits claimants.

The application judge had found that section 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule required insurers to provide a specific justification or reason for requesting such examinations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 33(4)3 does not require an insurer to provide a justification for its request that an applicant attend an examination under oath.

A general statement of the purpose of the examination that gives the applicant notice of the general type of questions that will be asked is sufficient.

The appellant was convicted of importing marijuana into Canada following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's exculpatory statement to police was deliberately concocted.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by making a finding of concoction based solely on evidence that proved the statement false, without independent evidence of fabrication as required by R. v. O'Connor.

Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction on other grounds, the error in law regarding the treatment of the exculpatory statement warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purposes of trafficking following a search of his apartment conducted pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge quashed the warrant on the narrow basis that the affiant failed to justify the use of the telewarrant procedure, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on cross-examination of the affiant, the finding of reasonable and probable grounds, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and refused leave to appeal sentence.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's order extending the stay period, approving the Monitor's report, declaring the litigation trustee was not in a conflict of interest, and staying litigation against the appellants.

The appellants challenged the extension of the stay, the appointment of the litigation trustee, and alleged bad faith by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave to appeal application, finding the proposed appeal failed to meet the test for leave and that the CCAA judge's decision was well-reasoned and entitled to deference.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 31, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed.

An addendum was issued after the reasons were prepared and signed, noting that counsel for the appellant subsequently provided the reasons for a ruling of July 31, 2014, which stayed the criminal harassment charge.

The trial judge's reasons, which detailed the evidence including the effect on the victim and the appellant's assessment under the Mental Health Act, were acknowledged by counsel to undermine many of the arguments made during the appeal, though the court found these reasons did not change the basis for dismissing the appeal.

An appeal against an Ontario Review Board disposition denying expanded privileges and absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on a charge of criminal harassment.

The appellant argued the Board failed to conduct a separate and specific analysis of whether his conduct would constitute a serious criminal offence with real risk of physical or psychological harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons demonstrated proper consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the risk to the community.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining a detention order for his care.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The Board accepted a joint submission from the appellant's counsel and physician to continue detention with increased community passes.

The appellant argued the Board erred in accepting the joint submission without properly discharging its inquisitorial duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board was entitled to rely on the joint submission and had conducted its own inquiry concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from injuries sustained by his cellmate at a correctional facility.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding footwear impressions on the victim's face, the jury charge regarding inconsistencies in the appellant's statements, and the trial judge's response to a jury question on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The respondents, a corporation and four individual shareholders, sued the Crown for damages arising from two theories of liability: forced incorporation and failure to enforce.

Under the forced incorporation theory, the respondents alleged that Crown misconduct forced them to incorporate their partnership, resulting in tax liability they would have avoided as Indians under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Under the failure to enforce theory, they alleged the Crown failed to properly implement an anti-smuggling initiative, causing them to compete unfairly against unlicensed contraband manufacturers.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to strike the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the forced incorporation appeal, allowing it to proceed to trial, but allowed the failure to enforce appeal in part by striking the fiduciary duty claims while permitting the negligence and misfeasance claims to proceed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The appellant was arrested during a traffic stop on Highway 401 when police discovered cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that the drugs belonged to another passenger and convicted him based on circumstantial evidence and credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, misapprehension of evidence, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking following a search of his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant did not specify a date for execution but authorized entry "at any time." The appellant appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to specify an execution date, rendering the search a violation of Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the warrant did not expressly state an execution date, an execution date could be implied from the date of issuance.

The court rejected the appellant's characterization of the warrant as expressly non-expiring and held that the absence of an express date was a technical fault that did not invalidate the warrant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave under Rule 39.02(2) to rely on a late expert engineering report in response to a pending summary judgment motion brought by the defendant property owners.

The defendants opposed the admission of the report, arguing it was produced after cross-examinations were completed and years after the incident.

The court granted leave, finding the report relevant, responsive to issues raised in cross-examination, and that its admission would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $5,000 in costs on a set-off basis for costs thrown away.

The applicant sought review of a detention order denying judicial interim release pending extradition proceedings to the United States for unauthorized use of a computer.

The applicant argued the application judge erred in principle and that material changes in circumstances warranted variation of the order.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors in the application judge's analysis of flight risk, public protection, and public confidence grounds.

The court rejected the argument that fresh evidence regarding the charges constituted a material change in circumstances.

The application was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the serious nature of cybercrime and the applicant's significant flight risk.

Appellants purchased a franchise from the respondent and sought rescission under section 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 on the basis that no proper disclosure document was provided.

The motion judge found the disclosure deficient but held that the appellants received sufficient information to make an informed decision and that deficiencies were not significant or misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that material deficiencies in the disclosure document—specifically the absence of two required director signatures and failure to provide current audited financial statements—rendered the purported disclosure document invalid under the Act and Regulation.

The appellants were entitled to rescission under section 6(2).

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm on two grounds: (1) whether his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and (2) whether the trial judge's finding that the gun used in the robbery was a firearm was unreasonable.

The appeal was heard after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which fundamentally changed the approach to s. 11(b) claims by establishing a presumptive 30-month ceiling for trial completion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.