Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, using an imitation firearm in committing an offence, threatening to cause bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon arising from an altercation in a secondary school washroom.

The trial judge convicted based on the complainant's evidence, which was contradicted by the appellant and co-accused.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: uneven scrutiny in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and misapprehension of evidence based on impermissible speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge applied consistent standards and that the conclusions drawn were reasonable inferences from the evidence as a whole.

The appellant sought an order releasing audio recordings of portions of his trial that were held in camera and subject to a sealing order, as well as any exhibits filed during the in camera proceedings.

The in camera proceedings related to a pre-trial application.

The appellant had appealed his conviction and sentence, and the correctness of the trial judge's decision on the pre-trial application was at issue on the appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found it was in the interests of justice to order production of the audio recordings and exhibits, as counsel required access to these materials to assess the viability of the ground of appeal and to pursue it if viable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge found that the complainant, by virtue of her intoxication, lacked the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in issue.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable and based on misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the complainant's lack of capacity to consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions under sections 7(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for operating a marijuana grow-operation in his rental apartment unit.

The appellant challenged the convictions on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The trial judge had found that the appellant maintained control of the unit and had knowledge of the grow-operation based on his tenancy, exclusive access, rent payment, and personal documents found in the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding all findings of fact were open to the trial judge and that no other rational conclusion was available on the evidence.

A parent sought accommodation from a school board to receive advance notice of classroom instruction on topics he considered "false teachings" based on his sincere Christian and Greek Orthodox beliefs, including matters related to sexual orientation, gender identity, and moral relativism.

The parent requested the ability to withdraw his children from such classes.

The school board refused, citing its statutory mandate to provide an inclusive and non-discriminatory educational environment.

The application judge found that while the board's refusal engaged the parent's freedom of religion, it was reasonable and proportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parent failed to establish any objective interference with his religious freedom, as he provided no evidence of actual harm to his children despite years of attendance at the school.

On appeal from a trial judgment, the appellant House challenged the trial judge's findings regarding municipal liability for winter road maintenance, apportionment of fault, and the discount rate applied to damages.

The trial judge found that the Township of Wilmot was not liable for the accident despite unanticipated ice formation on Huron Road, as the municipality met its statutory defences under the Municipal Act.

The trial judge apportioned fault equally (50/50) between House as driver and Baird as vehicle owner, whose defective tires contributed to the loss of control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed House's appeal on all three issues and also dismissed Baird's cross-appeal regarding costs.

The appellant appealed her sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

She had been sentenced to 12 months' custody plus 10 months' probation based on the mandatory one-year minimum sentence under section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

However, the sentencing judge expressed regret at being required to impose the mandatory minimum.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the mandatory minimum as unconstitutional in R. v. Lloyd.

The Crown consented to the appeal, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case for resentencing.

Two co-accused appealed their sentences imposed following guilty pleas to breaking and entering and convictions on firearm and drug offences.

The appellants argued the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the offence as a home invasion and imposed sentences that were too high and violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentences, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to find the appellants were reckless as to whether anyone was home, and that the sentences were fit given the aggravating factors including the use of a firearm, criminal records, breach of court orders, premeditation, and proximity to schools.

The court allowed Mr. Fourtounes' appeal only to award additional pre-trial custody credit of 227 days.

The respondent, a flooring contractor, was hired by the appellant general contractor to install sheet vinyl flooring at a long-term care facility.

When the respondent identified deficiencies in the sub-floor structure that prevented proper installation, the appellant refused to remedy the defects and instead directed the respondent to attempt a temporary fix.

After the temporary fix failed and the project architect required the flooring to be removed and replaced, the respondent refused to continue without payment for previous work and relief from warranty obligations.

The appellant hired another contractor to complete the work and counterclaimed for abandonment.

The trial judge found the respondent unable to perform due to sub-floor defects that were the appellant's responsibility to remedy, awarded damages for breach of contract, and dismissed the counterclaim.

The appellant appealed, and the respondent cross-appealed on damages assessment.

An appeal from a motion judge's order approving a $12.5 million settlement for a minor who suffered a severe brain injury in a high school rugby match.

The motion judge approved the overall settlement but reallocated funds to ensure adequate provision for the plaintiff's future care costs and reduced the solicitor's contingency fees from 30% to 20%, disallowing an additional $339,000.

The appellants challenged both the reallocation of funds and the fee reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding the allocation of funds for future care or the reduction of solicitor's fees.

An appeal from a motion judge's decision certifying a class action and granting partial summary judgment against an anaesthesiologist in a bacterial infection outbreak case.

The motion judge certified the class proceeding and found the defendant breached his duty of care regarding infection prevention and control practices.

The appellate court allowed the appeal on procedural fairness grounds, finding that the motion judge reformulated the certified common issue without notice to or submissions from the parties, and then decided the summary judgment motion on the basis of this new formulation.

The court held that this violated procedural fairness and entitled the defendant to a new hearing.

The applicant sought to review an order of a chambers judge dismissing his motion to extend the time to appeal three judgments: a default judgment against one defendant, a judgment dismissing his action against two institutional defendants arising from a jury verdict, and a costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension of time for the default judgment, finding no grounds of appeal were articulated and finality concerns favored denial.

The Court also confirmed that the appeal of the judgment dismissing the action and the incidental costs award lay to the Divisional Court based on the quantum of the jury's assessment of damages.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.

Appellants sued their former solicitors for negligence and lost opportunity damages, claiming the solicitors failed to raise a six-year limitation period in the underlying action against Mitsubishi Motors, which was dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the misrepresentation component of the damages claim, finding the appellants had not appealed the trial judge's obiter finding of no misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an appeal is from a judgment, not from reasons, and that the appellants' appeal of the entire judgment necessarily included misrepresentation claims.

The court also held that partial summary judgment was inappropriate as the misrepresentation claims were intertwined with other claims proceeding to trial.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissal of their action against a construction management company for alleged overpayments and damages under a penalty clause for construction delays.

The motion judge had rejected the overpayment claim and found the penalty clause did not apply to a feature wall.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's credibility assessment of the appellant was impaired by serious misapprehensions of evidence, including confusing testimony between witnesses and erroneously finding a non-existent invoice.

The court also found the motion judge erred by dismissing the action entirely despite the respondent's concession of a modest overpayment.

The appellants commenced a civil action for misfeasance in public office against a Canada Revenue Agency investigator and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging that the investigator had intentionally sworn a false Information to Obtain search warrants.

The action was discontinued on consent during trial after the appellants failed to establish key elements of their claim.

Approximately one month later, the appellants received Notices of Reassessment from the Minister of National Revenue reversing the original tax assessment.

The appellants moved to set aside the discontinuance based on these reassessments as fresh evidence.

The motion was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the reassessments could not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office and did not meet the high threshold for setting aside a consent discontinuance.

Following protracted custody and access litigation involving two trials and a prior appeal, a costs award of $200,000 was made in favour of the father.

The mother subsequently filed for bankruptcy before the costs could be enforced.

The father sought to lift the automatic stay of bankruptcy under section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to enforce the costs award against the mother's exempt assets (RRSPs).

The motion judge granted the order, finding material prejudice and equitable grounds.

The mother appealed, arguing the lift-stay remedy applies only to equalization claims, not costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lift-stay remedy applies to costs awards in appropriate circumstances and that the motion judge properly found material prejudice and equitable grounds based on the mother's breach of representations to the court and the protracted nature of the family litigation.

A class action appeal concerning copyright ownership in plans of survey registered or deposited in Ontario's electronic land registry system (ELRS).

The appellant land surveyors claimed that Teranet Inc., which operated the ELRS, infringed their copyright by digitizing, storing, and copying their survey plans.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that copyright in registered or deposited plans belonged to the Province of Ontario under section 12 of the Copyright Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, holding that the provincial land registration scheme gave the Crown complete control over registered plans, and that the Crown's publication of those plans through the ELRS occurred under the Crown's direction or control, thereby vesting copyright in the Crown.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order determining that claims for recovery of legal expenses incurred in connection with a coroner's inquest into the death of a family member were potentially recoverable under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in answering the question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) without proper pleadings raising the issue.

The pleadings predated the inquest and contained no reference to legal expenses.

The motion judge's answer that the expenses were "potentially recoverable" if they qualified as pecuniary loss did not advance the litigation or satisfy the purposes of Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The Children's Aid Society appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a Crown wardship declaration and directed the matter proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Superior Court order was interlocutory, not final.

An order directing that a matter proceed to trial, even when it sets aside a prior final order, does not itself constitute a final order for appellate jurisdiction purposes.

The appeal was quashed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.