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An officer's failure to strictly follow an approved screening device manual does not automatically invalidate reasonable grounds for a breath demand.
The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.
The trial judge found that the constable's demand for a breath sample violated section 8 of the Charter because the constable had not followed three procedures in the OPP manual for the Drager Alcotest 6810 device, and therefore could not have reasonably believed the device was functioning properly.
The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter.
The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no objective basis for the constable's belief that the device was functioning properly, and that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence under section 24(2).
The Court of Appeal upheld a sexual assault conviction but reserved the sentence appeal due to inadequate Gladue reports.
Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.
The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.
The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.
The Court of Appeal partially set aside a default judgment to allow a father to contest retroactive child support due to an arguable case on income discrepancy.
A family law appeal concerning custody and child support.
The father defaulted on attending a case conference following a motor vehicle accident and was noted in default.
The trial judge granted the mother sole custody with access at her discretion and ordered child support based on the father's 2015 income retroactive to October 2011.
The father's motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed at first instance.
On appeal, the court found the father had an arguable case on the issue of retroactive child support, as the trial judge may have failed to consider the father's significantly lower 2013 income when determining retroactive support.
The appeal was partially allowed.
The Court of Appeal upheld a partial summary judgment determining a bankrupt company's outstanding shareholder loan balance based on documentary evidence.
The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent.
The motion judge determined that the appellants' shareholder loan outstanding as of February 6, 2014 was $219,315 and that the outstanding balance at the time of the company's bankruptcy was at least $161,724.75.
The appellants argued that partial summary judgment was inappropriate and that the motion judge erred in making factual determinations without evidence rebutting their assertions regarding payments made on behalf of the bankrupt company.
The Court of Appeal upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the matter was essentially an accounting exercise determinable on documentary evidence and that the appellants' evidence did not support their claims.
The Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment finding that the appellant abandoned its goods and breached an agreement of purchase and sale.
The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding its failure to remove goods from premises as required by an agreement of purchase and sale.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the appellant abandoned the goods by refusing multiple opportunities to remove them, that damages were properly calculated based on lost rent, that the respondent did not fail to mitigate damages, and that the respondent was entitled to forfeit a $100,000 holdback due to the breach.
The court rejected arguments that the Commercial Tenancies Act procedures should apply by analogy and found the respondent acted commercially responsibly in selling the goods at public auction.
A limitations defence must be affirmatively pleaded by the party against whom the claim is made.
Two shareholders of a holding company that owns a commercial property brought an action against defendants for their full share of annual rental income.
The property manager held back part of the funds based on acknowledgements allegedly signed by the shareholders in 2002, which purported to give a deceased property manager a 25% interest in their entitlements.
The defendants moved to add the estate of the deceased manager as a necessary party.
The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the estate's claim was statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the estate's claim was not statute barred because the defendants never pleaded a limitations defence and had in fact invited the estate to assert its claim.
The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of a patient's claim against the Crown and health agencies due to statutory immunity and failure to provide mandatory notice.
The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking her claim and dismissing her action against healthcare defendants and government entities.
The appellant alleged psychological harassment and criminal negligence resulting in bodily harm arising from her admission and involuntary treatment at a hospital.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on multiple grounds: the appellant failed to comply with statutory notice requirements under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act; claims against the Local Health Integration Network were precluded by statutory immunity absent a finding of bad faith; and the Charter claim lacked material facts supporting any infringement.
The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded to the respondents.
Lawyer ordered to personally pay costs for enjoining life support withdrawal without client instructions.
A lawyer brought an application for an interim injunction to restrain a hospital from withdrawing life support from her client without instructions to do so and without notice to the client's family.
The application was granted ex parte but subsequently set aside by the reviewing judge after the client was declared brain dead.
The lawyer then appealed both the substantive decision and the costs award against her personally.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the lawyer had no authority to bring the application, acted without instructions, and seriously interfered with the administration of justice by misusing the court process during an emotionally sensitive family decision regarding end-of-life care.
The Court of Appeal upheld a second degree murder conviction and a 17-year parole ineligibility period.
The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a period of parole ineligibility of 17 years.
He appealed both conviction and sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no prejudicial error in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the fault element in murder, ante-mortem statements of the deceased, or the overall balance of the charge.
The court also dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding the 17-year period of parole ineligibility to be proportionate given the serious breach of trust involved in the killing of the appellant's benefactor.
The Court upheld a settlement agreement restricting grey market sales and confirmed reference jurisdiction.
Appeal from a summary judgment decision enforcing settlement agreements between Mars Canada Inc. and the appellants regarding the sale of grey market Mars products in Canada.
The appellants challenged the enforceability of the settlement agreements as being in restraint of trade, the motion judge's jurisdiction to order a reference on damages, and the award of substantial indemnity costs.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the settlement agreements reasonable under the Tank Lining test, confirming the court's jurisdiction to order a reference under Rule 20.04(3) on summary judgment, and affirming the substantial indemnity costs award based on the appellants' reprehensible conduct.
The Court dismissed an appeal for dependant's relief, upholding findings of no cohabitation.
The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing their application for dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.
The motion judge found that the appellants did not establish the requisite relationship with the deceased to qualify for dependant's relief.
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's findings of fact, including that the appellants and the deceased did not live together for any identifiable period and that the deceased did not have a settled intention to treat the second appellant as a child of his family.
The appellants' attempt to introduce fresh evidence regarding CPP survivor benefits was rejected as irrelevant.
The Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to review an order requiring the appellant to post security for costs for a frivolous appeal.
The appellant brought a motion to review a decision ordering her to post security for costs of $20,000 for her appeal.
The appellant, acting in person, confirmed she had no ability to pay costs and hinted she would refuse to pay in any event.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appeal had scant prospects of success and was frivolous.
The appellant would need to demonstrate palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge on both the limitations issue and the merits of the case.
The court found the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were not undermined by the evidence presented.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a duplicative superior court action as an abuse of process.
The appellant commenced an action in small claims court for breach of contract and subsequently filed a duplicative claim in superior court with additional claims.
The trial judge struck out the entire superior court action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, finding that the appellant had not followed proper procedure to transfer the small claims action and was attempting to litigate the same matters in two courts simultaneously.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the family law appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual findings on income imputation and business valuation.
The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning equalization amounts, spousal support, and child support.
The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of a psychiatric report regarding a child's dependent status.
The Court of Appeal declined to consider the fresh evidence on appeal, noting that the appropriate remedy was to seek variation under section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.
On the merits, the Court of Appeal applied the stringent standard of review for family law decisions and found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge's decision was plainly wrong.
The trial judge's findings regarding income imputation and business valuation were entitled to deference.
The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.
The court dismissed a non-lawyer's application to review a decision denying him permission to represent corporate appellants.
The appellant sought to review a decision by Huscroft J.A. denying him the opportunity to act for the corporate appellants pursuant to Rule 15.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no palpable and overriding error in the discretionary decision.
The court determined that the appellant had demonstrated through his filings and oral submissions that he was incapable of adequately representing the corporations or assisting the court in the appeal.
The appellant's material was voluminous but unfocused, and his oral submissions were similarly unfocused and often irrelevant to the core issues.
The Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court for lack of monetary jurisdiction.
The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated June 27, 2017.
The Court of Appeal found that the appeal was not within its monetary jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Divisional Court.
Costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.
The Court of Appeal upheld convictions for a large-scale fraud and money laundering scheme.
Four appellants appealed their convictions for various offences arising from a large-scale credit card fraud and money laundering scheme operating over several years.
The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000, participation in a criminal organization, identity theft, possession of property obtained by crime, and money laundering.
The appellants raised multiple grounds of appeal, including challenges to the single transaction rule, sufficiency of reasons, and the legal test for criminal organization.
The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but quashed certain convictions against one appellant that were entered without being charged, and corrected typographical errors in the trial judgment.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's credibility findings from a mini-trial.
The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment seeking to have the respondents' action declared statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The critical issue was whether the respondent lender, Trez Capital, had knowledge of the appellants' ownership interest in the project corporations prior to the expiration of the two-year limitation period.
The motion judge conducted a mini-trial on the disputed question of what was disclosed during a September 13, 2013 telephone call between the respondent's representative and Trez's representative.
The motion judge preferred the evidence of Trez's representative and found that the appellants' ownership interest was not disclosed during that call, thereby rejecting the limitation defence.
The appellants appealed on multiple grounds, including that the motion judge made findings beyond what was necessary to determine the motion, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and erred in law regarding the limitations period analysis.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Review Board's disposition detaining the appellant.
The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated May 1, 2017, which ordered her detained at the General Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences, though with discretion for the person in charge to permit community living.
The appellant challenged the Board's constitution, arguing the Chairperson did not meet statutory qualification requirements, and contested the Board's use of victim impact statements and its finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to the community.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no improper constitution of the Board, no improper use of victim impact statements, and that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and joint counsel recommendation.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Review Board's denial of an absolute discharge, finding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.
An appeal from the Ontario Review Board's disposition denying an absolute discharge to the appellant under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.
The appellant argued the Board erred in concluding she posed a significant threat to public safety.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by evidence including signs of decompensation in the community, lack of insight into her illness and the seriousness of the offences, refusal of recommended medication, and a paranoid belief system.
The Court also found the Board properly applied the least onerous and least restrictive standard in its restriction of liberty review.