Bradley W. Miller

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle while knowing there was a firearm in the vehicle.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant counselled an unknown SUV driver to shoot at the victim as retaliation for damage to the appellant's mother's vehicle.

The appeal raised the issue of whether the convictions were unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal was divided: one judge would have allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding insufficient evidence to support the convictions; the majority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the convictions, finding the jury verdicts reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of his summary judgment motion regarding fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy and the appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not determine the substantive rights of the parties.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of marijuana, cocaine and MDMA for purposes of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon, challenging the lawfulness of his arrest on the basis that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that police had received a detailed tip from a confidential informant that was corroborated through vehicle registration searches, and that subsequent surveillance observations of suspicious interactions consistent with drug trafficking provided reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

The appellant appealed a sentence of concurrent 12-month sentences followed by three years probation imposed for two counts of breaching court orders forbidding contact with the complainant.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by misapprehending evidence regarding threats.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's history of five previous breach convictions, his failure to be deterred by earlier sentences, and the devastating impact on the victim.

The appellant appealed a certiorari decision that refused to quash an Ontario Court of Justice decision denying the return of marijuana seized from the appellant after charges of possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking were withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellant failed to establish he was lawfully entitled to possession of the cannabis and did not have a licence authorizing possession at the time of seizure.

The certiorari judge did not err in concluding that no error or excess of jurisdiction occurred.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants commenced a motor vehicle accident action in December 2010 following a collision in December 2008.

The action was administratively dismissed as abandoned in August 2011 pursuant to rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants moved to set aside the dismissal in February 2014, more than two years after the dismissal order.

A master granted the motion to set aside, but the Superior Court judge allowed the respondents' appeal and reinstated the dismissal.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the master erred in considering the repeal of rule 48.15 as part of the contextual analysis, erred in assigning fault to the respondents for not filing a defence, erred in finding that the appellants always intended to prosecute the action without evidence to support this finding, and critically erred in failing to consider the finality principle in assessing prejudice to the respondents.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal by the Estate of Gabriel Zimmerman regarding its entitlement to be added as a party to the underlying action.

The court determined the costs payable by the respondents to both the Estate and the defendants for the motion heard in the lower court.

The Estate was awarded its actual partial indemnity costs, and the defendants were also awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis despite not participating in the appeal, as they benefited from the appellate decision.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their first-degree murder convictions and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a recantation by key Crown witness Ronnie Khananisho.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit the fresh evidence and confirmed the prior panel's dismissal of the appellants' appeals from conviction.

The court found that while the recantation was admissible and the due diligence requirement was satisfied, the evidence failed the cogency test.

The recantation suffered from serious credibility issues, including implausible origins involving contact with the incarcerated appellant's former girlfriend, and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial verdict given that the central witnesses were Jorge Restrepo and Jorge Acosta, whose testimony was corroborated by powerful independent evidence including cellphone records and medical evidence.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson Airport with eight suitcases containing over 40 kilograms of cocaine concealed in the lining.

The accused testified that her cousin provided the luggage and she was unaware of the drugs, having inspected the bags when she became suspicious but finding nothing.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and the doctrine of wilful blindness, concluding that the accused took reasonable steps to allay her suspicions and the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and attempt to obstruct justice, as well as the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed as an ancillary order on sentence.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should be 20 years.

Both the appellant and respondent agreed on this issue.

The court found that although there is no right of appeal from a SOIRA order imposed under s. 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge retains inherent jurisdiction to correct an erroneous SOIRA order.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, but the appellant was directed to return the matter to the trial judge for correction.

The appellant, a hotel owner, sought recovery for fire damage to its building caused by a fire in the respondents' leased restaurant space.

The appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action in the appellant's name.

The respondents argued that the lease terms barred the insurer from pursuing the claim.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the landlord's covenant to insure and the tenant's contribution to insurance costs triggered the principles established in the Supreme Court trilogy, preventing subrogation against the tenant.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the lease contained explicit "notwithstanding" language that overcame the trilogy principles and preserved the tenant's liability for its own negligence.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after a head-on collision on Highway 17 that killed the other driver.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstruction officer, arguing the evidence was tainted by bias and that the Crown failed to disclose draft reports.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while there were concerns about the expert's independence, the trial judge properly circumscribed the scope of admissible evidence and that any disclosure violation did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

Appeals arising from the implementation of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA).

The appellants sought declarations that Canada breached its disclosure obligations under the IRSSA by refusing to produce transcripts of examinations for discovery from civil actions (Cochrane Transcripts) and sought broad relief for all former students affected by alleged breaches.

The administrative judge dismissed the requests for directions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Canada did not breach its disclosure obligations by refusing to produce the Cochrane Transcripts, that the deemed undertaking rule applied to protect the privacy of examinees, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the broad relief sought.

The appellant law firm charged a "results achieved fee" in a family law matter in addition to hourly rates and daily counsel fees.

The respondent client was awarded sole custody of his child, half the proceeds of the matrimonial home, and costs.

The law firm unilaterally deducted the results achieved fee from trust funds.

The respondent objected, and the application judge found the fee constituted a prohibited contingency fee agreement under the Solicitors Act.

The law firm appealed, arguing the fee was a permissible bonus because the client remained liable for fees regardless of outcome and the fee was tied to success at trial rather than a specific monetary result.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that any part of a lawyer's compensation dependent on successful disposition of a matter constitutes a contingency fee agreement prohibited in family law matters.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted by jury of two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a two-vehicle collision.

She appealed on multiple grounds, including Charter violations, credibility assessments, jury charge errors regarding straddle evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter breaches, no reversible credibility errors, and no miscarriage of justice despite some improper prosecutorial conduct.

Capcorp Planning (2003) Inc. sold a health and welfare plan (HWP) that provided coverage for health, dental, vision, and hearing care, as well as protection against income loss due to illness or accident.

The plan was particularly attractive to owner-managers of small businesses who could not obtain equivalent coverage through traditional insurance due to pre-existing medical conditions.

The Minister of Revenue assessed Capcorp for failure to collect and remit retail sales tax (RST) on amounts paid by employers under the HWP, imposing a penalty of $278,625.31 including interest.

The Superior Court of Justice quashed the assessment, finding that the HWP was not subject to RST because participants could not obtain equivalent insurance coverage.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the HWP constitutes an "unfunded benefits plan" under the Retail Sales Tax Act and is therefore subject to RST.

The court found that the statutory definition focuses on whether protection against risk "could otherwise be obtained" through insurance generally, not whether specific individuals could obtain such coverage.

The appellant, Earl Lewis, operating as The Recovery Board, appealed a judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for conversion of three vehicles.

The vehicles had been towed by Chris's Towing and Lewis was retained to register liens and issue notices of intention to sell.

The application judge found Lewis liable for conversion and awarded damages including HST.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability for conversion but reduced damages by eliminating the HST component, as the respondent had not incurred HST costs and ownership had changed before actual sales occurred.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery in Leamington, Ontario.

He appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) that text messages obtained from the service provider should have been excluded as obtained in violation of his Charter rights, and (2) that the trial judge erred in accepting certain incriminating parts of a witness's testimony despite finding the witness to be fundamentally dishonest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Charter breaches occurred, the text messages were admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge's treatment of the witness's evidence was neither illogical nor inconsistent.

The appellant, a tradesman hired to complete construction of a two-story front porch, fell from the roof and was seriously injured.

He sued the homeowner respondents for negligence and breach of duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act, alleging they failed to provide safety equipment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the duty of an occupier toward a hired professional tradesman is limited to ensuring the premises are reasonably safe and does not extend to supervising the tradesman's work practices or providing safety equipment for work-related hazards.