Bradley W. Miller

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against their former lawyer for professional negligence.

The appellants alleged the respondent failed to protect their interests in settlement negotiations, failed to account for funds paid towards legal bills, and misappropriated funds secured by a mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellants had put forward no evidence to support their claims, that they were fully informed of and agreed to the settlement terms which benefited them, and that there was no evidence of inappropriate or excessive billings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no genuine issue for trial and rejecting all three grounds of appeal raised by the appellants.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a failed real estate transaction.

They raised two issues: first, that the motion judge erred by failing to allow credit for rent payments after the respondent failed to close; and second, that the motion judge failed to adjust the purchase price to account for wasted legal expenses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in finding no authority to make the rent adjustment, the inadequate record supported dismissing that ground.

However, the Court agreed that the motion judge had authority to adjust for wasted legal expenses and that the $10,000 figure was reasonable and established on the record.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment concerning a business purchase agreement that was terminated before completion.

The trial judge found that a $100,000 deposit paid by the appellant toward a $500,000 purchase price was to be retained by the respondent pursuant to a termination agreement entered into by the parties.

The trial judge found no legal fault on either side and concluded that the parties' intention in the termination agreement was that the deposit remain with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order denying him leave to bring a motion for recalculation of section 7 expenses for his son for the years 2014 to 2017.

The appellant was subject to a prior order prohibiting him from commencing or continuing litigation without leave if in arrears of child support, access cancellation costs, or court-ordered costs.

The motion judge imposed additional conditions before the appellant could bring further proceedings, including payment of a $5,000 costs award, compliance with an insurance order, and reduction of child support arrears to less than $2,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's order reasonable and consistent with the prior order.

A physician licensed to practice in the United States sought to obtain full licensing in Ontario through the Pathway 4 program.

He was employed by a hospital under a one-year fixed-term contract conditional on successful completion of the program.

Following personality conflicts with members of the cardiac team and a dispute over work assignments, his supervisor withdrew, causing his conditional license to automatically expire and his employment to terminate.

The trial judge dismissed his claims for wrongful dismissal, bad faith conduct, and defamation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the physician was wrongfully dismissed.

However, the court remitted issues regarding quantification of damages, bad faith conduct in the manner of dismissal, and defamation to a new trial due to inadequate reasons from the trial judge.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim to substitute the names of three doctors for "Dr. John Doe Anesthesiologist." The motion judge relied on the doctrine of misnomer and applied the "litigating finger" test, finding that the doctors would have known the claim was directed at them based on the notice of action, medical records, and their status as anesthesiologists.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the alternative finding based on the notice of action served within the limitation period.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, directing that the matter be returned to the Superior Court for a trial on the quantification of damages.

The court issued an addendum addressing the disposition of costs from the original summary judgment motion, reserving such costs to the judge hearing the damages trial.

David Turner sued the Town of Oakville under the Occupiers' Liability Act after falling off his bicycle on a recreational trail, claiming the Town acted with reckless disregard.

The parties settled damages, leaving liability as the sole issue for trial.

The Town argued no reckless disregard or causation, and alternatively, contributory negligence.

The court found that the plaintiff's choice to go around a control gate, rather than through it, and his failure to observe the trail ahead, contributed to the accident.

The court concluded that the Town's actions, including trail design, regular inspections, and maintenance, did not amount to reckless disregard for user safety, despite the absence of a specific "steep slope" sign before the incident.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal.

The application concerned the denial of reimbursement for non-prescription pain medication, cessation of coverage for prescription medication, and denial of benefits for certain dates in 1998.

The application judge found no urgency as required by the Judicial Review Procedure Act and dismissed the application as premature, as the appellant had not exhausted the administrative appeal process.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no legal error in the application judge's analysis regarding the reasonableness of the WSIB's request for updated medical information.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her action on the basis of a limitation period and denying relief from forfeiture regarding her late filing of a long-term disability (LTD) claim with the insurer.

Although the respondent conceded that the application judge erred in finding the action was barred by a limitation period, the Court of Appeal found that the relief from forfeiture analysis stood independently and was not tainted by this error.

The Court upheld the application judge's discretionary decision to deny relief from forfeiture.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for a declaration of a right of way over the respondents' property.

They argued that the original grant met all four requirements to establish an easement by grant and that the trial judge erred in considering post-grant evidence and in finding the grant ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the grant was ambiguous and lacked sufficient metes and bounds descriptions.

The trial judge correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the nature and location of the servient tenement over which the right of way was granted as it existed at the date of the grant, which was fatal to the claim.

The appellants, owners of a residential property in Caledon, Ontario, appealed a decision dismissing their application against the Ontario Heritage Trust and a local resident.

The appellants' property is accessible only via a 1 km driveway through parkland owned by the OHT, over which they hold an easement for ingress and egress.

The appellants claimed the easement granted them exclusive use of the driveway and sought to prevent public access by hikers using trails on the OHT property.

The court upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the deed of easement did not grant exclusive use, that public use by hikers did not substantially interfere with the appellants' easement rights, and that an injunction against the publication of a hiking guide was not warranted.

The appellant, a pizza restaurant operator, entered into a 10-year commercial lease but abandoned it within four months, claiming the premises were unsuitable.

The respondent landlord took possession, sued for damages, and obtained summary judgment for unpaid rent and prospective damages totaling $85,697.96, calculated on the basis of 22 months to re-let.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in awarding prospective damages without adequate evidence.

Before the appeal hearing, the premises were re-let approximately 10 months after the appellant's repudiation.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the re-letting and allowed the appeal, setting aside the damages award and remitting the matter for trial to properly quantify damages in light of the actual re-letting period.

This appeal concerns a proposed $2.5 billion class action involving more than 230,000 universal life insurance policies sold by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company between 1985 and 1998.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation in the sale of policies and breach of contractual duties relating to premiums and fees.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion for misrepresentation claims and initially declined to certify breach of contract claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, certifying the breach of contract common issues and allowing the plaintiffs to pursue individual misrepresentation claims.

The court found the motions judge erred in principle by failing to conduct individualized and contextual analyses of the limitation period defences and by improperly deciding the merits of the breach of contract claims at the certification stage.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal or, alternatively, for security for costs.

The appellant, appearing in person, sought an adjournment pending the availability of his previous counsel after serving a suspension from practice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal on multiple grounds: the operative amended notice of appeal was limited to an interlocutory order over which the Court had no jurisdiction; the appellant failed to seek leave to appeal the costs order; and the appellant was out of time to appeal the contempt order and had not sought an extension of time.

The Court also found that the appellant's procedural conduct was abusive and refused the adjournment request.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action named numerous defendants including government entities, corporations, and political parties, alleging perceived personal wrongs.

The motion judge found the statement of claim contained nonsensical allegations that disclosed no cause of action against any defendant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding both the underlying action and the notice of appeal to be frivolous and vexatious, as the appeal grounds merely reiterated the same problematic allegations from the statement of claim without demonstrating any merit.

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking out claims against Maureen Harvey (superintendent of Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre), John Doe, and Jane Doe.

The appellant sought damages for negligent investigation by Ontario Provincial Police officers and breach of duty of care by corrections officials during three years of custody.

The motion judge had struck the claims without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge failed to properly apply the generous reading standard for pleadings and set aside the striking order, allowing the appeal.