Jean Denis Belec

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a WSIB decision approving a worker's third-party settlement retroactively, allowing the worker to claim 'top-up' benefits under s. 30(14) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The employer argued the statute strictly requires WSIB approval before a settlement is made.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the WSIB's interpretation reasonable.

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and the mandatory/directory distinction, the court held that the pre-approval requirement is directory, and barring the worker from benefits due to timing would undermine the remedial purpose of the Act.

This costs endorsement addresses a motion in a proposed class action brought by self-represented plaintiffs seeking, among other things, an order that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) pay their legal costs or that amicus curiae be appointed.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the proceedings stayed pending compliance with Rule 15.01(1).

The successful defendants, WSIB and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT), sought costs.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs, found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, and ordered Mr. Taylor to pay $2,500 each to WSIB and WSIAT.

The court considered a motion by self-represented lead plaintiffs in a proposed class action challenging workers’ compensation regimes across Canada.

The plaintiffs sought an order requiring the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) to pay their legal costs, or alternatively, the appointment of amicus curiae or permission for the lead plaintiffs to represent the class.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with Rule 15, which requires representative parties to be represented by counsel.

The court held that compliance with Rule 15.01(1) is mandatory and that the plaintiffs could not represent the class.

The court declined to appoint amicus curiae or grant an interim advance cost award, finding no exceptional circumstances or evidence of financial need.

The action was stayed pending the plaintiffs’ retention of counsel.

The Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (WSIB) brought a Rule 2.1 motion to dismiss an urgent motion by Paul Taylor, one of the lead plaintiffs in a class action, who sought a contempt finding against WSIB for failing to finance his healthcare and an order compelling healthcare provision and monetary compensation.

The court found Taylor's motion lacked a basis for contempt as no prior court order had been breached.

Furthermore, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction over healthcare funding decisions, which fall under the exclusive authority of workers' compensation tribunals as per the Workplace Compensation Act and Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The WSIB's Rule 2.1 motion was granted, Taylor's motion was dismissed, and WSIB was awarded $250 in costs.

The applicant was awarded loss of earning benefits by the WSIB, which included an indexed amount calculated according to a WSIB policy.

The applicant submitted an Intent to Object to the indexation calculation, but the WSIB dismissed it, stating that its policy was not subject to appeal.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the WSIB's decision unreasonable because it ignored section 126 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, which expressly contemplates the WSIAT reviewing Board policies.

The court set aside the WSIB's decision and directed the matter to proceed to appeal, emphasizing the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal.

The application concerned the denial of reimbursement for non-prescription pain medication, cessation of coverage for prescription medication, and denial of benefits for certain dates in 1998.

The application judge found no urgency as required by the Judicial Review Procedure Act and dismissed the application as premature, as the appellant had not exhausted the administrative appeal process.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no legal error in the application judge's analysis regarding the reasonableness of the WSIB's request for updated medical information.

The appellant, injured in 1997 while unloading goods from a truck, brought a civil action against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal seeking compensatory damages of $1,710,455 and punitive damages of $15 million.

The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against these bodies and that relief must be sought through judicial review.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction and in striking the pleadings for failing to disclose a cause of action for bad faith or misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and Tribunal, and that circumventing this scheme through a civil action constitutes an abuse of process.

The court also held that bad faith is not independently actionable and that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's $17 million action against the WSIB and WSIAT for lack of jurisdiction, the defendants sought costs.

The WSIB claimed $7,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, and the WSIAT claimed $3,000.

The court considered the principles of indemnification, reasonableness, and access to justice, noting that the plaintiff's claim, while lacking a viable cause of action in the Superior Court, was not frivolous or vexatious.

Recognizing the plaintiff's self-represented status and the need to balance access to justice with discouraging improper litigation, the court fixed costs at $3,000 payable to each defendant.

The self-represented plaintiff, Paul Taylor, sued the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board (WSIB) and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) for approximately $17 million, alleging bad faith, breaches of the Human Rights Code and the Charter of Rights, and various torts related to the handling of his workplace injury benefits claim.

The WSIAT brought a motion to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the WSIAT lacked legal capacity to be sued, the action constituted an abuse of process by attempting to re-litigate issues already decided by the Tribunal, the claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including for assault and misfeasance of public office), and the claims were statute-barred.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied, and the statement of claim was struck in its entirety.

The applicant sought declarations that operational policies adopted under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act were unconstitutional and contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine the matter by application or whether it had to proceed as a judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The court held that the impugned policies constituted the exercise of statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Because the applicant sought only declarations regarding the legality of those policies and no civil action was pending, the matter properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court by way of judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his discrimination complaint against his employer and union to the Human Rights Tribunal.

He alleged a denial of natural justice because the Commission failed to interview certain witnesses and consider evidence of systemic discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness as the un-interviewed witnesses lacked direct knowledge, and holding that the Commission's conclusion of insufficient evidence of discrimination was reasonable given the applicant's objective test scores.

The applicant suffered a workplace injury and was granted Future Economic Loss benefits.

The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board calculated his pre-injury earnings without including his employer's contributions to his union's health and pension plans.

The applicant appealed to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, which upheld the decision.

The applicant applied for judicial review.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the Tribunal's decision patently unreasonable because it failed to consider the legislative history and the government's explanation for the applicable statutory provisions.

The applicant was seriously injured at work and received WSIB benefits.

The WSIB failed to recognize a potential third-party claim against the equipment manufacturer and did not send the applicant an election form.

When the applicant later sought to sue the manufacturer, the WSIB ruled his receipt of benefits constituted a deemed election and refused to allow him to withdraw his claim without immediate repayment of all benefits.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the WSIB made a patent error in finding a deemed election where the applicant was uninformed, and improperly applied an inflexible rule rather than exercising its discretion based on the merits of the case.

The applicant filed a duty of fair representation complaint against the union, alleging it failed to pursue a grievance regarding her seniority ranking in 1987.

The union raised a preliminary objection that the application should be dismissed due to delay.

The Board agreed, finding that the nine-year delay from the initial events in 1987, and the further one-year delay from the final events in 1996, was excessive and unreasonable, causing significant prejudice to the union and employer.

The application was dismissed.