Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge that struck out his motion to change on the grounds of non-compliance with a consent order requiring him to commence his appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada by September 15, 2017.

The motion judge found the appellant's belated efforts to bring his motion for leave to appeal demonstrated disrespect for the court.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision, noting the appellant's history of delay and failure to comply with support payment obligations.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice ordering him to repay $337,653.67 to the respondent bank.

The claim arose from a forged cheque that the appellant had deposited to his bank account.

The appellant's primary complaint was that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant's counsel requested an adjournment the day before the hearing, citing recent retention and scheduling conflicts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to proceed with the motion, finding no error in the exercise of discretion and noting that the appellant had ample notice of the hearing date and that waiting until the last minute to request an adjournment was contrary to the principles and directives governing summary judgment motions.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 21, 2018, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant danger to public safety due to improved insight into his mental illness, medication compliance, and stable employment and housing.

However, the court found the Board's concerns about recent cocaine use were reasonable given the appellant's history of manic episodes preceded by cocaine use and associated medication non-compliance.

The court allowed the appeal on the basis of transcription errors in the Board's reasons, which confused the appellant with another hospital patient and relied on irrelevant material.

A new hearing was ordered to take place as the appellant's annual review hearing in February 2019.

Appeal of summary judgment dismissal in a negligence action arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff's estate and family sued social hosts for damages, alleging the hosts owed a duty of care when the intoxicated guest drove home and subsequently drove his children and their babysitter, resulting in a fatal collision.

The motion judge dismissed the claims, finding no duty of care existed and alternatively that any duty ended when the guest arrived home safely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding genuine issues of fact regarding foreseeability and proximity that required trial, and rejecting the proposition that a social host's duty of care automatically expires upon an intoxicated guest's safe arrival home.

The appellant appealed her sentence for abduction of a child in contravention of a court order.

The appellant had removed her twin children from school in violation of a court-ordered access schedule, driving aggressively to evade the complainant (the children's father).

She pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence.

On appeal, she argued the sentencing judge erred by considering her prior wrongdoing as an aggravating factor and by emphasizing general deterrence over her specific circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to consider the appellant's course of conduct in determining whether a discharge would be contrary to the public interest, and was entitled to find that a conditional discharge was not appropriate given the aggravated manner of the offense.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation by a Superior Court judge and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment concurrent on both counts, plus two years' probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed the convictions on four grounds: uneven scrutiny of witness credibility, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, failure to address the Crown's failure to call certain witnesses, and improper admission of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter following a guilty plea in the death of his 53-day-old son.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that the sentencing judge unfairly minimized the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; that the judge unduly relied on the appellant's failure to disclose a head injury to medical personnel; that the judge misapprehended the agreed statement of facts regarding the force used; and that the judge erred in declining to award pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio for harsh detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of H.E. on a charge of sexual assault against his wife.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the assault but acquitted the accused based on a reasonable doubt about whether he possessed the required mens rea, citing factors including the complainant's delay in reporting and continued sexual relations with the accused.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed reversible errors by considering an honest but mistaken belief in consent defence that was not raised at trial, by relying on a shared mistaken belief about marital rights that cannot form the basis for such a defence, and by considering factors that were irrelevant to the accused's state of mind.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and using an imitation firearm in the commission of that offence.

He was sentenced to six months' incarceration for robbery and 12 months' consecutive for the firearm offence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: the admissibility of dog tracking evidence, the trial judge's use of post-offence conduct evidence (flight from police), the trial judge's treatment of evidence regarding the appellant's intoxication, and a misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault against his step-granddaughter.

The trial judge found that the appellant sexually assaulted the complainant on multiple visits over a nine-year period, characterizing the assaults as part of an ongoing course of conduct.

The complainant acquiesced to the appellant's demands out of fear and therefore did not consent.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by drawing a negative inference from the absence of medical evidence regarding the appellant's physical capability, and that the trial judge failed to apply the third step of the W.(D) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge on the respondent who pled guilty to importing hashish contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial judge had found s. 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and its combined effect with Criminal Code s. 742.1(c) to be unconstitutionally overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, rendering the respondent eligible for a conditional sentence.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and 18 months' probation.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that given the respondent's changed circumstances, time already served, and community service completed, reincarceration was not warranted, and requested the sentence be stayed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, with the probation order remaining in effect.

This is a costs endorsement addressing the allocation of costs for certification and summary judgment motions in the Superior Court and the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The plaintiffs appealed from orders of Justice Paul M. Perell denying certification and granting summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiffs achieved partial success: they obtained certification on some common issues but not on their negligent misrepresentation claim, and they reversed summary judgment on some claims while others remained time-barred.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the plaintiffs reflecting their overall success.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The appellant, an egg producer, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to belatedly comply with a 2013 judgment order requiring payment into court.

The appellant had failed to pay the judgment funds into court, failed to bring a motion to add respondents as defendants to a related action, and took no further steps to advance its counterclaim for five years.

When the appellant finally returned to court in 2018, it sought permission to proceed with the counterclaim and amend it.

The motion judge applied the test from Rule 48 (dismissal for delay), placing the onus on the appellant to establish an acceptable explanation for the delay and that respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion judge found the appellant's explanation inadequate and concluded actual prejudice existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's legal test or factual findings.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his claim against the respondent regarding unauthorized charges to his credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that while the respondent's first affidavit contained inaccuracies regarding credit agency collections, these were corrected in a second affidavit before the motion judge.

The appellant failed to adduce evidence regarding two new charges he raised at the initial return of the motion, despite the motion judge adjourning to permit him to do so.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's cost order and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case where the trial judge admitted liability just before trial and the matter proceeded as a damages assessment before a jury.

The appellants contended that the trial judge failed to address transgressions by respondent's counsel, unfairly summarized evidence in jury instructions, and displayed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's conduct was fair and balanced, that many complaints were not objected to at trial, and that the allegations of bias did not meet the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The respondents operated a fitness club business through a corporate entity and agreed to sell the business to the appellants through an Asset Purchase Agreement dated October 30, 2015.

The agreement required the purchaser to assume approximately $58,000 in equipment and leasehold improvement loans.

After taking possession and operating the business, the appellants refused to sign the required promissory note, stopped payment on a cheque, and immediately defaulted on lease obligations, triggering the respondents' personal liability.

The motion judge found the corporate purchaser liable for breach of contract and pierced the corporate veil to hold the individual appellants personally liable for fraudulent conduct.

The appellants appealed on three grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the date of separation in a family law matter.

The motion judge had ruled that the parties did not reach a final settlement agreement on the date of separation and struck references to settlement communications on the ground that they were protected by settlement privilege and would be irrelevant at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that once the motion judge determined there was no agreement, the settlement communications became privileged and could not be used at trial to establish a date of separation.

The appellants constructed a detached garage on their property pursuant to a building permit issued by the respondent municipality.

During construction, the appellants accessed an unopened road allowance (Ninth Street).

After completion, the respondent took the position that access via Ninth Street was not permitted and blocked the street with concrete barriers.

The appellants sued seeking removal of the barriers, an easement, or damages for breach of promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding negligence, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or punitive damages.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with the complainant, his spouse's daughter, over a period when the complainant was between 9 and 11 years old.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial judge misapprehended his evidence regarding a January 2011 assault on the complainant's mother; and (2) the trial judge applied a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence than to the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her credibility findings.