Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissal of her negligence action against a lawyer and his law firm.

The appellant alleged the respondent lawyer negligently counselled her to accept an improvident settlement of a motor vehicle accident tort claim and failed to report two other settlements to the Ontario Disability Support Program.

The motion judge found the settlement was not improvident but rather favourable to the appellant and in her best interests, and found no negligence in the failure to report the settlements to ODSP.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's dismissal of his action seeking a declaration of adverse possession over part of the respondents' property.

The appellant contended that the motion judge failed to consider evidence of his predecessor in title's mistaken understanding regarding the boundary location.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the predecessors had no intention to use the land to the exclusion of its true owner, based on the totality of evidence including the R-Plan filed in support of conversion to the Land Titles Act regime.

The court also rejected the appellant's assertion regarding an old fence creating a boundary, finding it unsupported by evidence.

The appellant signed an agreement for purchase and sale of real property as a buyer "in trust for a company to be incorporated without any personal liabilities" and provided a $100,000 deposit.

When the appellant advised the vendor that he would not close the transaction, the vendor refused to return the deposit.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the vendor, finding that the deposit was forfeited.

The appellant appealed, arguing that section 21(4) of the Business Corporations Act, which exempts pre-incorporation contract signatories from personal liability, should also exempt them from forfeiture of the deposit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a deposit stands as security for performance of the contract and is distinct from the purchaser's contractual obligations.

The court found that the phrase "without any personal liabilities" did not extend to the deposit, as the contract contained no express provision to that effect, and such a contrary intention must be expressly stated.

The appellant appealed a decision by the motion judge upholding a default payment of $60,000 in a settlement agreement, arguing it was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's thorough analysis and conclusion that the default payment was reasonable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted by jury of attempting to knowingly participate in or contribute to the activities of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group, and counselling an undercover police officer to do the same.

The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years on each count, resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 7.5 months with credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the conviction grounds and upholding the sentence as fit and appropriate for terrorist offences.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 26, 2018, continuing a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding she continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, substance abuse disorder, history of violence, lack of insight into her mental illness, medication compliance issues, and actuarial risk assessment placing her at moderate-high risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by evidence.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge declaring them to be vexatious litigants under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in counting 20 motions since a prior order, when the actual number was seven.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a palpable and overriding error and upheld the vexatious litigant designation based on clear evidentiary support, including findings from prior judges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a company that purchased land in Kingsville, Ontario, gave a promissory note for $171,000 to Ronald Colasanti in exchange for an assignment of a water allocation.

When the appellant refused to pay, claiming the promissory note was void for failure of consideration, the trustees of Colasanti's estate brought an action in debt.

The trial judge found valid consideration existed and awarded judgment.

On appeal, the appellant renewed its argument that the water allocation never belonged to Colasanti and therefore could not constitute valid consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant obtained an immediate resolution of its water supply problem and a building permit, which constituted valid consideration regardless of the legal status of the water allocation itself.

The appellant appealed a divorce order granted by a pretrial conference judge on the ground of mental cruelty.

The parties had been married on January 6, 2018, never cohabitated, and both sought a divorce based on allegations of mental cruelty against the other.

The pretrial conference judge granted the divorce based on the respondent's application, creating the impression that the divorce was granted due to the appellant's cruelty.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge erred in granting a divorce on the ground of mental cruelty without agreement between the parties that one had inflicted mental cruelty on the other.

Cross-allegations do not constitute agreement.

The court set aside the divorce order and remitted the matter for retrial, noting that the parties would become eligible for a no-fault divorce one year from the separation date.

An appeal concerning the division of proceeds from the sale of a family residence held as joint tenants by parties in a common law relationship.

The appellant contributed $5,000 to the purchase price while the respondent contributed $116,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust and that there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the findings regarding the presumption of resulting trust and the unjust enrichment analysis.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of three overlapping actions brought under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The actions arose from a family dispute concerning the appellant's exclusion from his grandfather's will and alleged undue influence and fraudulent conduct by family members and lawyers.

The motion judge dismissed the actions as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge failed to make explicit findings that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process; (2) the harassment and defamation claims were supported by the pleadings; and (3) the motion judge failed to explain why the statements of claim could not be amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the dismissals.

The appellant was convicted of sexual and violent offences against a complainant aged 12-14 years over a two-year relationship while the appellant was aged 27-29.

The trial judge imposed an 8-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies and admitted lies, the authentication of photographic evidence, reliance on the parents' evidence, and rejection of the defence theory regarding motive to fabricate.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part only with respect to pre-trial custody credit, with the Court finding the sentence otherwise fit given the appellant's position of trust, the complainant's vulnerability, the age disparity, duration of abuse, and instances of violence.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.

A lawyer was convicted of three offences arising from conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a refugee claimant.

The Crown alleged the appellant counseled the undercover officer to provide false information to immigration authorities.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization on the basis of material omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit.

The trial judge found two errors in the affidavit but concluded they would not have affected the issuance of the authorization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's analysis was correct and her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the circumstances warranted a significant jail term given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's professional status.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and ordered detained at Waypoint Centre, a maximum security facility.

On appeal, the appellant sought to have the detention order set aside and a new hearing directed to consider placement at Ontario Shores, a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Review Board's decision, finding that while the appellant's recent conduct was positive, the Board was required to consider the entire picture, including the serious nature of the mental illness, the long history of mental disorder accompanied by serious criminal activity, past non-compliance with medication, and demonstrated history of quick decompensation and violence when medication was discontinued.

The court found the Board's conclusion that a transfer to medium security was premature was not unreasonable.

Appeal from a conviction entered by a Superior Court judge sitting with a jury on charges of sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on two grounds: first, that the jury should have been specifically cautioned that the appellant's failure to return to Canada immediately upon learning of the charges could not be used as evidence of guilt; and second, that the jury should have been instructed that if they found the complainant deliberately lied about a specific incident (the "2008 event"), they could use that lie to reject all of her evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the appellant's delay in returning could be relevant to credibility, the trial judge's instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that they must assess the complainant's entire testimony in context and that deliberate lies are relevant to credibility.

The appellant, who had died prior to the appeal hearing, was convicted on March 16, 2017 by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Both the Crown and the appellant's counsel agreed that the conviction represented a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter applications under s. 10(b), alleging police failed to assist her in contacting her counsel of choice and failed to provide adequate privacy during her consultation with duty counsel.

She also argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence regarding her impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the law, concluding the appellant's belief that she lacked privacy was not reasonably held.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal by the Ministry of Labour from a provincial offences appeal court decision that reduced sentences imposed on a small furniture warehouse company and two of its directors for Occupational Health and Safety Act violations.

The defendants pleaded guilty to failing to provide fall protection equipment and safety training to an epileptic employee who fell to his death from an elevated order picker.

The sentencing judge imposed a $250,000 fine on the company and 25-day intermittent sentences on the directors.

The appeal judge reduced these to a $50,000 fine and $15,000 fines respectively.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that while the appeal judge made errors in principle regarding moral blameworthiness and the rarity of incarceration for regulatory offences, the sentences ultimately imposed were not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed that moral blameworthiness is a relevant sentencing consideration for regulatory offences and that incarceration is not per se unavailable for first offenders, but upheld the reduced sentences based on changed circumstances and the principle of restraint.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a contingency fee agreement provision requiring them to join in an application under section 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act for court approval of the inclusion of a percentage of legal costs paid to them as part of the solicitor's contingency fee.

The appellants argued that the provision was unenforceable and that they should have been permitted to oppose the application on the grounds that exceptional circumstances did not exist.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that the provision was enforceable and that the appellants were required to support the application.

The court also found that exceptional circumstances existed justifying the payment.