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The Court of Appeal upheld the summary dismissal of a borrower's action against a mortgage broker and lender over unfulfilled financing.
The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a mortgage broker and lender.
The appellant sought to refinance commercial properties he believed were worth $1.2 million with a $600,000 mortgage.
Two appraisers declined to complete appraisals at the requested valuation.
The lender eventually provided an appraisal showing a value of $600,000-$665,000 and offered revised financing of $390,000, which the appellant rejected.
The motion judge found no cause of action because the property was owned by a corporation, not the appellant, and no damages were caused by the respondents.
The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.
The Court of Appeal upheld the appellant's drug convictions, finding the search warrant was properly issued based on confidential informant evidence.
The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and possession of stolen property.
He appealed on the basis that evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant at his residence should have been excluded, arguing the reviewing justice erred in considering the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the credibility and reliability of three confidential informants using the Debot criteria and that reasonable grounds existed to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the residence.
The Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction over abducted children under section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act due to the risk of serious harm.
An appeal from a motion judge's order staying custody proceedings in Ontario and ordering the return of three adolescent children to Nigeria, their place of habitual residence.
The motion judge found that an Ontario court lacked jurisdiction under section 22 of the Children's Law Reform Act because the children were habitually resident in Nigeria and a custody application was pending there.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that although section 22 did not provide jurisdiction, section 23 of the CLRA permitted Ontario to exercise jurisdiction because the children would suffer serious harm if returned to Nigeria.
The serious harm was based primarily on evidence of physical discipline with objects by the father and the children's mature objections to returning.
The court granted interim custody to the mother with generous access to the father pending a full hearing on the merits.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the mortgagor's appeal of a summary judgment for possession following default.
The appellant defaulted on a residential mortgage held by the respondent.
The respondent obtained summary judgment for possession, which was granted unopposed by the motion judge.
The motion judge held the order in abeyance for five weeks to allow the appellant an opportunity to redeem the mortgage.
The appellant appealed and sought to admit fresh evidence and amend his statement of defence to file a counterclaim.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, found no arguable defence or counterclaim, and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.
The Court upheld the dismissal of a negligent misrepresentation claim regarding a bank's comfort letter.
Appeal from a trial judgment dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim.
The appellants, a manufacturer of assembly lines, contracted to supply equipment to a German company.
When the purchaser transferred the contract to its Canadian subsidiary, the appellants requested assurances from the parent company.
The respondents provided a letter from their bank confirming project financing and the parent company's guarantee.
When the project failed due to industry collapse, the appellants sued for negligent misrepresentation, claiming the letter was misleading because it failed to disclose that the bank's financing was conditional.
The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the representation was true and not misleading, and that the appellants had not reasonably relied on it.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no palpable and overriding error and no denial of procedural fairness.
The court granted an unopposed adjournment to allow an involuntary patient to attend his appeal hearing.
The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated February 16, 2017, regarding an application under the Health Care Consent Act.
The appellant, an involuntary patient at Brampton Civic Hospital, wished to attend the hearing of his appeal.
The respondent did not oppose the adjournment request.
The court granted the adjournment to a date to be fixed.
The Court of Appeal held that a law firm's potential vicarious liability for a lawyer practicing in association is a novel issue requiring a full trial.
The appellants, a law firm, appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their defamation action against a lawyer and her firm.
The lawyer, Brunning, practiced "in association" with Williams-Litigation Lawyers, sharing office space and using the firm's letterhead without supervision.
The motion judge found Williams could not be vicariously liable for Brunning's allegedly defamatory correspondence regarding Indian Residential School claims.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the question of liability was novel and important, involving policy considerations that should be determined at trial rather than on summary judgment.
The court emphasized that Williams had authorized Brunning's use of its letterhead and held her out as associated with the firm, creating potential liability.
The court upheld a summary judgment declaring life insurance proceeds payable to the estate following a valid policy assignment.
The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order declaring that life insurance proceeds from his deceased father's policy are payable to the father's estate.
The father had originally designated the appellant as a revocable beneficiary in 1998, but in 2006 executed an Assignment Policy Absolute that cancelled all previous beneficiary designations, making the estate the beneficiary.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the father clearly intended the estate to be the beneficiary through the 2006 Assignment and that there was no genuine issue requiring trial.
The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim.
The court dismissed the appeal to add a lawyer as a defendant because the claim was statute-barred.
The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing its motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add a lawyer as a party defendant.
The motion judge found that the claim could not succeed on the merits and was statute-barred.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on the basis that the claim was statute-barred, as the appellant had discovered or should have discovered its potential claim by 2014, more than two years before the motion to amend was brought in October 2016.
The appeal was dismissed with costs due to the appellant's failure to appear.
The appellant failed to appear at the scheduled appeal hearing despite being aware of the hearing date.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000, payable to Legal Aid Ontario, inclusive of disbursements and HST.
The Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment enforcing a vendor takeback mortgage following an unremedied default.
The appellants appealed from a summary judgment order granting judgment in favour of the respondents in two related actions concerning the sale of a property in Brampton.
The property was sold by the respondent Linda Hill to the appellant Fawzia Mary Mikhail with a vendor takeback mortgage.
The appellant Michael Mikhail guaranteed his mother's obligations under the mortgage.
The appellants defaulted on the mortgage beginning in May 2016, and the respondents issued a Notice of Sale.
The appellants sought to set aside the Notice of Sale and the respondents sought summary judgment.
The motion judge found a valid mortgage, proper notice of sale, and default since May 2016, and granted summary judgment.
The appellants argued they had missed only one payment by accident and quickly indicated willingness to correct the error, asserting the consequences were too severe.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's factual findings regarding the continuing default were supported by the record and that there was no evidence the default had been remedied.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the accused's appeal from convictions for sexual and physical offences.
The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his former common law wife and her three daughters.
He appealed on five grounds: refusal to sever the sexual assault charge involving the adult complainant; refusal to allow him to sit at counsel table; improper application of the collateral fact rule; jury instructions on similar fact evidence; and failure to correct alleged impropriety in Crown's closing address.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some errors occurred, they were not material and did not result in an unfair trial.
The Court of Appeal upheld a conviction, finding that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless police entry and a telewarrant was lawfully issued.
The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice on March 11, 2016.
The appeal concerned the lawfulness of a police entry and search of commercial premises.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that exigent circumstances justified the police entry prior to execution of the search warrant, that the officer's evidence regarding the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in person satisfied the requirements for a telewarrant, and that any misdescription of the municipal address constituted at most a minor technical error that did not justify exclusion of evidence.
The Court of Appeal upheld an aggravated assault conviction based on circumstantial evidence but ruled that sentencing judges lack jurisdiction to bifurcate a sentence.
The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as well as his sentence.
The offences occurred at a detention centre where the appellant and three co-accused attacked a fellow inmate in his cell.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred by drawing inferences to fill evidentiary gaps regarding what occurred inside the cell where there was no video surveillance.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for aggravated assault but set aside the convictions for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace on the basis of the Kienapple principle.
The Court also found the trial judge erred in law by bifurcating the sentence, ordering part of it to be served concurrently and part consecutively.
The sentence was varied to two and one-half years to be served consecutively to the appellant's existing sentences.
The Court of Appeal upheld the summary dismissal of a solicitor negligence claim because the appellant failed to prove any resulting loss.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of his negligence claim against a solicitor.
The appellant had retained the respondent solicitor to assume carriage of three actions.
The appellant alleged that the respondent's errors caused two actions to be dismissed and prevented execution of a judgment in one action, and that a third action was not prosecuted diligently, resulting in a judgment that could not be executed due to the defendant's bankruptcy.
The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence of negligence and no proven loss.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant failed to meet the onus on summary judgment to put his best foot forward and demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, particularly regarding causation and quantifiable loss.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Review Board's decision to maintain the appellant's maximum security placement due to public safety concerns.
The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 12, 2017, regarding his placement and security regime.
The appellant and Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care argued that the Board's decision was unreasonable.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable.
The Board had concluded that public safety would be compromised if the appellant was transferred unless the maximum security regime at Waypoint could be effectively replicated at the receiving hospital, which would negate the purpose of transfer.
The court noted that further assessment by an independent assessor remained possible at the appellant's annual hearing scheduled for early April.
The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of a father's motion to change support due to his persistent non-compliance with prior court orders.
The appellant father appealed an order of the Superior Court motion judge who struck his motion to change a trial judge's order for spousal and child support, and granted the Family Responsibility Office's motion for enforcement.
The trial judge had imputed annual income of $110,000 to the father and ordered him to pay ongoing spousal and child support for two daughters and an equalization payment.
The father had failed to comply with multiple court orders, owing over $60,000 in support arrears and over $50,000 in equalization payments.
The motion judge found the father had the means to pay but chose not to prioritize court-ordered payments.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary orders.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a frivolous claim alleging implanted microchips and medical misdiagnosis.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the Superior Court of Justice.
The appellant's statement of claim alleged that criminals associated with government had implanted microchips in his body and brain, and that a hospital had misdiagnosed him with schizophrenia when the real cause was the implanted microchips.
He sought damages of $350 billion.
The trial judge dismissed the action without notice to the appellant, finding that the claim disclosed no cause of action and that the appellant required medical assistance.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision.
The Court of Appeal upheld a jury's $225,000 general damages award, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of late expert evidence or inflammatory closing submissions.
Appeal from a Superior Court judgment in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.
The defendant-appellants admitted liability, and the sole issue was damages.
A jury awarded substantial damages for future loss of income, cost of medical care, and $225,000 in general damages for pain and suffering.
The appellants challenged the award on three grounds: restriction of expert testimony, failure to declare a mistrial due to inappropriate closing submissions, and insufficient guidance on the range for non-pecuniary damages.
The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the jury's award.
Park regulation prohibiting abusive language is constitutional; banning a profane political sign is not.
The appellant displayed a sign reading "Trump is right.
Fuck China.
Fuck Mexico" in Grand View Plaza within Niagara Parks.
The Niagara Parks Police issued a summons for violations of section 2(9)(a) of Ontario Regulation 829 under the Niagara Parks Act, which prohibits abusive or insulting language that interferes with the use and enjoyment of the parks.
The appellant was also issued an oral trespass notice.
The application judge dismissed the constitutional challenge.
On appeal, the court held that while section 2(9)(a) does limit freedom of expression under the Charter, the limitation is justified under section 1.
However, the court found that the trespass notice was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's political expression.