Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that no valid Agreement of Purchase and Sale existed between a builder and a purchaser.

The builder agreed to construct a home in Welland.

The purchaser made unilateral amendments to Schedule D of the agreement (striking out "builder's samples" in six places) without the builder's knowledge or consent.

When a dispute arose over the choice of kitchen cabinet supplier, the application judge found no meeting of the minds due to the parties' fundamentally different understandings of the contract terms, particularly regarding supplier selection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the application judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and that the builder had acted reasonably throughout the dispute.

The appellants appealed their convictions for methamphetamine production and possession, and challenged a pre-trial ruling dismissing their Charter applications.

The appellants obtained a residential property through fraud and converted it into a methamphetamine laboratory.

They were arrested during a police search warrant execution.

The application judge found the appellants lacked standing to bring a section 8 Charter claim and dismissed their section 7 claim as lacking factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, concluding that the appellants' tenuous connection to the property through fraudulent means, combined with their temporary and illegal use of it, precluded any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant obtained using information from a confidential informant.

The warrant was executed at night and resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 grams of cocaine and $46,000 in cash.

The appellants challenged the warrant on multiple grounds, including the use of the Garofoli step six procedure, the adequacy of the judicial summary of redacted information, whether the confidential informant's tip met the Debot criteria for reliability, and whether the night search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the warrant was valid and the search lawful.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The complainant testified that she would not have consented to sexual intercourse three weeks after giving birth.

However, a sexual assault questionnaire completed at the hospital on the day of the alleged assault indicated that the complainant had reported consensual intercourse two days prior to the assault.

Trial counsel failed to notice this answer in the questionnaire and did not bring a section 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on this prior sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to attempt a section 276 application constituted ineffective representation that undermined the reliability of the verdict and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum available under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence and varied it to 24 months' custody and supervision (16 months secure custody and 8 months community supervision), with 494 days of custody credited against the sentence, followed by 12 months' probation with specified conditions.

The court considered fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's rehabilitative progress.

The appellant was convicted of theft over $5,000, break and enter, two counts of possession of property for the purpose of trafficking, and one count of possession of property obtained by crime.

He appealed his convictions on grounds that the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, applied stricter scrutiny to the defence case, provided insufficient reasons, and misapprehended evidence.

The appellant also argued that two convictions should be stayed under Kienapple as included offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most grounds of appeal but allowed the appeal in part, staying two convictions as included offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an incident involving an argument and physical interaction between the appellant and a passenger, during which the appellant's vehicle struck and injured the passenger and collided with a retaining wall.

The appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no inconsistency between the acquittals and the conviction, and upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle warranting intervention.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana), possession of a prohibited device, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, less credit for pre-disposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 42 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged: (1) the trial judge's decision to apply section 653.1 of the Criminal Code to bind the parties by a prior ruling refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant; (2) the correctness of that prior ruling; and (3) the trial judge's rejection of the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

An appeal from a Superior Court order striking out a notice of objection to the passing of accounts in the estate of Lidia Iaboni.

The appellant, Carlo Iaboni, objected to the respondents' administration of his parents' estates on grounds of alleged misappropriation of funds.

The motions judge struck the notice of objection on three bases: lack of merit, abuse of process (attempting to relitigate a dismissed action), and being time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motions judge and noting that the appellant's factual allegations were not substantiated.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of her action seeking to invalidate two wills of her great-aunt on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval of contents, and undue influence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge misapprehended the medical evidence regarding testamentary capacity and failed to distinguish between capacity to manage property and testamentary capacity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, holding that the appellant failed to establish special circumstances to rebut the presumption of testamentary capacity and that the trial judge's conclusion was fully supported by the evidence.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants appealed the decision of Justice Fred Myers dated April 12, 2017.

The Court of Appeal reviewed written submissions on costs and determined that the appellants must pay the respondent's costs in the fixed amount of $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

An insured brought an action against international insurers for breach of an insurance contract.

The insurers moved to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration in London, England pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding that the "Action Against Insurer" endorsement provided an alternative method of dispute resolution allowing domestic court proceedings.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was mandatory and the sole method of dispute resolution, and that the "Action Against Insurer" clause was a service of suit provision that did not conflict with the arbitration clause.

The court also clarified that the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration applies to agreements providing for arbitration of certain disputes, not only those providing for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution.

The appellant brought four related actions against various respondents arising from dealings that occurred primarily in the United States between 2001 and 2016.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a real and substantial connection to the province.

The motion judges granted the motions and dismissed all actions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether Ontario jurisdiction existed based on: (1) consulting contracts allegedly entered into at Toronto airport; (2) products being advertised, marketed, and distributed in Ontario; and (3) respondents carrying on business in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissals, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario and affirming that mere advertising or distribution through third-party retailers does not constitute carrying on business in the jurisdiction.

The respondent appealed a Superior Court judgment that granted the applicant's application to enforce her rights under a Governance Agreement concerning the replacement of Board members of Spectrum Health Care.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in interpreting the contract, should have stayed the application pursuant to an arbitration clause in the shareholders' agreement, and erred in alternative findings regarding oppression remedy and interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the Governance Agreement or his analysis of the alternate remedies.

The appellant, a minor injured when a barista poured scalding hot water on her hands at a Starbucks location, appealed the motion judge's decision striking the Statement of Claim against the individual defendants (the barista and store manager).

The motion judge had struck the claim on two grounds: that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that suing the individuals constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that employees can be personally liable for their own negligence while acting within the scope of employment, and that naming individual defendants for discovery purposes does not constitute an abuse of process when a proper cause of action has been pleaded against them.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment in a matrimonial property dispute.

The trial judge found that a declaration of trust and a $300,000 second mortgage were sham documents designed to defeat the respondent wife's interest in the matrimonial condominium.

The trial judge awarded the respondent an equalization payment of $100,500 and rejected an unequal division of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, finding no basis to interfere with the credibility assessments or the detailed reasons for finding the documents to be shams.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their claims against the Toronto Police Services Board.

The appellants argued that criminal proceedings were a nullity because the information was not properly vetted by the Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal found this issue was irrelevant to the summary judgment motion.

The appellants failed to file evidence supporting their claim that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and did not cross-examine the respondents' extensive material.

The motion judge correctly found the respondents met their onus.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants sought to review an order of Roberts J.A. refusing to extend the time to file a motion to review and set aside a security for costs order made by Laforme J.A., and to obtain a stay of both that order and the underlying summary judgment.

The appellants had defaulted under two mortgages and obtained summary judgment against them.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with Roberts J.A.'s decision, which was based on the appeal being wholly without merit and the justice of the case not warranting the orders sought.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted on an indictment containing ten counts of various offences against three persons, with allegations spanning periods of 8 to 10 years.

On appeal from conviction, the appellant advanced two grounds: first, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, subjecting Crown witnesses to a less rigorous standard than defence witnesses; and second, that the trial judge improperly imposed an evidentiary burden on the appellant to explain injuries sustained by one complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons reflected a cautious, even-handed approach to credibility assessment and that the trial judge's comments regarding the unexplained injuries were merely observations on the state of evidence rather than an improper shift in the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed a disposition issued by the Ontario Review Board that imposed additional restrictions on his community access, reducing his indirectly supervised community access to a maximum of four hours with an approved itinerary and reducing day passes from seven days indirectly supervised to three days directly supervised.

The appellant challenged the disposition on multiple grounds, including that it was not the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, that the Board failed to carry out its inquisitorial mandate, that the Board focused exclusively on public safety, that a treatment impasse existed requiring Board intervention, and that the Board failed to consult the complete risk assessment report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the Board's disposition.