Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 8, 2016, challenging the motion judge's assessment of damages and raising allegations of negligence and dishonesty against the respondent's lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's assessment of loss.

The court rejected the appellant's claims regarding solicitor negligence, noting that such claims raised in the context of an appeal can only succeed in the rarest of cases and would require evidence of collusion, which was absent here.

The court held that solicitor negligence claims are not the appropriate subject of an appeal and should be pursued through separate litigation against the lawyer.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had not demonstrated any error in the court below and dismissed the appeal without costs.

A motion to reconsider an order by Justice Gloria Epstein dismissing an appeal for delay.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal, arguing inadequate notice and that the time for perfection should be extended.

The Court of Appeal upheld Epstein J.A.'s decision, finding no merit in the appellant's submissions and confirming that the entire history of the proceeding could be considered in assessing delay.

The appeal was properly dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant and respondent appealed from a trial judge's order dealing with child support and spousal support.

The appellant sought to characterize a $75,000 advance as a payment on account of spousal support, while the respondent contended that the trial judge erred in calculating the length of cohabitation as 13 years instead of 16.5 years, which affected the duration of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding the $75,000 payment and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the period of cohabitation should be 16 years and 5 months, resulting in an increased duration of spousal support from 11 years to 14 years from the date of separation.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice refusing to adjourn an application.

The appellant argued it was denied procedural fairness as it was unrepresented, had taken steps to prepare a response, and there had been no prior adjournments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's discretionary decision to refuse the adjournment, finding that the request appeared to be an attempt to delay proceedings.

The court noted the appellant's pattern of resisting performance of contractual obligations through litigation and its relative inaction in the seven weeks between service and the return date.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a successful federal election candidate in 2008, was convicted of exceeding his election expense limit, wilfully exceeding his personal contribution limit, and filing a false election campaign return.

He paid $21,000 personally for voter identification and get-out-the-vote services from a contractor, circumventing campaign spending limits, and then conspired to file a false return reporting only $1,575 in expenses.

The trial judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Judge upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "election expense" under the Canada Elections Act, arguing that the Crown must prove the actual use and commercial value of services purchased.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory definition of election expense is clear and unambiguous, and that expenses are measured by the cost incurred, not the value of goods or services consumed.

The court also upheld the application of Criminal Code party liability provisions to Canada Elections Act offences.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He brought two applications for a stay of proceedings based on infringement of his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The first application was dismissed on September 25, 2015, and the second was brought following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Jordan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of both applications and dismissed the appeal against conviction.

Crown appeal from the acquittal of Aasif Patel on charges of first degree murder and second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Lorenzo Martinez.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code (common unlawful purpose) and in his instructions regarding section 21(1) liability (aiding and abetting).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had materially changed its legal theory between trial and appeal, which would be unfair to the respondent and offend double jeopardy principles.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instructions on causation or on the relationship between the liability of the principal and the party.

The appellant appealed his conviction from the Ontario Court of Justice on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the ineffective assistance of counsel undermined the validity of the verdict and resulted in unfair trial procedures constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence on the grounds that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-trial custody and that such denial constituted an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal found that while the absence of explicit reasons was concerning, the trial judge's decision was justified based on the nature of the manslaughter conviction, the appellant's institutional record showing gratuitous violence, his significant criminal history, and his refusal to address addiction issues.

The court concluded this was a rare case where enhanced credit should not be granted.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered correction of the warrant of committal to reflect 1:1 credit for 1083 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and his four-year sentence.

The sole issue on appeal concerned the trial judge's treatment of identification evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly account for frailties in the identification evidence provided by Officer Snyder and erred in relying on corroborating evidence from a witness.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence, finding that the identification circumstances were excellent and the corroborating evidence was properly used.

The appellant's extensive history of similar driving offences supported the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault arising from incidents in a domestic relationship.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony, which the appellant denied.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the limited use of prior consistent statements; whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of mistaken belief in consent; and whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit evidence of other sexual activity between the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

This appeal concerns a child relocation motion where the mother sought to move her five-year-old son from Cochrane, Ontario to Thunder Bay.

The parties had joint and shared custody following their separation in November 2015.

The motion judge dismissed the mother's relocation motion, finding that the child would lose meaningful contact with his father and that the mother's financial difficulties were self-imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the mother as the primary caregiver and by making a palpable and overriding error in concluding that the mother's financial difficulties were self-imposed.

The court found a valid and compelling parenting-based reason for the move, as it was necessary to enable the primary caregiver to remain financially viable while providing care for the child.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claim for economic damages.

The appellant argued that the respondents breached their obligation to properly quantify post-closing costs, which impeded the appellant's ability to obtain financing for phase II of a development.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly addressed the appellant's submissions and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing that there was an understanding that the respondent had a 24-hour cooling-off period to withdraw from a deal, and that the respondent failed to communicate this understanding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the evidence was too tentative to support a legally enforceable cooling-off provision, and that even if such a provision existed, the appellants failed to demonstrate that withdrawal was communicated within the 24-hour period.

The appellants' damages claim was found to be speculative.

The appellant protested outside town hall with a megaphone against a municipal by-law permitting a medical marijuana facility to be built near his home.

Town employees expressed fear for their safety, and the town issued a one-year trespass notice banning the appellant from all town property.

The application judge found the appellant's protest was violent and therefore not protected by the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant's protest was peaceful expression protected by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the trespass notice unjustifiably limited his freedom of expression.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking arising from the discovery of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in Scarborough containing approximately 150 kilograms of drugs with a street value of $12 million.

The appellant challenged the verdicts as unreasonable, inconsistent with his acquittal on production charges, and inconsistent with the trial judge's finding that he lacked standing under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of 8 years as manifestly unfit and sought a 12-year sentence with delayed parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and making child pornography available, as well as his sentence.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in not providing reasons for dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application; (2) the trial judge erred in not finding a breach of section 8 Charter rights; (3) the trial judge erred in credibility assessments of defence witnesses; and (4) the trial judge erred in not applying the Kienapple principle to stay one conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, though it acknowledged that the trial judge had erred in failing to provide reasons for the section 11(b) decision and that the Crown's warrantless request for Internet subscriber information violated section 8 rights.

However, the Court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) given the seriousness of the offences and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the scope of a judge's jurisdiction under section 36(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act to direct a police force to enforce a child custody and access order.

The motion judge ordered the Ontario Provincial Police to enforce a custody and access order in place of the Waterloo Regional Police Service due to an inherent conflict of interest arising from the father's membership in the WRPS and allegations that the WRPS had inappropriately intervened to further the father's interests.

The appellants argued the motion judge lacked authority to impose such an obligation and that only the Ontario Civilian Police Commission could determine whether a municipal police force had failed to provide adequate policing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that section 36(2) permits a judge to specify any police force having jurisdiction in the area where the child may be found, and that in exceptional circumstances such as this, a judge may order the OPP to assist where the municipal police force cannot act due to a conflict of interest.

A self-represented litigant subject to a vexatious litigant order sought a stay of that order pending appeal.

She brought a motion in the Court of Appeal for Ontario seeking both leave to bring the motion and the stay itself, rather than following the prescribed written procedure under rule 38.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion was dismissed by a Superior Court judge as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that leave to bring a motion for a stay of a vexatious litigant order must be obtained from the Superior Court in writing pursuant to rule 38.13, and that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant such leave.

The court rejected the argument that the right to appeal a vexatious litigant order without leave necessarily extends to seeking a stay of that order.