Alison Harvison Young

The appellant, a formerly licensed lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his $15 million action against his former counsel for negligent legal advice and ineffective assistance during contempt proceedings.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 21.01(3)(d) as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on previous contempt findings.

The court also upheld the motion judge's finding regarding the limited scope of the retainer, which did not obligate counsel to adduce the additional evidence the appellant claimed was missing, and concluded that such evidence would not have altered the original contempt finding based on the appellant's collusion with his former client.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, Paccar Leasing Company Ltd., appealed a motion judge's order that Royal Bank of Canada's perfected security interest in a debtor's property prevailed over Paccar's unperfected security interest in leased commercial trucks.

Paccar argued that its "true lease" meant it retained title, giving it priority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the 2007 amendments to the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) prioritize perfected security interests over common law notions of title, even for true leases, if the lessor fails to perfect their interest.

The appellant was convicted of firearm charges and appealed, arguing that his initial arrest for breach of an undertaking was unlawful, leading to an illegal search and discovery of the firearm, thus violating his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest due to their failure to check an available database (Versadex) for consent to communicate, constituting a s. 9 Charter breach.

However, the Court also determined that the police had independent lawful grounds to search the vehicle under the Cannabis Control Act, 2017, based on observations of marijuana possession.

Applying a fresh s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that despite the s. 9 breach, the firearm evidence should not be excluded, as the impact on the appellant's Charter rights was minimal (due to the lawful CCA search) and society's interest in adjudicating serious charges on their merits strongly favored admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, an investment syndicate holding a first mortgage, appealed an order denying their priority over a second mortgagee (Greenpath) for certain disputed amounts from a power of sale.

The application judge found these amounts were not properly part of the first mortgage and constituted prohibited penalties under s. 8(1) of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the forbearance agreement was separate from the first mortgage and not enforceable against the second mortgagee, and that the disputed prepayment and default fees were unlawful penalties under the Interest Act due to lack of evidence proving they were legitimate costs.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied their applications for habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's refusal to reclassify and transfer them to lower-security institutions.

The application judge found that these denials did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the application judge's finding, concluding that a refusal to reclassify an inmate to a lower security level, without a change in the conditions of detention or an entitlement to greater liberty, does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus.

The Court affirmed that the existing grievance procedure and judicial review in the Federal Court are the appropriate avenues for such challenges.

The dissenting judge argued that an unlawful reclassification refusal could crystallize an initially lawful deprivation of liberty into an unlawful one, making it reviewable by habeas corpus.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of sexual assault, one count of sexual touching, and one count of showing pornographic materials to a minor, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding him guilty of an incident that allegedly occurred at the complainant's grandmother's house, claiming it was outside the scope of the charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the incident fell within the broad scope of the indictment, which specified a time period and town rather than precise locations.

The court reiterated that the Crown is not bound to prove its specific theory of the case if the conviction falls within the indictment's scope and the defence had a full and fair opportunity to defend, which was found to be the case here given the extensive cross-examination and closing submissions by trial counsel regarding the incident.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking, one count of simple possession, and two counts of breach of probation, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal challenged the trial judge's dismissal of a pre-trial Charter application, arguing that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search violated his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in concluding that seized fentanyl and fentanyl/cocaine mixture were for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including confidential informant information and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trafficking convictions, finding the evidence overwhelming despite a minor error by the trial judge regarding a concession.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The central issue on appeal concerned the proper use of an accused's mixed statement (containing both inculpatory and exculpatory elements) when introduced by the Crown, and when the accused subsequently testifies consistently with the exculpatory part.

The trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the exculpatory aspect of the out-of-court statements could not be used for their truth.

The Court of Appeal clarified that such mixed statements, when led by the Crown, are admissible for the truth of their contents, regardless of whether the accused later testifies consistently.

However, the jury must be cautioned against impermissible lines of reasoning, such as inferring truth from mere repetition or using the prior statement as independent corroboration.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's erroneous instruction and the resulting confusion and prejudice to the accused.

The appellant wife appealed several orders from a half-day trial concerning spousal support, equalization, and the matrimonial home.

The appeal raised three main arguments: error in ordering occupation rent, failure to assist the self-represented litigant, and error in valuing the respondent's Alberta pension for equalization purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's discretionary findings on occupation rent, finding no reversible error in assisting the self-represented litigant, and confirming the Alberta pension's value crystallized before marriage.

This appeal concerned the appropriate remedy for a party who deliberately accessed the opposing party's privileged information.

The application judge had struck the appellant's Notice of Appearance, barred them from filing evidence, and ordered the Partition Application to proceed undefended.

The appellant argued that this remedy was unpleaded, unproven, and that lesser remedies were available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found no error in applying the three-part test for unauthorized access to privileged documents, particularly given the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice or propose effective alternative remedies.

This appeal concerned the distribution of proceeds from a property sale, specifically regarding the priority of a third mortgage, an alleged equitable fourth mortgage, and a writ of execution.

The appellants, lenders, sought recognition of an equitable fourth mortgage and a specific interest calculation for their third mortgage.

The respondents, execution creditors, challenged the third mortgage's interest rate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, declaring the existence of an equitable fourth mortgage, but dismissed the appellants' claim for interest to run until full payout.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding the third mortgage interest rate was dismissed.

The appellant, OZ Optics Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its action against two former general counsel, Diane Lesley Evans and Samuel Edgar Schwisberg, following a successful motion for summary judgment.

The action alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and negligent performance of service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the bench, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims were amenable to summary judgment, that Evans's actions did not constitute a breach or cause loss, and that Schwisberg's obligations under a holdover clause were absolved by the appellant's actions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The respondent was acquitted of child luring, with the trial judge finding him reckless as to the complainants' ages but concluding recklessness was insufficient mens rea based on a misinterpretation of R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal clarified that recklessness as to age is sufficient mens rea for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code where the Crown proves an actual child complainant, distinguishing this from police sting operations.

However, as the trial judge did not make findings on the respondent's subjective intent to facilitate a secondary offence, the appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

He argued that the sentencing judge provided insufficient reasons, failed to properly consider treatability at the designation stage, and improperly placed an evidentiary burden on him to prove a reasonable expectation of eventual control in the community.

He also argued that the trial amicus curiae failed to ensure a fair hearing by conceding that he met the dangerous offender criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant patently met the statutory thresholds for the designation based on a pattern of violent sexual assaults.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not impose an improper burden of proof and that the trial amicus curiae's performance did not cause actual prejudice or create an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

This appeal was dismissed as abandoned due to the appellants' failure to appear.

The respondent was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants brought a motion to traverse their appeal to the Divisional Court.

The respondent consented to the transfer early on a without-costs basis, but the appellants unreasonably refused and sought costs against the respondent's counsel personally without basis.

The court granted the transfer on consent and awarded the respondent substantial indemnity costs of the motion due to the appellants' unreasonable conduct.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed a lower court decision regarding a share purchase agreement with his former employer.

The dispute centered on interest payments, alleged breach of good faith, and repudiation of the agreement.

The application judge found no breach of good faith or repudiation, ordered payment of overdue interest, T5 form corrections, and post-judgment interest, but denied pre-judgment interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings on good faith and repudiation, affirming that the employer's failure to pay some interest did not constitute repudiation as principal payments continued.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision on pre-judgment interest, ordering it at the rate set out in the agreement.

The appellant, Matthew Paik, initiated private prosecutions against six police officers, alleging they illegally preserved surveillance video.

The Crown intervened to withdraw these charges, asserting a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for prosecution.

Paik sought certiorari in the Superior Court, arguing the Crown's intervention was in bad faith and an abuse of process.

The Superior Court dismissed his application, finding the Crown's actions appropriate and no evidence of bad faith.

Paik appealed this decision, as well as an earlier order concerning the disclosure of police officers' birth dates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Crown's discretion to withdraw private prosecutions when reasonable and probable grounds are absent, and noting the appellant failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of process.

The court also found the appeal regarding the disclosure of birth dates to be moot given the withdrawal of the underlying charges.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal.

The court reviewed cost submissions and concluded that while success in the underlying appeal was divided, the respondent wife (appellant on the cross-appeal) achieved greater overall success than the husband.

Consequently, costs in the amount of $10,000 were awarded to the wife, payable by the husband.