Lise G. Favreau

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address discrepancies between the complainant's evidence and that of her sister, and misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's demeanour upon disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons were responsive to the issues and disclosed no misapprehension of evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to find that discrepancies were explained by the passage of time and to rely on the consistent evidence of the complainant's emotional upset during disclosure to support her credibility and reliability.

The appellants, a police officer and an employee of the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted of defrauding an elderly man's estate using a fabricated will.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing errors in the trial judge's refusal to stay proceedings for a Charter breach, admission of after-the-fact conduct evidence regarding the concealment of their affair, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sentences imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous operation causing death and failure to stop after an accident causing death.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the truck that struck and killed a pedestrian.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of video surveillance evidence under Nikolovski, failed to apply W.(D.) to exculpatory evidence, and misapprehended evidence regarding the vehicle's features.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the extensive video evidence tracing the appellant's vehicle and properly considered all potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

The appellant appealed the refusal to terminate a SOIRA order after obtaining a pardon.

The court held that the application judge properly applied the statutory criteria in s. 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and the mandatory factors in s. 490.016(1.1), and made no error in principle in concluding the appellant failed to prove either no connection to the registry's purpose or gross disproportionality.

The court rejected arguments that a pardon alone justified termination, that the Crown had to file the pardon materials, and that the seriousness of the predicate offences had been overstated.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence motion because the materials were unsworn and did not satisfy the Palmer criteria.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a triple shooting, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that no eyewitness-identification instruction was required because the surviving victim had known the appellant for many years and the real frailties in the evidence concerned memory and reliability, which were adequately covered in the charge.

The court further held that the jury was sufficiently instructed on the proper use of after-the-fact conduct evidence and that the surviving victim's spontaneous post-shooting statements were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to hearsay.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the 25-year parole ineligibility period for the second degree murder convictions was upheld as fit and free of error in principle.

The appellant challenged drug, proceeds, and firearm-related convictions arising from a search of a residence and a vehicle, arguing unreasonable verdict and misapprehension of evidence.

The court held that, on the circumstantial record, the trial judge could not reasonably infer constructive possession of the cash hidden behind a cabinet or the oxycodone found in plain view in a room occupied by four men, because knowledge and control specific to the appellant were not the only reasonable inferences.

In contrast, the appellant's observed operation of the vehicle, possession of its keys, the location of the hidden firearm and cocaine near the driver's seat, and the surrounding evidence of trafficking reasonably supported the vehicle-related convictions.

Acquittals were substituted on the residence-related counts, the balance of the appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing a detention order for a not criminally responsible accused who sought an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued that the Board’s reasons were insufficient, that its significant-threat finding was unreasonable, and that it misapprehended the treating psychiatrist’s evidence regarding medication compliance and substance abstinence.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the Board’s analysis was brief and imperfect, the reasons read as a whole and in light of the record adequately explained why the appellant remained a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The court found the risk assessment was grounded in evidence of poor insight, prior failed community placement, substance-use history connected to the index offence, and the very recent return to community living.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged jury convictions arising from a series of violent offences and a police chase, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because the identification evidence was tainted and unreliable.

The court held that, although several eyewitness identifications had significant frailties, the jury was carefully instructed and there remained a safe path to conviction based on one potentially untainted lineup identification together with substantial confirmatory circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also challenged his dangerous offender designation on the basis that the sentencing judge did not expressly consider treatability and intractability at the designation stage.

Applying the framework in dangerous offender jurisprudence, the court held that any omission was immaterial because the sentencing judge’s findings at the penalty stage established there was no more than speculative hope of treatment reducing the appellant’s risk to an acceptable level.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a seven-year consecutive penitentiary sentence imposed after a guilty plea to possessing a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm without authorization or licence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by exceeding the Crown's five-year position without notice, contrary to the framework in Nahanee, and by providing erroneous reasons for doing so.

The sentencing judge misread the applicable sentencing range in Tabnor, failed to give effect to the guilty plea and youthful first-offender status, and improperly disregarded rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to five years' imprisonment consecutive to any sentences being served.

Six organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal from an order dismissing the certification of a proposed class action regarding the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in the child welfare system.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to the Anishinabek Nation, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the Chiefs of Ontario, and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, finding they would provide useful and unique perspectives on the issues raised on appeal.

The motions by the Hiawatha First Nation and Nigig Nibi Ki-win Gamik were dismissed because their proposed submissions would improperly expand the scope of the appeal and the evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order varying spousal support due to the respondent's imminent retirement and dismissing her motion for retroactive adjustment.

The motion judge found a material change in circumstances based on the appellant's increased medical expenses and the respondent's retirement, ordering support to terminate after a two-year transitional period.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis of the compensatory support termination or the denial of retroactive support, noting the deferential standard of review for support orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 because the arresting officer's subjective belief for the arrest was not objectively reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Grant analysis that would displace the deference owed to such determinations.

The appellant, a driving instructor, appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a student during a lesson.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny, misapprehended evidence, and improperly relied on social norms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and noting that the trial judge properly applied common sense and human experience.

The parties married in Belgium and moved to Ontario shortly before separating.

The appellant husband initiated divorce proceedings in Belgium, while the respondent wife initiated proceedings in Ontario, including claims for property equalization.

The Belgian court ruled it had jurisdiction over the liquidation of the matrimonial regime but not the divorce itself.

The appellant brought a motion in Ontario arguing that Ontario lacked jurisdiction over the property claims or, alternatively, that Belgium was the clearly more appropriate forum (forum non conveniens).

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario had jurisdiction and that the appellant failed to show Belgium was the clearly more appropriate forum, especially given the risk of multiplicity of proceedings if the property claims were split from the divorce and support claims.

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order authorizing a court-appointed Sales Officer to enter into agreements to separate joint venture interests in real estate projects as part of a corporate wind-up.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it was a step in implementing the wind-up and sale process, not a final determination of substantive rights.

Furthermore, the Court held that the order was made pursuant to the Business Corporations Act, meaning any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The appellant property developer sued the respondent municipal councillor for defamation after she made a police complaint about him following an altercation.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action lacked substantial merit as the mere making of a police complaint that is closed without charges does not constitute defamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant tenant appealed the dismissal of its application to restrain the respondent landlord from terminating its commercial lease.

The landlord relied on a 30-day termination clause from a 1998 amending agreement.

The tenant argued that subsequent amending agreements, which included a six-month termination clause conditional on redevelopment, indicated the 30-day clause was confined to the 1998 extension term.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by failing to address this key argument regarding contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment holding it jointly liable with a related corporation for wrongful dismissal under the common employer doctrine.

The court held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, made findings available on the record, and committed no palpable and overriding error in concluding that both corporations jointly ran the hotel and intended to create an employment relationship with the deceased employee.

The court also upheld the conclusion that res judicata and abuse of process did not bar the estate's subsequent claim against the appellant, because the appellant was not a defendant in the initial action and the corporate relationship was not easily discernable.

The appeal was dismissed with partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The appellant challenged a conditional discharge from bankruptcy requiring him to satisfy several conditions, including payment of approximately $13.6 million into the bankruptcy estate.

He argued that the monetary condition was improper because there was no evidence he could fulfill it and also challenged the remaining terms of discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge made no error in principle, that the monetary condition fell within the court's discretionary authority under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the conditions were justified on the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the trustee.

The moving parties (plaintiffs) brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order adding them as defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The responding parties argued the order was final because it definitively dismissed their limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's findings regarding the limitation period were preliminary and did not preclude the responding parties from pleading the defence at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, the appeal was quashed, and the matter was transferred to the Divisional Court.