Lise G. Favreau

In a commercial lease dispute, the appellants challenged findings that the landlord breached the lease and acted in bad faith by terminating access to loading facilities central to the tenant’s business operations.

The court upheld the application judge’s lease interpretation, including that contractual improvements and related access rights could not be nullified through redesignation of common areas.

The court also upheld the finding of repudiatory breach, rejecting the argument that temporary restoration under a without prejudice consent order cured the breach.

A new argument that the tenant had irrevocably affirmed the lease was not entertained on appeal and was unpersuasive in any event.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against the respondent homeowners after she slipped and fell on their staircase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in excluding the first set of expert slip resistance testing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's gatekeeping decision under the White Burgess framework, as the excluded testing differed materially from the actual conditions.

Even if the exclusion were erroneous, no miscarriage of justice resulted because the tampering theory was still advanced at trial through other evidence and the jury's verdict turned on the credibility of the parties.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring the respondent the beneficial owner of 15% of a corporation's shares and finding their conduct oppressive under the OBCA.

The appellants narrowed their appeal to challenge only the order requiring production of financial statements dating back to 2014.

The Court of Appeal held that the production order was ancillary to the respondent's damages claim, not a standalone shareholder rights claim subject to a limitation period, and that compliance required only producing existing documents.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $30,000.

The moving parties sought to re-open a dismissed appeal more than three years after this court dismissed their appeal from a summary judgment order enforcing four mortgages.

The court considered the motion under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving parties failed to meet the high threshold for re-opening, having raised unsustainable allegations of fraud and misconduct that were or could have been previously advanced.

The motion to re-open was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court refusing to order payment into court of a "costs reserve." The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, characterizing the order as interlocutory and akin to an order dismissing a motion for security for costs.

The court directed that an appeal from such an order must be brought to the Divisional Court, with leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the agreed amount of $7,500 all inclusive.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, transferred $400,000 to herself from her late stepfather's estate, claiming it was an inter vivos gift.

The respondent successfully challenged the transfer at first instance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred by excluding the stepfather's investment advisor's notes as hearsay and by finding the gift was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the exclusion of the notes as double hearsay under the Evidence Act and affirming the finding that the stepfather lacked a continuing intention to make the specific gift.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

The moving parties sought a panel review of a motion judge's order requiring them to pay $19,365.37 in costs for their abandoned appeal.

They argued the motion judge erred by refusing an adjournment to cross-examine the respondent's affiant and by fixing an unreasonable amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding cross-examination and costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application to remove a construction lien registered by the respondent for sewage backup remediation work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal or if it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The parties agreed that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that decisions made in reliance on the Construction Act, including orders discharging or refusing to discharge a lien, must be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred accordingly.

The appellants challenged dismissal of their action as an abuse of process.

The court agreed the claim repeated issues from prior mortgage litigation and also dismissed the fresh-evidence motion.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences against two sisters.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting cross-count similar fact evidence and prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the similar fact evidence had significant probative value that outweighed its prejudicial effect, and properly admitted the prior consistent statements under the narrative exception to explain the delay in reporting.

The appellants, FedEx, appealed an order certifying a class proceeding brought by the respondent, who alleged FedEx charged undisclosed and unsolicited customs brokerage fees in breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

FedEx argued the claim disclosed no cause of action, lacked common issues, and had an overly broad class definition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the systemic nature of the billing practices raised common issues, and the class definition appropriately included claims that might face limitation or jurisdictional defences, which are better addressed at trial.

Two defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding substantial damages for breach of fuel-delivery contracts and for inducing breach.

The court upheld findings that Remote breached contract and good faith duties, that Wasaya induced the breach, and that mitigation findings were available on the record.

However, it held the trial judge erred by not applying the contractual limitation clause, reducing Remote’s liability to $50,000 while leaving Wasaya liable for $856,458.

The appellant advanced two criminal appeals and sought an adjournment to retain counsel and add new grounds.

The court refused adjournment, found no reversible error in conviction or sentencing processes, and held the appellant had already received ample procedural accommodation.

Both appeals were dismissed.