Lise G. Favreau

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against the respondent homeowners after she slipped and fell on their staircase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in excluding the first set of expert slip resistance testing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's gatekeeping decision under the White Burgess framework, as the excluded testing differed materially from the actual conditions.

Even if the exclusion were erroneous, no miscarriage of justice resulted because the tampering theory was still advanced at trial through other evidence and the jury's verdict turned on the credibility of the parties.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring the respondent the beneficial owner of 15% of a corporation's shares and finding their conduct oppressive under the OBCA.

The appellants narrowed their appeal to challenge only the order requiring production of financial statements dating back to 2014.

The Court of Appeal held that the production order was ancillary to the respondent's damages claim, not a standalone shareholder rights claim subject to a limitation period, and that compliance required only producing existing documents.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $30,000.

The moving parties sought to re-open a dismissed appeal more than three years after this court dismissed their appeal from a summary judgment order enforcing four mortgages.

The court considered the motion under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving parties failed to meet the high threshold for re-opening, having raised unsustainable allegations of fraud and misconduct that were or could have been previously advanced.

The motion to re-open was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court refusing to order payment into court of a "costs reserve." The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, characterizing the order as interlocutory and akin to an order dismissing a motion for security for costs.

The court directed that an appeal from such an order must be brought to the Divisional Court, with leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the agreed amount of $7,500 all inclusive.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

In the context of a receivership involving a partially constructed residential development, the debtors' representative sought to appeal orders approving a sales process and specific vesting orders.

The Receiver brought a motion declaring no appeal as of right existed, while the debtors sought an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held there was no appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the debtors failed to demonstrate a direct loss exceeding $10,000.

The Court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the progress of the receivership.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on other firearm charges, and appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the jury to find constructive possession of the fentanyl and one firearm while having a reasonable doubt about the other.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a youthful first-time offender.

The sentence for the drug offence was reduced from 13 years to 10 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to quash a vehicle search warrant and denying leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the ITO relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip and speculative police surveillance, and was drafted with gross negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the surveillance evidence sufficiently corroborated the tip to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, and that the alleged drafting deficiencies did not amount to bad faith or warrant cross-examination.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Law Society Tribunal finding that the applicant, who had a history of child sexual abuse, was of good character and could be licensed to practice law with a condition that he not be alone with minors.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable because it failed to properly consider the overarching public interest and public trust in the legal profession.

The Court also found the licensing condition internally inconsistent with a finding of good character.

The matter was remitted to the Hearing Division for a fresh assessment.

Additionally, the Court granted the applicant's motion for an anonymization and non-publication order to protect the identity of his daughter, a victim of his past abuse.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to stay the proceedings due to excessive force used by an officer during his arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, who had noted the excessive force and the officer's testimonial dishonesty but declined to stay the proceedings.

The Court upheld the trial judge's choice of a six-month sentence reduction under s. 24(1) of the Charter, concluding this was not one of the clearest of cases requiring a stay.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application to remove a construction lien registered by the respondent for sewage backup remediation work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal or if it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The parties agreed that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that decisions made in reliance on the Construction Act, including orders discharging or refusing to discharge a lien, must be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred accordingly.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, transferred $400,000 to herself from her late stepfather's estate, claiming it was an inter vivos gift.

The respondent successfully challenged the transfer at first instance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred by excluding the stepfather's investment advisor's notes as hearsay and by finding the gift was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the exclusion of the notes as double hearsay under the Evidence Act and affirming the finding that the stepfather lacked a continuing intention to make the specific gift.

The moving parties sought a panel review of a motion judge's order requiring them to pay $19,365.37 in costs for their abandoned appeal.

They argued the motion judge erred by refusing an adjournment to cross-examine the respondent's affiant and by fixing an unreasonable amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding cross-examination and costs.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The moving party sought review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion for an extension of time to appeal a 2017 conviction and sentence.

The court held that criminal appeal rights are purely statutory and that no provision of the Criminal Code authorizes review or appeal from a single judge's decision under s. 678(2).

Assuming without deciding that a panel might exercise concurrent jurisdiction afresh upon a material change in circumstances, the court found no such change on the record.

The court also stated that, in any event, the motion judge applied the correct legal analysis and made factual findings entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed an order striking most of their tort, constitutional, and human rights claims arising from accident benefits assessments, surveillance, and the administration of statutory accident benefits after a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the battery, intrusion upon seclusion, abuse of process, and vicarious liability claims were properly struck, and that the challenges to ss. 55 and 19(3) of the SABS were properly treated as an abuse of process because the matters had been or could have been pursued before the LAT.

However, the court found the motion judge erred in concluding that no breach of contract had been pleaded against the insurer and in treating the SABS as outside the insurance contract.

The appeal was allowed only to permit the insured appellant to amend and properly plead breach of contract and breach of good faith claims against the insurer.