COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Simmons, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Cadence Beauparlant
Appellant
Stefan Rinas, for the appellant
Bryan Guertin, for the respondent
Heard: January 13, 2026
On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice Antonio Skarica of the Superior Court of Justice, on February 22, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 1655.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm without an authorization or licence. He received a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to two sentences he was already serving.
2The appellant seeks leave to appeal against his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge committed several errors in principle, including exceeding the sentence requested by the Crown without giving notice to the parties.
3For the reasons that follow, we grant leave to appeal, allow the sentence appeal, and vary the sentence to one of five years’ imprisonment.
A. Background facts
4The circumstances surrounding the appellant’s crime are tragic.
5The appellant, who was 19 years old at the time, went to a small house party at the home of his friend, Devante Skye-Davis, on July 15, 2020. The appellant, Mr. Skye-Davis and four other people were present, including Mr. Skye-Davis’ 17-year-old girlfriend, Myah Larmond. The appellant brought a loaded handgun to the gathering, which was passed around by others during the evening. Tragically, at about 4:00 a.m., the handgun discharged while Mr. Skye-Davis was handling it. The bullet struck Ms. Larmond in the head. Mr. Skye-Davis immediately called 911. Sadly, Ms. Larmond succumbed to her injuries in hospital at 9:30 a.m. that morning. Rather than staying at the home to render assistance, the appellant fled the scene. The gun has never been recovered.
6The appellant was not arrested for possessing the firearm until over a year after the offence, on August 12, 2021. In the meantime, he committed drug offences and was convicted and sentenced on two sets of charges.
7On August 2, 2022, he received a sentence equivalent to five years’ imprisonment after being convicted of five drug-related charges, including possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (the net sentence was two years and nine months after being reduced for pre-sentence custody). Then, on September 15, 2022, he pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment (less 66 days’ pre-sentence custody).
8The judge who sentenced the appellant in September was not informed by the parties that the appellant was already serving a penitentiary sentence. Consequently, the September 2022 sentence ran concurrently to the previous sentence imposed in August.
B. Sentencing proceedings
9The appellant had originally been charged with manslaughter jointly with Mr. Skye-Davis. That charge was withdrawn when the appellant pleaded guilty to possession of the loaded handgun.
10At the sentencing hearing, in February 2024, the Crown sought a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. The appellant sought a sentence in the range of 18 months to 2 years. The parties agreed that the appellant’s sentence should be consecutive to the sentences he was already serving.
11The sentencing judge imposed a seven-year sentence consecutive to the sentences that the appellant was serving. The sentencing judge listed several aggravating factors, including that the appellant: (1) had no licence for the firearm; (2) brought a loaded firearm to a party and allowed it to be “passed around like a plaything” among people who were drinking and using drugs; (3) brought the firearm to a semi-detached townhouse in an urban area, a location that increased the risk to neighbours and others; (4) fled the scene and made no attempt to help Ms. Larmond; (5) used the firearm as a “tool of the trade” for drug trafficking; and (6) by fleeing, successfully disposed of the gun.
12The sentencing judge correctly observed that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives for this offence. The sentencing judge also canvassed several sentencing authorities in his reasons. He noted that the Crown had not provided a range of sentence and had only given a position of five years. The sentencing judge ultimately relied on R. v. Tabnor, 2021 ONSC 8548, as setting out the appropriate range of sentence, which he incorrectly said was set at five to seven years. He also found that the appellant did not have good prospects for rehabilitation because he consumed alcohol and drugs while in jail, had not taken initiatives such as enrolling in school to better himself while incarcerated, and was described by his parole officer as young and immature and a follower. The sentencing judge concluded that the aggravating circumstances warranted a sentence at the top end of the incorrect five-to-seven-year range.
C. Analysis
13The appellant submits that the sentencing judge committed several errors in principle that warrant this court’s intervention, including the sentencing judge`s failure to give the parties notice that he planned to exceed the Crown’s position.1
14In R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, [2022] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 52, the Supreme Court of Canada held that it is an error in principle for a sentencing judge to exceed the Crown’s sentencing position without first giving notice to the parties that they plan to do so. However, the court added, at para. 59, that the failure to give notice will only warrant appellate intervention in three circumstances:
(1) If the failure to provide notice and allow further submissions impacts the sentence. This will be the case when there is information the offender could have provided, if given the opportunity, that would have impacted the sentence.
(2) If the sentencing judge failed to provide reasons, or provided unclear or insufficient reasons, for imposing the harsher sentence.
(3) If the sentencing judge provided erroneous reasons for imposing a harsher sentence.
15The appellant submits that this court’s intervention is warranted on the third basis. He argues that the sentencing judge’s reasons for imposing a harsher sentence disclose errors. Specifically, the appellant argues that the sentencing judge incorrectly relied on Tabnor to support a range of five to seven years. The appellant says the sentencing judge misread that case, which set out a sentencing range of four to six years: Tabnor, at para. 26. Additionally, the appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in giving him a sentence at the top of the range because it gave the appellant no credit for his guilty plea or his status as a youthful first offender. Relatedly, the appellant also submits that the sentencing judge improperly disregarded rehabilitation as a sentencing objective because he did not consider the appellant to have good rehabilitative prospects.
16The respondent acknowledges that the sentencing judge did not give notice to the parties but submits that there is no basis for this court to interfere because the sentencing judge did not give erroneous reasons. The respondent argues that misidentification or misapplication of the sentencing range is not, on its own, a basis for appellate intervention. The respondent also draws distinctions between Tabnor and this case. Even though a gun was discharged in Tabnor, nobody died. And, unlike the appellant, Mr. Tabnor’s sentence accounted for the effects of anti-Black racism on his degree of moral culpability: Tabnor, at paras. 21-25; R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641. As for rehabilitation, the respondent observes that the sentencing judge’s findings of fact about the appellant’s rehabilitative potential are entitled to deference. Similarly, the weight the sentencing judge gave to rehabilitation as a sentencing objective is also entitled to deference, particularly so given that denunciation and deterrence are paramount objectives for this offence.
17We agree that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not giving the parties notice that he planned to exceed the Crown’s position and, further, that he provided erroneous reasoning for imposing a higher sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the authorities, the sentencing judge settled on Tabnor as providing the appropriate range of sentence for the appellant’s crime. However, he got the range wrong by one year on both ends. Accepting that Tabnor set the appropriate range at four to six years, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence above that range. Moreover, we agree with the appellant that imposing a sentence at the top of the range, whether the top was six or seven years, gave no effect to the appellant’s guilty plea or to the fact that he was a youthful offender who had no criminal record when he committed the offence. While it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the appellant’s rehabilitative prospects were not significant, it was not open to him to disregard rehabilitation altogether as a sentencing objective given that the appellant was a youthful first offender: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at paras. 30-32. We also observe that, at the time of sentencing, the appellant had difficulty accessing programming in custody because he was assessed to present a low risk of reoffending.
18Nothing in these reasons should be taken as diminishing the seriousness of the appellant’s crime. His reckless act of bringing a loaded gun to a party and allowing others to handle it led to an innocent young woman’s death. However, the sentence sought by the Crown was the appropriate sentence in the circumstances because it properly considered the aggravating factors – the most significant of which was Ms. Larmond’s death – and the mitigating factors, including the appellant’s youth, guilty plea, and lack of criminal record at the time he committed the offence.
D. Disposition
19Leave to appeal the sentence is granted, the appeal is allowed, and the sentence is varied to five years’ imprisonment consecutive to any sentences being served. There is no change to any of the ancillary orders.
“Janet Simmons J.A.”
“L. Favreau J.A.”
“M. Rahman J.A.”