Janet M. Simmons

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against a nine-year-old child.

The trial judge found that the appellant, who had prior convictions for similar offences involving foot fetishism, breached his probation conditions and sexually assaulted the child by forcing her to rub her feet on his penis.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate scrutiny of the complainant's evidence, misuse of similar fact evidence, and misapprehension of defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the child's credibility despite inconsistencies in her testimony, appropriately used similar fact evidence to corroborate the complainant's account, and correctly weighed the defence evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder of a drug dealer who was found dead with blunt force trauma to the head and multiple stab wounds.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the appellant's connection to the deceased, knowledge of his residence, financial motive, threatening text messages, cell phone evidence, and possession of the deceased's stolen belongings.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: exclusion of alternate suspect evidence, admission of threatening text messages, and failure to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant Glassdoor Inc. sought a stay of a Norwich order pending appeal.

The application judge had ordered disclosure of personal information of third parties in relation to defamatory posts on Glassdoor's website.

The chambers judge granted the stay, finding serious questions to be tried regarding the application judge's jurisdiction in light of a forum selection clause in Glassdoor's Terms of Use and whether the respondents had agreed to those terms.

The judge found irreparable harm would result from disclosure of third-party information that could not be undisclosed, and that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant, particularly given the appeal was scheduled within three months and the respondents could seek an expedited hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for break and enter and related offences.

The appellant did not contest that he was the driver of a van that neighbours observed passing a tool to the perpetrator of a daylight residential break-in.

The Court of Appeal found that the constellation of evidence at trial amply supported the inference that the driver of the van was party to a planned break and enter of a dwelling house.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the appellant abandoned his sentence appeal during oral argument.

Bail was rescinded and the intermittent sentence was ordered to resume.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial Crown improperly invited the jury to use prior consistent statements of the complainant for the truth of their content in closing address.

The trial judge failed to correct this submission and provided no instructions to the jury on the limited use of prior consistent statements.

This error in law tainted the conviction, particularly as the evidence concerning one complainant was used as similar fact evidence in relation to another complainant.

Additionally, the trial judge failed to provide a meaningful review of the evidence at trial beyond a cursory review of similar fact evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence of 7 years 4 months imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of evidence that the appellant possessed a handgun at the time of arrest, three days after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the evidence of the handgun was highly relevant as it could connect the appellant to the shooting and corroborate witness testimony, and that there was no realistic possibility the jury engaged in improper propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his sentence for unauthorized use of credit card data, challenging the imposition of house arrest and curfew terms as conditions of probation.

The appellant argued these conditions were unreasonable and not authorized under section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code as they were punitive rather than rehabilitative.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the traditional rehabilitative purpose of probation but noted the sentence resulted from a joint submission accepted by the sentencing judge.

The court declined to strike the conditions as illegal given the unique circumstances and the limited record before it, though it noted the sentencing judge should have articulated the basis for accepting the impugned terms.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder of his wife following a judge alone trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twelve years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material misapprehension of evidence, specifically regarding a police demonstration video concerning the time required for a wheelchair-bound person to reach an alarm keypad.

The appellant also raised arguments regarding DNA cross-contamination and alternate explanations for gunshot residue.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in stating no video recording existed, this error did not constitute material misapprehension warranting intervention, as the trial judge had fully considered the demonstration evidence and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had described an accidental blast from a sawed-off shotgun as narrowly missing the complainant as an aggravating factor, despite the appellant's qualification of the facts during his guilty plea that the blast was accidental.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give effect to the appellant's factual qualification and that this mis-description factored into the sentence imposed.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence on the possession of a prohibited firearm charge was reduced from five years and thirty-four days to four years, seven months and four days.

The balance of the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial conviction, raising three issues regarding the trial judge's reasons.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence of a prior consistent statement to corroborate the complainant's evidence, failed to adequately explain why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, and that the complainant's evidence regarding the appellant's statement about getting "his boys to come down" was insufficient to constitute a threat.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three submissions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

Duty counsel raised three issues: that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding who instigated the dispute, erred in finding excessive force was used in the jail cell context, and erred in assessing Officer Chen's observations of the altercation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The court also found the sentence, imposed for a serious aggravated assault in the context of interference with a justice system participant, to be entirely fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less one day imprisonment plus two years' probation following his guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's reasons and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court noted that the appellant, then 23 years old, had sucker-punched a 55-year-old victim causing significant injury, and that such conduct must be both deterred and denounced.

The appeal was dismissed and the warrant of committal was amended to reflect the lesser but included offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that there were no objective grounds for his arrest and that the gun found in his possession should not have been admitted into evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there were both subjective and objective grounds for arrest based on a constellation of factors observed by the officers.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant failed to identify any error made by the trial judge, and the court found no basis to interfere with the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, duty counsel argued that the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, but the court rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had carefully considered the mitigating factors and imposed a sentence within the range suggested by defence counsel.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's decision not to formally self-instruct in accordance with the Vetrovec warning regarding the credibility of a co-accused who testified.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to conclude the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion.

The trial judge had properly considered the co-accused's status and motivation to fabricate, found her evidence honest and supported by corroborating evidence, and provided ample reasons for rejecting the defence theory of evidence planting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury charge by failing to sufficiently caution the jury that items linking the appellant to a particular address were relevant only to his relationship with the vehicle's passenger and did not directly support his identification as the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions clearly identified the relevance of the evidence and that the jury was sufficiently instructed on identification and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but as he had served the custodial portion, that issue was moot.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against their former lawyer for professional negligence.

The appellants alleged the respondent failed to protect their interests in settlement negotiations, failed to account for funds paid towards legal bills, and misappropriated funds secured by a mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellants had put forward no evidence to support their claims, that they were fully informed of and agreed to the settlement terms which benefited them, and that there was no evidence of inappropriate or excessive billings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no genuine issue for trial and rejecting all three grounds of appeal raised by the appellants.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment concerning a business purchase agreement that was terminated before completion.

The trial judge found that a $100,000 deposit paid by the appellant toward a $500,000 purchase price was to be retained by the respondent pursuant to a termination agreement entered into by the parties.

The trial judge found no legal fault on either side and concluded that the parties' intention in the termination agreement was that the deposit remain with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and dismissed the appeal.