Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant’s silence at the scene as a factor in rejecting his testimony.

The appeal court held that using an accused’s failure to protest innocence at the scene as a credibility factor is impermissible.

Because the trial judge’s reasoning indicated that this improper factor formed part of the chain of reasoning leading to conviction, the court could not conclude that the verdict would inevitably have been the same without it.

The conviction was therefore set aside.

A new trial was ordered on both counts and the conditional stay on the failure to stop charge was lifted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application under s. 11(b) of the Charter based on unreasonable delay and further erred in concluding that police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The court held that approximately nine months of institutional delay did not justify a stay of proceedings and that additional delays were attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence choices during the litigation.

The court also rejected the argument that the breath demand violated s. 8 of the Charter, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge’s credibility assessment of the arresting officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to secure the attendance of a police supervisor whose evidence was said to relate to an alleged “over-holding” Charter breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion in trial management decisions such as adjournments and that the appellant failed to demonstrate what relevant evidence the missing witness could have provided.

The court further rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no evidence that counsel’s failure to subpoena the officer resulted in prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

Even if over-holding had occurred, the stringent standard for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter was not met.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the secondary ground.

The charges arose from an alleged impaired driving incident involving a high-speed collision shortly after the applicant had pleaded guilty to a prior “over 80” offence and was subject to a one-year driving prohibition.

The applicant proposed a new release plan involving two sureties, financial pledges, house arrest, and counselling for alcohol-related issues.

The court held that the proposed plan did not sufficiently mitigate the substantial likelihood that the applicant would commit further offences while on release.

The application for bail review was dismissed on the basis that detention remained necessary for the protection and safety of the public.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment after the Crown indicated it would seek to amend the Information to expand the timeframe of the alleged conduct, and that the refusal created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant also challenged the finding that the actus reus and mens rea of criminal harassment were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that decisions concerning adjournments attract deference and found no prejudice because disclosure of the earlier incidents had already been provided and the evidence would have been admissible regardless of the amendment.

The court further concluded that the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence establishing the complainant’s reasonable fear and the accused’s intent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was found guilty of six counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown subsequently applied to have her found not criminally responsible (NCR).

On the day of the NCR hearing, the self-represented appellant was provided with a lengthy psychiatric report and requested a two-week adjournment to retain counsel.

The trial judge refused the adjournment, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the refusal of the adjournment in these circumstances undermined the appearance of fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge’s “unorthodox” approach to hearing the application created a reasonable apprehension of bias because the judge outlined his preliminary views after reviewing the written materials before hearing full submissions.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s conduct reflected preparation rather than predisposition and that counsel had a full opportunity to make submissions.

The court further found no error in the trial judge’s attribution of delay or assessment of prejudice.

The conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.