Charles William Hourigan

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing trial unfairness.

At trial, Crown counsel breached an agreement not to cross-examine the appellant about his post-arrest conduct, specifically his departure from the jurisdiction and subsequent conviction for failing to attend court.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's ill-advised question opened the door to this evidence, prejudicing the appellant's credibility in a case that turned entirely on credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the rule in Browne v. Dunn was violated when he was not confronted with an alleged motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give an Oliver instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant testified after his co-accused and had ample opportunity to respond to the evidence.

Furthermore, an Oliver instruction was not requested at trial, and its absence did not amount to misdirection.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant.

The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The appellant appealed a March 2016 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the March order had been overtaken by a subsequent order made in August 2016, which the appellant had also appealed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, child luring, and other offences, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment along with prohibition orders under ss. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the parties agreed that the s. 161(1)(c) order must be replaced with the former version of the provision, following the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. K.R.J. regarding retrospective operation.

The appellant also challenged the fitness of the s. 161(1)(d) order, which imposed a 20-year blanket ban on Internet use and device ownership.

The Court of Appeal found the blanket prohibition demonstrably unfit and overbroad, noting it would unreasonably hinder rehabilitation and employment.

The court varied the order to specifically prohibit accessing illegal content and participating in social networks or chat rooms.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not awarding 1.5-to-1 credit for pre-trial custody and challenging a section 161 order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the pre-trial custody ground, finding the reduced credit was justified because the appellant reoffended while on release pending trial.

The court reserved its decision on the section 161 order pending a Supreme Court of Canada ruling on its constitutionality.

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding him liable for credit card charges under a September 2012 agreement with the respondent bank.

The appellant argued he was merely an authorized user and not liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's conclusion was a mixed finding of fact and law owed deference, and was amply supported by evidence that the appellant received statements, used the card, and made payments.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats and failing to comply with probation, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board imposing a detention order with community living privileges.

He argued the ORB applied the wrong legal test and should have granted a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB applied the correct test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to manage the appellant's risk, ensure medication compliance, and allow for expeditious return to the hospital if his condition decompensated.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim on his propensity for violence at the outset of the trial.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge correctly applied the rule in Scopelliti, finding the request premature as there was no appreciable evidence of the victim's aggression at that stage.

The appeal was dismissed, noting the appellant chose not to renew the application later and ultimately, details of the victim's propensity for violence were put to the jury.

The appellant sued her landlord for negligence after suffering serious personal injuries from a fall on a fire escape, alleging it was not kept free of ice and snow.

The trial judge dismissed the action, accepting the superintendent's evidence of daily inspections and finding no snow or ice was present, while rejecting the appellant's evidence on credibility grounds.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the record and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that the standard of care was met.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically cheques in the appellant's name found in the bedroom where the drugs were located.

The Court of Appeal held that no reasonable jury could conclude the appellant was in possession of the drugs based on the entirety of the evidence, as the absence of evidence left open other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge, found the appeal had no merit, and dismissed it with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the respondent bank's refusal to approve a rehabilitation plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had the discretion to refuse approval for expenses over $5,000 and that its refusal was reasonable based on the medical opinion evidence.

The court also held that the application judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of guns and drugs and public mischief, arguing that the trial Crown's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant by demanding his 'theory' of the case, which undermined the presumption of innocence.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly telephoned a potential witness from the courtroom and used the resulting hearsay during the cross-examination of a key defence witness.

The Court concluded that the Crown's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial to deprive the appellant of a fair trial, allowed the appeal, and directed a new trial.

The appellants commenced a proposed class action for damages for misrepresentations in a takeover bid circular under s. 131(1) of the Securities Act.

The motion judge ruled that plaintiffs must elect whether to sue the offeror or its directors/signatories, and that secondary market sellers could not rely on s. 131(1).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 131(1) allows a plaintiff to sue both the offeror and its directors/signatories for damages.

However, the Court upheld the ruling that secondary market sellers cannot assert a claim under s. 131(1), as they must rely on the statutory cause of action in Part XXIII.1.

The Wises severed their lakefront property, gifting one lot with road access to the appellants and retaining a water-access only lot.

The respondent bank, holding a mortgage on the retained lot, applied for an easement of necessity over the appellants' lot.

The application judge granted the easement, finding water access impractical and relying on public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the test for an easement of necessity is strict necessity, not practical necessity.

Because water access existed at the time of the grant, the property was not inaccessible, defeating the claim for an easement regardless of inconvenience.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the LCD industry, asserting claims in civil conspiracy and under s. 36 of the Competition Act.

The defendants appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion regarding limitation periods, while the plaintiff appealed the denial of leave to amend its statement of claim to add a direct purchaser.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the defendants' appeal on the civil conspiracy limitation issue as the order was interlocutory and leave was not granted.

The Court affirmed that the discoverability principle applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the Competition Act.

The Court also allowed the plaintiff's appeal, granting leave to amend the statement of claim, and confirmed that it is not plain and obvious that a breach of s. 45 of the Competition Act cannot serve as the unlawful means for a civil conspiracy claim.

The appellant was observed street racing and subsequently abandoned his vehicle in a stranger's driveway.

Police detained the appellant, conducted a pat-down search for officer safety, and discovered the vehicle's keys.

The appellant was arrested for careless driving and outstanding warrants.

Police impounded the vehicle as apparently abandoned under s. 221(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and conducted an inventory search, discovering a loaded handgun.

The trial judge found Charter breaches under s. 10 but admitted the handgun under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the sentence of seven years' imprisonment, finding the searches lawful and the sentence fit.