Charles William Hourigan

The appellant was observed acting suspiciously at a gas station and fled on foot when approached by police, leaving his unlocked vehicle behind.

Police searched the vehicle without a warrant, finding a Taser and a handgun.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the search was authorized as an inventory search of an abandoned vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the vehicle was not 'apparently abandoned' and the search violated section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully producing marihuana and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

At trial, she raised the defence of duress, arguing she participated due to physical and emotional abuse by her romantic partner.

The trial judge failed to relate the expert evidence on battered spouse syndrome to the objective elements of duress in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals as the appellant had already served her sentence.

During an appeal involving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant's trial counsel retained his own lawyers.

Trial counsel's lawyers inadvertently disclosed a letter between trial counsel and themselves to the appellant's appeal counsel.

Trial counsel brought a motion for the return of the document, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the letter was privileged, the inadvertent disclosure did not constitute a waiver, and the innocence at stake exception did not apply to abrogate the privilege.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that evidence should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The appellant was detained at a store for 40 minutes without being advised of her right to counsel, after which police searched her vehicle, arrested her, and found fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in requiring a causal connection for the s. 10(b) breach and found an additional s. 9 breach for arbitrary detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded that the serious police conduct and substantial impact on the appellant's rights warranted exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for directing corporate rebate cheques to a company he owned, defrauding his employer of nearly $4 million.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $3.4 million in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge improperly intervened during his testimony, failed to exclude banking records obtained in breach of an implied undertaking, and erred in ordering restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate to assist a self-represented accused.

Assuming the banking records were obtained in breach of the appellant's Charter rights, the Court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s 24(2).

The restitution order was also upheld.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

He argued the Board failed to inquire into the hospital's diagnostic assessment and erred by not transferring him to a less secure facility closer to his family in the Greater Toronto Area.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no treatment impasse that required inquiry and concluding the Board reasonably found the secure environment at Waypoint was necessary to manage the appellant's risk to public safety.

The appellant physician appealed a Superior Court order that set aside a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the respondent incapable of consenting to medical treatment.

The Superior Court had ordered a new hearing because the respondent's current attending physician did not testify before the Board.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred by deciding the case on a procedural fairness issue raised for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal further found that the Board's original decision was reasonable and supported by the record, and restored the Board's finding of incapacity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to police.

He claimed he was under the influence of a prescription medication overdose and lacked an operating mind, and that the Crown's failure to call two police officers who had contact with him deprived the court of corroborating evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no rule requires the Crown to call every officer, and holding that the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary was well supported by the videotape and other witness testimony.

The appellants' son, a British soldier, was killed in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan.

The appellants brought a negligence action in the Ontario Superior Court against the federal Crown and others.

The motion judge struck the claim against the federal Crown for lack of jurisdiction under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the claim arose in Afghanistan.

On appeal, the appellants argued the 'real and substantial connection' test should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific statutory language of s. 21(1) governs and the substance of the claim arose in Afghanistan.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he continued to beat the victim after an initial punch, a theory not put to him at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the initial punch was unprovoked was supported by the evidence and fatal to the appellant's claim of self-defence.

The findings regarding a subsequent beating were therefore irrelevant and did not infect the rejection of the self-defence claim.

The appellant was convicted of having care or control of a vehicle while impaired.

After her first appeal was dismissed by a summary conviction appeal judge, she sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court found no error of law and noted the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant's conduct created a realistic risk of danger was amply supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed an order striking his motion to vary, arguing he had insufficient notice and should have been allowed to file materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, noting the appellant had ample time and had failed to pay trial costs, a contempt fine, equalization, and failed to comply with disclosure obligations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to delete a requirement that the appellant prove payment of all support obligations up to January 1, 2014 before bringing a future motion to vary, as the ability to pay is the very subject matter of such a motion.

The appellants appealed their convictions for various firearms offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in identifying them from video surveillance footage, ignoring the lack of evidence from a search warrant, rejecting exculpatory witness testimony, and finding that the objects they carried were loaded restricted firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles for video identification, adequately considered the search warrant evidence, reasonably assessed witness credibility, and drew a logical inference that the firearms were loaded given the circumstances of the altercation.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant Estate successfully defended the respondent's claim for a one-half interest in a property, the court determined the costs for the proceedings in the court below.

The Estate sought partial indemnity costs of $169,508.

The court reduced this amount by $30,000 to account for two unsuccessful motions brought by the Estate during the litigation.

Costs were fixed at $134,478.68 payable by the respondent to the Estate.

The appellant was convicted of intentional discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault after shooting an unarmed man in his home following a drug deal gone wrong.

The appellant claimed self-defence, arguing he believed the victim was armed and part of a group that included another man carrying a shotgun.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant's response unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by holding the appellant to a standard of perfection, failing to consider the fast-paced and stressful context, and making unreasonable factual findings based on a blanket rejection of the appellant's credibility.

The appellant, a personal support worker, pled guilty to assault and criminal harassment.

The Crown and defence agreed on a joint submission for an eight-month conditional sentence and one year's probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by a six-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge failed to explain why the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The appellant private school terminated the respondent teacher's employment for cause after discovering he had falsified student grades and lied to cover up the improprieties.

The trial judge found the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages, including lost long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the trial judge erred in his application of the McKinley test.

The Court found the teacher's intentional misconduct and academic fraud struck at the heart of the employment relationship, justifying summary dismissal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that a 13-minute delay in obtaining an alcohol screening device violated his right to counsel and that the failure to use a N.I.S.T. thermometer raised a reasonable doubt about the breath test results.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were case-specific, did not raise questions of general importance to the administration of justice, and lacked strong merit.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a maximum security psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued the Board should have conducted its own inquiries or ordered an independent assessment due to a lack of unanimity among his treatment team regarding his placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, balanced the appellant's continuing threat to public safety with his liberty interests, and reflected the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault involving young complainants subject to a publication ban.

He argued that the trial judge erred in relying on demeanour, in finding that he minimized his opportunity to offend, and in assessing the evidence of both complainants, including one child’s prior statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that demeanour was only one non-dispositive factor in the credibility analysis, that the minimization finding was supported by the record, and that the trial judge’s treatment of the complainants’ evidence disclosed no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed.