Charles William Hourigan

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to mood stabilizers, anti-psychotic, benzodiazepines, and anticholinergic medications.

The appellant challenged the procedural fairness of the Board hearing, the reasonableness of the decision, and the adequacy of reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no procedural unfairness, no unreasonable decision, and adequate evidentiary foundation for the findings of incapacity.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment granting an application for the sale of two jointly-owned properties.

The appellants contended that the deceased had agreed to sell his interest to the surviving brother for $110,000 prior to his death.

The application judge rejected this claim, finding no direct evidence of agreement and no part performance satisfying the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's careful analysis of the facts against the governing legal principles.

The offender was convicted of cocaine trafficking and related offences, receiving a 6.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred in interpreting aggravating factors under the CDSA and in refusing a half-parole order.

The offender cross-appealed, seeking pre-trial custody credit for time spent in custody on unrelated charges that were later stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed the aggravating factors, appropriately exercised discretion regarding parole eligibility, and correctly refused to credit time served on unrelated charges.

The young person appealed a conviction for attempted robbery arising from a meeting arranged through an online classified ad.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding the identification evidence, which included surveillance video and IP address tracking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the identification and the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the passing of accounts and approving compensation for the respondent as attorney for property and estate trustee.

The appellant argued the claim for compensation as attorney for property was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that the quantum was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an application for the passing of accounts does not constitute a 'claim' within the meaning of the Limitations Act, 2002, as it does not seek to remedy an injury, loss, or damage.

The court also found no error in the application judge's assessment of the compensation.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a psychiatric facility, arguing he did not pose a significant threat to public safety and should receive an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board reasonably addressed conflicting medical evidence and properly considered a recent incident where the appellant brought methamphetamine into the facility.

The appeal was dismissed, as the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable because no cocaine was seized during the transactions and the substance could have been methamphetamine.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting intercepted communications without a Carter ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, police surveillance, and physical evidence found upon arrest, overwhelmingly established the substance was cocaine.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to make a Carter ruling, the error was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter and breach of probation, receiving an eight-month sentence based on a joint submission.

Four months later, an amendment to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act came into force retrospectively, rendering him inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality with no right of appeal due to the sentence length.

The appellant sought to reduce his sentence to five and a half months to preserve his right of appeal against deportation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reduced sentence remained proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export ecstasy into the United States and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and corroboration of a co-conspirator who testified for the Crown after receiving a reduced sentence in the U.S. The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including recorded phone calls that demonstrated the appellant's involvement.

The court also upheld the six-year sentence, noting the large quantity of drugs and the appellant's use of a courier to take the cross-border risk.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant moved to review an order refusing to restore his motion to review a previous order that refused to extend the time for a motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it to be the latest in a series of frivolous and meritless interlocutory motions.

The appellant provided no reasonable explanation for his lengthy delays, and there was no merit to his underlying request for leave to appeal.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissing a motion to extend the time to file an application for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The panel agreed with the single judge that there was no prospect of success on the merits of the proposed leave to appeal motion.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from two interlocutory orders.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from interlocutory orders of a Superior Court judge lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and the appellant's cross-motion was dismissed.

In this addendum to a previous judgment, the Court of Appeal amended its declaration regarding the duty to defend under commercial general liability policies.

The court removed Royal & Sunalliance Insurance Company of Canada from the declaration, as it had settled prior to the appeal.

The court also removed a stipulation regarding a Professional Services Exclusion, which the insurers had withdrawn reliance upon.

Finally, based on a prior agreement between the parties, the court vacated its previous costs award and directed submissions for full indemnity costs.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that their insurers had no duty to defend them in an underlying action regarding defective septic systems.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by applying the 'Your Work' exclusion after correctly identifying that the underlying pleadings raised the mere possibility of consequential damages.

Because consequential damages are not excluded by the 'Your Work' exclusion, the mere possibility of such claims triggered the insurers' duty to defend.

The appeal was allowed and a declaration compelling the insurers to provide a defence was granted.

The appellant brought an application for a declaration that an arbitrator had no authority to reopen an arbitration.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature, directing that the matter should proceed before the arbitrator first to create a complete record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the application judge's exercise of discretion, noting that the efficient operation of the arbitral process is best served by having an initial determination made by the arbitrator.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to renew a writ of execution, arguing that the underlying judgment debt was owed by a trust and she was duty-bound to maintain its confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it could not go behind the judgment and that the appellant's assertion did not justify refusing to renew the writ.

The court deferred to the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a preliminary determination of whether the respondent was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued this was a coverage issue that had to be determined by a court before the mandatory dispute resolution scheme under s. 279 of the Insurance Act applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the s. 279 scheme is a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process that governs all disputes concerning entitlement to statutory accident benefits, including whether a claimant qualifies as an insured person involved in an accident.

The respondent walked into a police station and confessed to burning down his mother's house, stating he was homeless and wanted to go to jail.

The police officer repeatedly warned him of the consequences and advised him to seek counsel, which he eventually did before giving a full statement.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding it was involuntary due to the respondent's oppressive personal circumstances and the 'inducement' of jail time, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by finding oppression and inducement absent any police misconduct, and by conflating the voluntariness analysis with the ultimate reliability of the statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding consent and bodily harm, and brought a fresh evidence application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the appellant's credibility regarding his trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 13-month reformatory sentence for attempted rape.