Bradley W. Miller

The appellants, Jason Geil and Geil Style Enterprises Inc., appealed a finding of contempt for violating a consent order by dumping fill on wetlands.

They argued the motion judge erred by relying on hearsay, making a finding without evidence of the precise timing of the fill, and accepting a late-filed affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the submissions.

The court held that the motion judge relied on firsthand evidence, the precise date of the fill deposit was not material as it occurred after the order, and accepting the late affidavit was within the judge's discretion.

The finding of contempt was entitled to deference.

The appellant, R.W. (Brad) Blair, appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against Premier Doug Ford, which was dismissed under an anti-SLAPP motion (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

Ford cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Blair's appeal, upholding the dismissal of the defamation action, and allowed Ford's cross-appeal in part regarding the timing of costs payment, making the full award immediately payable.

The court also quashed appeals from preliminary interlocutory orders due to lack of jurisdiction.

The parties entered into minutes of settlement to resolve a business dispute.

The settlement required the respondent to produce business records to an accountant, who had to be satisfied with the production before the appellant advanced settlement funds.

The appellant refused to advance funds, arguing the accountant was not satisfied with the sufficiency of the records.

The motion judge granted summary judgment enforcing the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record amply supported the motion judge's conclusion that the accountant was satisfied with the production.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from a summary judgment that set aside two transactions by a bankrupt: the transfer of his 50% interest in his residence to his wife as an undervalue transfer and fraudulent conveyance, and the transfer of shares in a corporation to a non-arms length creditor as an improper preference.

The appellants argued the claims were time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, confirming that the limitation period for the Trustee's claims began upon the Trustee's appointment and that the amended statement of claim did not introduce a new cause of action.

The court also rejected the abuse of process argument as speculative.

A cross-appeal on costs by the Trustee, seeking substantial indemnity, was also dismissed, with the court deferring to the motion judge's assessment of partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, Kay Hon, appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent developer, Forest Hill Homes (Cornell Rouge) Limited, for failure to close on a home purchase.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no misrepresentation by the developer's agent regarding agency, and that summary judgment should not have been granted while a third-party claim remained outstanding.

The Court of Appeal found no clear and palpable error in the factual finding regarding agency, noting the appellant's own evidence and the agreement confirmed the agent acted for the vendor.

The court also held that the main action and counterclaim were sufficiently distinct from the third-party claim to allow for summary judgment, and clarified that the motion judge's observations on the third-party claim were not binding findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary motion judge's decision dismissing their negligence claim against a lawyer and a related costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that a lawyer cannot be held liable for negligence when conducting a discovery in accordance with a court direction, even if an unfortunate event occurs.

Leave to appeal the costs order was granted, but that appeal was also dismissed, as the costs order fell within the broad discretion of the summary motion judge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its main appeal decision.

The court awarded the respondents costs for two pre-hearing motions ($1,000 for the Motion to Expedite and $7,000 for the Motion to Introduce Fresh Evidence).

Due to divided success on the appeal itself, the parties were ordered to bear their own costs for the appeal.

The lower court's costs order was not disturbed as the basis for the appellants' partial success on one issue was not argued at the application level.

The appellant, Margaret Lee Cole, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of Richard Humble, who died in a house fire.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive (forged documents and will), the presence of a sedative (Alprazolam) in the victim's system (prescribed to the appellant), a false alibi, and other suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting extrinsic misconduct evidence (the "Chapman letters") and in the jury's instruction on its use, as well as in the jury's instruction on the fabricated alibi.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown's case was overwhelmingly strong and that the errors did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld.

John Doe brought a motion to extend the time to serve and file a Notice of Appeal from a lower court order that denied his standing to appear as an anonymous party and make submissions on an Anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that Doe did not form a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant period, his delay was a result of a failed litigation strategy, and granting the extension would cause significant prejudice to the responding parties.

The court also found the proposed appeal lacked merit, rejecting the novel argument that Anti-SLAPP provisions protect anonymity in litigation.

The applicant, K. Matthew Hoang, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal for Ontario seeking to set aside a prior decision of the same court and allow him to amend his pleadings, following the dismissal of his appeal in a long-standing litigation against Mann Engineering.

The court, on its own initiative, invoked Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to consider dismissing the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the motion to be without merit and part of a pattern of abusive litigation conduct, as Mr. Hoang had repeatedly challenged prior decisions of the court through meritless motions.

The motion was dismissed as an abuse of process, and Mr. Hoang was prohibited from filing any further motions in respect of this appeal without leave of a judge of the court.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is an appeal from convictions for drug and firearm offences and the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the validity of search warrants, the warrantless "pinging" of his cell phone, and the calculation of pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the warrants and the admissibility of evidence, including the "judge-shopping" issue.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant additional pre-trial custody credit.

Matthew Gibson, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for criminal harassment and breach of recognizance, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining conditional discharge.

He argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety, contending the risk assessment was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence, particularly given his compliance with medication and treatment, and stable family support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's application of the significant risk test under the Criminal Code.

The court affirmed the Board's holistic consideration of risk factors, including lack of insight into his illness and index offences, and continued cannabis use, which outweighed protective factors, concluding the conditional discharge was necessary to manage the ongoing significant risk to public safety.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and failing to comply with a court order, applied for bail pending the appeal of his convictions.

He had been sentenced to three years in custody for sexually assaulting a 70-year-old personal support worker in his home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court held that the applicant posed a serious risk to public safety due to his history of breaching court orders, and that public confidence required immediate enforcement of the sentence given the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the appeal grounds.

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual touching of his stepdaughter, A.G., contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended important evidence, failed to reconcile material inconsistencies, unevenly scrutinized evidence, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, concluding that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the victim's letter, was reasonable and did not unfairly scrutinize the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, owners of a servient tenement, appealed a decision dismissing their application to declare two registered rights of way (ROWs) abandoned by the dominant tenement owners.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that abandonment requires proof of a fixed intention never to assert the right, inferred from non-use and acquiescence to permanent obstructions.

The Court found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the 174 Strachan ROW, concluding it was completely obstructed by a permanent house extension and thus abandoned.

For the 176 Strachan ROW, which was only partially obstructed, the Court dismissed the appeal for total abandonment but allowed it for partial abandonment of the portion under the house extension, remitting this issue for further determination.

This motion sought a stay pending leave to appeal an order authorizing the sale of a 51% interest in Downsview Homes Inc. (DHI) within ongoing CCAA proceedings.

The moving party, the Foreign Representative of Urbancorp Inc., argued the sale process should be postponed until a related arbitration regarding a disputed payment was resolved, fearing a chilling effect on potential bids.

The supervising judge had previously dismissed these concerns as speculative.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for a stay, finding the grounds for appeal weak, no irreparable harm to the moving party, and the balance of convenience favoring the respondents (the Monitor and Mattamy Homes Limited, the debtor-in-possession lender).

Consequently, the motion for a stay was dismissed.

This appeal arose from the seizure of heavy construction equipment without notice following a default on a promissory note and an unassumed lease.

The trial judge had dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, concluding that no notice was required under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the common law duty to provide reasonable notice before seizing secured assets (the Lister v. Dunlop principle) was not displaced by the PPSA.

Furthermore, the Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) explicitly required 15 days' notice, and the doctrine of merger did not apply to this personal property transaction.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in holding Mr. Priest personally liable for the unassumed excavator lease, as he was not a party to that specific agreement.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's re-calculation of damages in the main action was dismissed, as no error in principle was identified.

The case was remitted to the Superior Court for an assessment of damages on the counterclaim.

The Estate of William Albin Herold claimed ownership of three islands in Lake Katchewanooka, arguing they were conveyed as part of Lot 35 by Letters Patent in 1868, despite having separated from the mainland due to rising water levels.

The application judge found in favour of the Estate, applying a "Flooding Principle" to fix the boundary and concluding that treaties with First Nations did not affect the Crown's right to sell.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals by the First Nations and the Attorney General of Canada, finding that the application judge made extricable errors of law by failing to objectively ascertain the parties' intentions in the Letters Patent, misapplying the Flooding Principle, and not properly considering the Crown's treaty obligations.

The appellate court concluded that the Letters Patent did not convey the islands, as they were physically separate, separately identified, and subject to specific Crown obligations under Treaty 78.