Bradley W. Miller

R.S., a young person, appealed his sentence for two counts of sexual assault, which included an 18-month custody and supervision order.

The appeal raised three grounds: the availability of a deferred custody and supervision order under s. 42(5) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the harshness of the sentence, and the impact of fresh evidence regarding his progress.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had sufficient evidence to conclude that serious psychological harm was caused to the victims, precluding a deferred custody order.

The court also determined that the sentence was not unduly harsh given the serious nature of the offences and their profound impact on the victims, despite mitigating factors and the appellant's rehabilitative potential.

Fresh evidence of the appellant's positive progress post-disposition did not alter the fitness of the original sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion for reconsideration of the determination of an appeal, seeking to re-argue issues the court had previously stated it would not entertain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to meet the high hurdle required to reopen an appeal and did not establish an accidental slip or omission under Rule 59.06.

Costs of $6,000 were awarded against the moving parties.

The appellant appealed his sentence for firearms-related offences, arguing it was overly harsh and that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the onerous conditions of incarceration due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in principle or misapprehension of facts regarding the sentence's fitness, noting it was well within the available range.

Regarding the incarceration conditions, the court affirmed that the sentencing judge properly factored these as a mitigating circumstance and was not required to provide a mathematical credit.

Both grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, common assault, and mischief, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the sexual assault and common assault convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of DNA evidence, resolution of inconsistencies, or consideration of post-offence conduct.

However, the mischief conviction was quashed due to insufficient analysis by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to correct a pre-sentence custody credit error, with the overall sentence upheld as appropriate given the nature of the offences and the appellant's record.

The appellants, Eugene Bokserman and Elena Krasnov, appealed a summary judgment that found a fraudulent conveyance of their jointly held home and awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the conveyance was fraudulent, the refusal to admit fresh evidence, the determination that the action was not statute-barred, and the substantial indemnity costs award.

The court affirmed the motion judge's ability to assess credibility and weigh evidence in a summary judgment context and found no error in the application of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act or the Limitations Act.

The appellants, a web development business and its principal, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action against a financing company and granted judgment against them for $82,250.

The appellants alleged procedural unfairness, unsuitability for summary judgment, an incorrect outstanding loan amount, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the appellants had proper notice and their absence from the motion was tactical.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision on the merits, finding the action in debt well-suited for summary judgment, and refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence, deeming it available with reasonable diligence or not credible.

This appeal concerned minor modifications to a final order respecting parenting and child support issues.

The parties, who had been involved in high-conflict litigation, consented to the motion judge determining outstanding issues by way of summary judgment to avoid a full trial.

The motion judge made minor amendments to parenting time, child support, and the shared Christmas holiday schedule.

The appellant challenged the motion judge's decision on several grounds, including the absence of a material change in circumstances and the judge's role as case manager.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties' express consent to the procedure negated claims of error or unfairness, and that the motion judge's decision was sensible, practical, and in the child's best interests.

This is an appeal from a judgment ordering the sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The Court of Appeal addressed a preliminary jurisdictional issue, noting that section 7 of the Partition Act stipulates appeals from orders made under the Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Despite the appellants' argument that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction due to intertwined issues, and the respondents' lack of objection, the court held that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement.

The Court found the judgment squarely fell under the Partition Act, and therefore, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellants were ordered to pay costs.

The Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether the Administrative Judge of the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to make orders under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP provisions).

The court found that such jurisdiction lies exclusively with Superior Court judges, based on statutory interpretation, prior jurisprudence (Bruyea, Nanda, Ontario College of Teachers), and the incompatibility of the complex s. 137.1 process with the summary nature and rules of the Small Claims Court.

The appeals were allowed, confirming the Administrative Judge's lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition to the United States, arguing violations of Charter sections 6 (right to remain in Canada) and 7 (fundamental justice due to sentencing disparity), and that the surrender would be unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable, had properly considered the Cotroni factors, and that the potential sentencing disparity did not meet the high threshold of "shocking the conscience" required to violate section 7 or render the surrender unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment of $102,862.95 plus interest, granted to the respondent based on a promissory note.

The appellant argued the note was unenforceable due to unfulfilled oral conditions and that the motion judge erred in denying an adjournment and in finding no evidence to support his claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's refusal of adjournment reasonable and his characterization of the appellant's evidence as "bald allegations" lacking credibility was supported by the record, especially given the appellant's inconsistent conduct.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to establish any agreement altering the promissory note's terms.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The appellant, Ahmad Durani, appealed his convictions for criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to remain, and his global sentence of 5 years' imprisonment.

The convictions stemmed from a street race that resulted in a fatal collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the actus reus and mens rea of criminal negligence and in applying the presumption for failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in evidence and that the appellant's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the norm.

The court also found the trial judge correctly rejected the appellant's statements as "evidence to the contrary" for the failing to remain charge.

The appellant, Kristian Jarvis, appealed his sentence of 13 years in custody for multiple firearm-related robberies, aggravated assault, and failing to stop for police.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences, imposing a harsh sentence, failing to adhere to the principle of restraint, and improperly weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal found no error, upholding the consecutive sentences for flight from police due to the need for deterrence, confirming the sentence was not excessive given the circumstances, and noting the sentencing judge properly considered restraint while prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court also affirmed that reweighing factors is not an appellate function.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada for 30 years, sought to set aside guilty pleas to firearms offences on the basis that he was uninformed of the significant immigration consequences.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that the appellant's assertion of being unaware was credible, given the absence of a plea inquiry at trial and trial counsel's lack of specific recollection or uniform practice regarding advising on immigration consequences.

The appellant also demonstrated prejudice from potential removal from Canada due to his long-standing residency and family ties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty pleas and convictions, and ordered a new trial.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.

The appellant, licensed for medical marijuana, was arrested after an officer, ignorant of the relevant regulations, disbelieved his medical card.

A search incident to arrest yielded a handgun and cocaine.

The appellant sought to exclude this evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the officer's belief was objectively unreasonable, leading to Charter violations.

However, applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that despite the institutional and individual police failings, the seriousness of the conduct was at the less serious end of the spectrum.

Given the appellant's reduced expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the high reliability and importance of the evidence (gun and drugs), its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and several First Nations against the Estate of William Albin Herold.

The Court of Appeal had previously allowed the appeals and set aside the lower court orders.

In this endorsement, the court fixed the costs of the proceedings below at $154,530.76, awarded to the appellant First Nations, as the Attorney General of Canada did not seek costs below.

The court also varied its previous appeal costs award, granting the full $43,000 (inclusive of disbursements and taxes) to the appellant First Nations, with no costs awarded to the Attorney General of Canada on appeal, in accordance with a prior agreement between the parties.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the defendant Francesco Fiore, brought an action to unwind the transfers of a residential property from Francesco to his son, and subsequently to his daughter.

The plaintiff alleged the transfers were fraudulent conveyances or created a resulting or express trust to shield the property from creditors.

The court found the action was not statute-barred as the 10-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied.

While the court did not find sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent or an express trust, it concluded that the transfers lacked consideration and that Francesco retained control and beneficial ownership of the property.

The court declared a resulting trust and ordered the reappointment of a bankruptcy trustee to sell the property and pay creditors.