Bradley W. Miller

The appellant, Ricardo Francis, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded firearm and possession of drugs for trafficking, and his seven-year sentence.

The convictions arose from vehicle and strip searches conducted after his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the searches lawful under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the principle of restraint for a youthful, first-time offender.

The sentence was varied from seven years to five years imprisonment.

The appellant, a class member, sought an extension of time to opt out of a consolidated class action after commencing an individual action without knowledge of the class proceeding.

The motion judge denied the request.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario clarified and affirmed the test for extending the time to opt out: the class member must demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay and show that granting the extension will not result in prejudice to the class, the defendant, or the administration of justice.

The Court found the motion judge erred by not applying this test and by misinterpreting the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an extension to opt out, as he demonstrated excusable neglect and no prejudice was shown.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the defence of accident (unintended act).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence of accident did not have an air of reality based on the totality of the evidence, including witness testimony, video surveillance, and coroner's evidence, which contradicted the appellant's equivocal testimony.

The respondent, Ardian Fishka, brought a motion to dismiss two family law appeals initiated by the appellant, Melissa Bell, arguing they were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the extensive litigation history, noting the appellant's repeated re-litigation of decided issues, abusive conduct, and deliberate non-compliance with court orders, including orders for security for costs and previous cost awards.

The court found the appeals clearly met the criteria for dismissal under Rule 2.1, emphasizing the need for finality in litigation and preventing the abuse of court resources.

The appellant, Nancy Johnson, appealed the dismissal of her application to prove her mother's 2015 will in solemn form and sought leave to appeal a costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the Neuberger framework.

The application judge correctly determined that the appellant failed to meet the minimal evidentiary threshold to call into question the will's validity or the testator's capacity, and that the respondents successfully answered any challenge.

The court also affirmed the costs award, reiterating that estate litigation is subject to general costs rules and that the appellant's case did not warrant an exception for costs to be paid from the estate.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s. 89 of the Indian Act and whether a court could place an on-reserve business into receivership at the instance of a non-Indian creditor.

The Superior Court had found a "commercial mainstream" exception to s. 89, allowing a receiver to recoup profits from the appellant's on-reserve businesses to satisfy a debt owed to a non-Indian lawyer.

The Court of Appeal overturned this, clarifying that the "commercial mainstream" exception applies only to s. 90(1) of the Indian Act (personal property deemed on-reserve) and not to s. 89, which protects all real and personal property of an Indian or band situated on a reserve from seizure by non-Indians, regardless of its commercial nature.

The appeal was allowed, holding that the receiver could not seize on-reserve business profits but could seize off-reserve assets.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marihuana, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The evidence was obtained via a search warrant that contained an incorrect address, rendering it invalid.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding the breach minor due to good faith and no risk of entering the wrong house.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in minimizing the seriousness of the Charter breach but ultimately upheld the admission of the evidence based on a holistic application of the R. v. Grant factors.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's appeal of the three-and-a-half-year sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing approach.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted by the motion judge in a mortgage default case.

The appellants (mortgagors and guarantor) argued that an agreement existed with the respondent mortgagees to forebear payment until the mortgaged properties were "construction ready." The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's determination that no such oral or written agreement existed, and that the parties' conduct and documentation were inconsistent with such an assertion.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondents were awarded partial indemnity costs.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence and in excluding evidence of the respondent's prior disreputable conduct and criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary rulings on the evidentiary issues, notably confirming for the first time that Gladue principles are relevant to a Corbett application when assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of an Indigenous accused's prior convictions.

The appellant, Roger Mercury, appealed his convictions for several drug and firearm related offences and his nine-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended material facts, and failed to consider other reasonable possibilities inconsistent with guilt, specifically regarding his presence in the apartment and evidence from a car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable and based on a careful assessment of formidable evidence, including video surveillance and key fob records, which supported the appellant's control over the car and unit.

The court concluded that the trial judge correctly applied the law on constructive possession and circumstantial evidence and adequately addressed the appellant's submissions.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct—specifically, an incident of physical abuse against another child—to cross-examine the complainant's mother if she testified for the defence.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to the mother's credibility, not for propensity reasoning.

The court found the evidence constituted other discreditable conduct and applied the balancing test from R. v. L.B. The application was dismissed, as the potential prejudicial effect of distracting the jury with a collateral issue outweighed the weak probative value of the evidence.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking, firearm, and weapons offences, appealed his convictions, arguing that seized evidence should be excluded due to Charter violations (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The trial judge found violations but erred by not conducting a s. 24(2) analysis, believing no causal link existed between the breach and evidence discovery.

The Court of Appeal conducted the s. 24(2) analysis, balancing the severity of breaches, their impact on the appellant's Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite serious breaches, the evidence was admitted due to the minimal impact on the appellant's rights and the significant public interest in adjudicating serious firearm and drug offences.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Asher Veliz, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and a related firearm offence, and his global net sentence of 4.5 years.

He argued breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) concerning arbitrary arrest, an invalid search warrant, and denial of his right to counsel of choice.

He also appealed the sentence, alleging the trial judge imposed a higher custodial sentence for the drug offence than sought by the Crown without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the validity of the search warrant, or the right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting the global sentence imposed was lower than what the Crown had sought.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will clause granting an option to purchase "the farming business carried on by me." The testator had ceased active farming years prior to her death, instead leasing the land.

The application judge found the farming business had ceased, causing the option to lapse.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the application judge erred by not applying the presumption under s. 22 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which states a will speaks as if made immediately before death.

The Court found that the testator was still carrying on a farming business at the time of her death through leasing the land and declaring farm income, thus the option was valid.

The appellant, Casey Zizek, appealed the dismissal of a motion to stay proceedings.

The underlying action involved an alleged fraud by the defendants against the respondent school board.

The school board had settled with other defendants via a Mary Carter or Pierringer agreement but failed to immediately disclose this to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by not applying the principle that immediate disclosure of such agreements is mandatory and that failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process, regardless of prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, and the proceeding was stayed.

This is an appeal from an order granting primary residence of the parties' child to the respondent mother.

The appellant father argued the trial judge erred by not considering the impact of relocation on parenting time, failing to apply mandatory Divorce Act provisions regarding relocation, and presumptively basing the decision on the mother being the primary caregiver.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error, affirming that the trial judge properly considered the child's best interests, including the impact of relocation, and that the appellant was not prejudiced by any notice defect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that required them to pay an additional amount under a collateral mortgage after the principal debt (promissory note) had been paid.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in granting what were, in essence, two separate judgments for the same obligation.

Once the principal debt was paid, the collateral security was spent, and the respondent had no right to claim further under the mortgage.

The appeal was allowed in part, ordering the respondent to repay the additional amount and setting aside the judgment against one of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal.

The underlying dispute arose from a commercial arbitration where the arbitrator made a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction over a counterclaim.

The Superior Court reversed this ruling.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, holding that under section 17(9) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, there is no right of appeal from a court's decision reviewing an arbitrator's preliminary jurisdictional ruling, distinguishing it from an appeal of an award.

This appeal concerned the dismissal of a motion to set aside a default judgment against the appellant, Fida Kasi, related to a breached agreement for the purchase and sale of a residential property.

The appellant argued that the respondent, LIV Communities, was not the correct contracting party or property owner and thus could not have sustained damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's decision that LIV Communities and Landmart Homes were the same entity and that the appellant understood they were dealing with LIV Communities.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that his responsibilities had changed following the hiring of a new senior employee, which he contended amounted to a constructive dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument directly contradicted the trial judge's factual findings.

The trial judge had expressly found that the appellant maintained his role as general manager, that there was no change in the company's hierarchy, and no evidence of a change in his remuneration or bonus package.

The appellate court concluded that the trial judge made no legal error and that her well-supported factual findings were fatal to the appellant's position.