Bradley W. Miller

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, deemed so under s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code due to the murder occurring while committing criminal harassment.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: errors in jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, improper admission and use of prior misconduct evidence, improper admission and use of ante mortem statements of the deceased, and insufficient evidence/inadequate jury instruction on the criminal harassment route to first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and concluding there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for voyeurism.

The trial and summary conviction appeal judges excluded evidence (a hidden camera) found in an Airbnb apartment, ruling that the apartment owner (accused) had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and police actions violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found that the accused, as the apartment owner, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment while it was rented to the complainant.

The complainant was entitled to invite police to investigate a crime committed against him in the apartment.

The hidden camera was properly seized under the Criminal Code.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, admitted the evidence, and ordered a new trial.

The moving party, who was the respondent on a previous appeal, brought a motion under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the Court of Appeal's decision and dismiss the appeal.

The moving party argued the court erred by misreading the record regarding the interpretation of a partnership agreement.

The court found Rule 37.14 inapplicable as it pertains to specific procedural errors, and Rule 59.06 (accidental slip or omission) also inapplicable, as the submission was a re-argument of a point already considered and not supported by the trial judge's findings or the agreement's wording.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal where the appellants were wholly successful on the underlying motion.

The appellants sought costs of approximately $28,800 for the motion.

The court found this amount reasonable, considering the respondent had previously been awarded $34,663.03 on partial success of the same motion.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the appellants $28,800 in all-inclusive costs for the motion.

The appellant, Karen Irwin, sued her former employers for constructive dismissal.

The respondents moved to stay the action, arguing an arbitration clause in the employment contract required arbitration.

The appellant challenged the arbitration clause's validity due to unconscionability and inconsistency with the Employment Standards Act and Human Rights Code.

The motion judge stayed the action, deferring the validity question to arbitration.

The appellant appealed, arguing procedural unfairness and that the motion judge erred by not determining the arbitration clause's validity.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, as the motion judge was permitted to leave the validity question to the arbitrator, especially since it involved mixed questions of fact and law requiring more than superficial consideration.

This appeal addressed whether an innocent purchaser for value obtains good title to property sold under a power of sale, despite the mortgagee's breach of section 22 of the Mortgages Act (failure to provide a default statement, suspending enforcement rights).

The lower court had set aside the transfer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the purchaser's appeal, holding that the "Safe Harbour Protections" under sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act and section 99(1.1) of the Land Titles Act protect an innocent purchaser, providing good title upon registration.

The mortgagor's remedy for the mortgagee's non-compliance lies against the mortgagee, not the innocent third-party purchaser.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that partially set aside a default judgment against them and imposed substantial indemnity costs, including a personal costs order against their counsel.

The default judgment stemmed from their inability to close on a home purchase agreement, leading to the respondent retaining their down payment and selling the property at a significant loss.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in full, finding that the motion judge erred in her assessment of the appellants' arguable defence, misapplied principles regarding promptness and prejudice, and made palpable and overriding factual errors.

The personal costs order against counsel was set aside due to a breach of procedural fairness and factual errors.

The Court ordered the default judgment and noting in default to be set aside entirely, allowing the appellants to file a full statement of defence and counterclaim, and awarded substantial indemnity costs of the appeal to the appellants.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the motion judge's alleged error in admitting gang evidence, a claimed miscarriage of justice due to trial severance and the jury being unaware of a co-accused's verdict, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of gang evidence, no miscarriage of justice, and that the verdict was reasonable given the evidence of motive, animus, and association.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to assume jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a complex international fraud and conspiracy case.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that a Toronto resident orchestrated a scheme to misappropriate billions of dollars from Saudi Arabian corporations and dissipate them globally, with the assistance of family members and various corporate entities.

The appellants (foreign defendants) challenged Ontario's jurisdiction, arguing a lack of real and substantial connection.

The motion judge found jurisdiction based on contracts made in Ontario (including a gift deed central to the alleged scheme), property located in Ontario, and the tort of conspiracy being committed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding factual errors or legal errors in applying the Van Breda test for jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, self-represented at trial, was convicted of armed bank robbery.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct himself on a key witness's motive to lie and by relying on the appellant's uncompleted testimony after indicating it would not be used.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding witness credibility but agreed the trial judge erred in using the appellant's testimony for conviction after leading him to believe it would not be used, thereby jeopardizing trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerned a failed residential property transaction due to substantial water damage occurring shortly before closing.

The purchasers (respondents) sued the vendors (appellants) for breach of the agreement of purchase and sale (APS), seeking return of their deposit and damages.

The vendors counterclaimed, alleging repudiation by the purchasers.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The motion judge found in favour of the purchasers, ruling that the damage was 'substantial' under s. 18 of the APS, entitling the purchasers to terminate, and that the vendors had not acted in good faith.

The vendors appealed, arguing procedural unfairness regarding the pleading of s. 18, errors in factual findings, and incorrect damages calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on s. 18 and good faith, but reduced the damages awarded by the cost of an engineering report.

The defendant, a Spanish law firm, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, sued the defendant for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the status of patent applications in Panama and Costa Rica, which had lapsed.

The court applied the Van Breda test and found that the plaintiff failed to establish a good arguable case for the tort of misrepresentation occurring in Ontario, as the plaintiff had not provided the necessary powers of attorney in time and the defendant had not provided incorrect information.

The motion was granted and the claim was dismissed.

The appellant, J.G., appealed his conviction for sexual interference offences related to his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge made inconsistent findings regarding reliability, conflated reliability and credibility, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence on the core issue of the offence, despite minor inconsistencies regarding peripheral details, especially given the complainant's age at the time of the events.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable under a guarantee to The Toronto-Dominion Bank.

The central issue was whether an email sent by one of the appellants constituted clear and unequivocal notice to terminate their liability under the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal found that the email, which sought confirmation of no obligation, did provide such notice.

The court distinguished the facts from a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision, noting that the bank had no doubt about the appellants' intent to terminate and did not take actions indicating a continuing relationship after the notice.

The appeal was allowed, reversing the summary judgment against the appellants.

The appellant appealed convictions for various drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's findings on reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the legality of a search incident to arrest under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, based on confidential informant information and the discovery of drugs in the appellant's car.

The court also upheld the search of a locked container within the vehicle as a lawful search incident to arrest, despite the appellant's assertion of privacy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and forcible confinement, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's implausible account and acceptance of the complainant's evidence, despite minor inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to quash the unconstitutional victim surcharge order, with the balance of the sentence remaining in effect.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons to its judgment, addressing the disposition and sentence after setting aside the appellant's conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

Given the appellant had served her original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission to dismiss the appeal, substitute a verdict of guilty for simple possession of oxycodone, and impose an absolute discharge effective from the original sentencing date.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing a police officer to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of trafficking and in instructing the jury not to speculate about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in permitting the expert opinion on the ultimate issue, as it was not necessary and risked the jury accepting it without critical consideration of the evidence, particularly the absence of evidence on dosages and consumption rates.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the error was not harmless.

The conviction was set aside, and the court requested submissions on substituting a conviction for simple possession and an appropriate sentence.

The appellant, Adam Kaup, appealed his convictions for drug possession and trafficking, arguing two main points: that the search warrant for his home was invalid due to insufficient grounds and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that the trial judge erred in finding he had constructive possession of drugs found in the basement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the ITO, concluding that it provided sufficient grounds for the warrant when viewed holistically.

Regarding constructive possession, the court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law, considering all circumstantial evidence beyond mere occupancy, and reasonably concluded that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.