Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of awareness of potential immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding it unbelievable that the appellant, given his prior immigration history, was unaware of the potential consequences.

However, the court allowed the appeal against sentence, varying it to reflect the joint submission that had been made at the time of the guilty plea.

The appellant, Princes Gates GP Inc. (PG), appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract and bad faith termination of agreements with the respondent tenant, 2505243 Ontario Limited (250), a food services provider.

The trial judge awarded 250 reliance damages and employee compensation damages.

PG argued errors in findings of improper termination, refusal to assist with the Canada Emergency Commercial Rent Assistance Program (CECRA), bad faith, and damages calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed PG's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that PG's actions contributed to 250's inability to pay rent, their refusal to assist with CECRA was unjustified, and their termination was in bad faith by misleading 250 while secretly negotiating with a new provider.

The court also affirmed the reliance damages award and the employee compensation damages.

This appeal concerns the application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP provision, s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, in a defamation action arising from negative online reviews posted by a client against contractors.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the public interest in the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by unduly focusing on SLAPP hallmarks, failing to adequately consider reputational harm, and not qualitatively assessing the value of the respondent's vitriolic expression.

The Court conducted a fresh analysis, concluding that the significant harm to the appellants' professional reputations outweighed the minimal public interest in the malicious and scurrilous statements, reinstating the defamation action.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of communicating with a person believed to be under 16 for the purpose of facilitating a sexual assault, and one count of making child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that an intention to meet in person is not required for the "purpose of facilitating" a sexual assault under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and that the trial judge correctly applied the mens rea standard of knowledge or wilful blindness regarding the complainant's age.

The court also found no error in the "making" child pornography conviction, despite a slip in the sentencing reasons, as the appellant directed the complainant to create new sexual images.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's defamation action against the respondents was dismissed on a summary judgment motion by the Superior Court, which found the action statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appellant's appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to adduce credible evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the commencement of the limitation period.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's procedural rulings, noting the appellant's failure to properly pursue remedies for refusal to cross-examine or to bring a formal motion for leave to amend her statement of claim.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal by the appellant, Dong Jin Qiu, regarding the quantum of damages.

The appeal resulted in the respondent, Biao Liu, owing the appellant $10,496.68.

The court determined that the appellant was the successful party at both trial and appeal, contrary to the respondent's argument for partial indemnity costs based on a forfeited deposit.

As the appellant did not request costs, no order for trial costs was made.

The appellant, R.V., appealed his sentence for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's restoration of his convictions, the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal for Ontario to consider the sentence appeal.

Fresh medical evidence, filed with the Crown's consent, revealed the appellant had terminal cancer with a very bleak prognosis.

In light of these exceptional circumstances, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the original term of imprisonment and probation order, and substituting an 18-month conditional sentence order.

Other orders from the trial judge remained in force.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's refusal to certify a claim for intrusion upon seclusion against Trans Union of Canada, Inc. in a class action.

The appellant alleged that Trans Union, a "Database Defendant" enabled third-party hackers to access private information due to inadequate security.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as recognized in Jones v. Tsige, does not extend to "Database Defendants" for the actions of independent third-party hackers, as there is no basis for vicarious liability in such circumstances.

The court also confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the refusal to certify as a final order effectively dismissing the claim.

The appellant, Glenn Winder, appealed a motion judge's decision that his claim for the intentional tort of intrusion upon seclusion against Marriott International, Inc. did not disclose a cause of action.

The lawsuit stemmed from a data breach of Marriott's Starwood hotels reservation database.

Winder argued that Marriott's collection and storage of personal information, in a manner that did not meet its representations and legal obligations regarding security, constituted an invasion of privacy, vitiating consent.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires an actual intrusion into private affairs, not merely a failure to safeguard information from third-party intrusion.

The court found no facts pleaded to support that Marriott itself disclosed or caused disclosure of the information, distinguishing it from a failure to protect against external hacking.

This appeal concerns the applicability of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to "Database Defendants" (entities that collect and store personal information) when a data breach occurs due to the alleged negligence or recklessness of the defendant, but the actual intrusion is committed by independent third-party hackers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as defined in Jones v. Tsige, requires an act of intrusion by the defendant itself, not merely a failure to prevent intrusion by others.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim, which alleged Equifax's failure to protect data from hackers, did not disclose a viable cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion against Equifax.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the termination of his conditional sentence order, which directed him to serve the remaining eight and a half months in custody due to a second breach.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge overemphasized the presumption of termination and failed to consider proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that the sentencing judge properly considered all circumstances, including the deliberate nature of the breach and the appellant's repeated non-compliance.

The Court concluded that the resulting sentence was not disproportionate or in violation of the jump principle, considering the original "crime spree" offences and the global sentence served.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Michael Beaudin, severely injured in a dirt bike motocross competition, sought statutory accident benefits from Travelers Insurance.

Travelers denied coverage, arguing the dirt bike was not an "automobile" under the Insurance Act and Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) because it was exempt from the Off-Road Vehicles Act (ORVA) insurance requirement.

The core issue on appeal was whether the ORVA exemption for closed course competitions applied only if the competition was sponsored by a motorcycle association.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the ORVA exemption applies only to sponsored competitions.

Consequently, the dirt bike was not exempt and was considered an "automobile" entitling Beaudin to benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

Antonio Duscio sought a review of a single judge's decision dismissing his motion for release pending the hearing of his appeal from a 16-month sentence for contempt.

The contempt findings related to concealment of assets to avoid execution on a fraud judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to intervene, deferring to the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, and dismissed the motion for release.

The court declined to decide whether criminal or civil process governs such release motions.

This decision concerns a third motion brought by the applicant to reopen an appeal abandoned in 2003, following his 1996 convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual touching, and subsequent dangerous offender designation.

Previous motions to reopen were dismissed in 2005 and 2013, with the latter upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal, assuming without deciding jurisdiction for successive motions, found no change in circumstances or merit in the proposed appeal, emphasizing the critical need for finality in criminal proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for robbery in 2006, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Board maintained his detention, removed indirectly supervised community privileges, and denied a transfer to another facility, following his conviction for child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding its refusal to transfer and removal of community access reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight and ongoing risk, deferring to the Board's expertise.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable for the balance of a business purchase price.

Their defence was based on fraudulent misrepresentations about the business's revenues.

The motion judge had dismissed this defence, relying on an "entire agreement" clause in the purchase agreement and the appellants' opportunities for due diligence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in law by giving preclusive effect to the entire agreement clause, as such clauses do not immunize against fraudulent misrepresentation.

Furthermore, opportunities for due diligence do not negate a party's right to avoid a contract based on fraudulent misrepresentation if actual knowledge of the untruth was not proven.

The Court concluded that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding the fraudulent misrepresentation and allowed the appeal, setting aside the summary judgment and remitting the matter for trial.

The appellant challenged the legality of a by-law passed by the City of Kingston imposing impost fees for water and wastewater infrastructure under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The appellant argued that such fees could only be imposed under the Development Charges Act, 1997 (DCA), or alternatively, if under the Municipal Act, 2001, then subject to the procedural protections of the DCA, including a right of appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), which the City could not provide.

The appellant also argued the by-law was illegal under s. 394(1)(e) of the Municipal Act, 2001, as water and wastewater are natural resources.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that municipalities have dual legislative regimes for imposing development fees, and the Municipal Act, 2001, provides a valid basis for the impost fees.

The court clarified that s. 15(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, does not require importing DCA procedural protections, as the two statutes confer different powers and have distinct review mechanisms.

Furthermore, the court found that s. 394(1)(e) does not prohibit fees for infrastructure that transports water and wastewater for ratepayers' benefit.

The appellant, Garey Harris, appealed his convictions for weapons and drug trafficking offences, arguing errors in the application judge's Charter decisions (ss. 8 and 9) and the trial judge's instructions to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the Charter arguments, upholding the finding that police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that the search warrant was valid, with only a minor, non-prejudicial Charter breach regarding police remaining in the unit.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in jury instructions by potentially removing a legitimate defence from the jury's consideration, specifically regarding competing inferences of control over the seized items due to the presence of other individuals connected to the unit.

This error jeopardized the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed in part, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Lorne Clement, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The grounds included counsel's failure to ensure the appellant reviewed his police statement, failure to review potentially exculpatory evidence from a witness (R.D.), and failure to order witness statement transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even assuming factual shortcomings in counsel's performance, the appellant failed to establish prejudice.

The court reasoned that the appellant's own admissions to police regarding intoxication were pivotal to the trial judge's rejection of his testimony, and the witness's evidence was not clearly exculpatory.