Stephen T. Goudge

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in it.

The Court noted that it was obvious on the face of the prior order of Lang J. that it bound only the parties to that litigation.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding he breached a lease agreement, which rendered his option to purchase null and void.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to sustain the motion judge's findings of fact.

On consent of the respondent, the judgment was modified to delete provisions regarding monies paid into court and a writ of possession.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondent fixed at $5,000.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his civil action against his employer, which included a claim for malicious prosecution arising from a traffic charge instigated by the employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

As the statement of claim attacked a wide array of employer conduct in managing the workplace, the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that granted the respondent limited community access for special purposes.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's order was supported by evidence from the treating psychiatrist and was not unreasonable.

The Court allowed the appeal only to the extent of adding uncontested conditions prohibiting the respondent from possessing intoxicants and weapons, which had been inadvertently omitted from the Board's order.

The appellant appealed her sentence for common assault, which occurred during a noncontact hockey game.

She argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and that gender played a role in the sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range based on the facts and that there was no basis to suggest gender influenced the sentence.

The appellant failed to surrender into custody as required by his release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal as abandoned.

The appellant failed to surrender himself as required by his release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding his employment termination.

On appeal, he raised a new issue claiming entitlement to stock options promised in his employment letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the options were not granted until the end of his probationary period and did not start to vest until a year later, which was well after his employment had terminated.

The appellant physician performed ear surgeries using a new antiseptic introduced by the hospital, which caused profound hearing loss in two patients.

The hospital settled with the patients and sought contribution and indemnity from the appellant, arguing he was negligent in failing to inquire about the new antiseptic's properties.

The trial judge found the appellant 50% liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding no evidence that the appellant breached the standard of care or that further inquiries would have revealed the antiseptic's ototoxicity prior to the surgeries.

The hospital's claim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding whether an unconditional settlement offer was made on July 8, 2008, and accepted the following day.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was charged with disobeying a court order under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code after allegedly violating an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protest activity.

The trial judge quashed the information, finding that the Rules of Civil Procedure provided another mode of proceeding for contempt, thereby triggering the exception in s. 127(1).

The summary conviction appeal court reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the authority to punish for civil contempt originates in the common law, not statute, and therefore is not 'expressly provided by law' as required to exclude the application of s. 127(1).

The appellant appealed his convictions for several sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to account for inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge grasped the essence of the case, made essential factual findings, and properly applied the burden of proof and the W.(D.) framework.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision dismissing his appeal from two assault convictions.

The sole ground of appeal was that the summary conviction court erred in failing to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the proposed grounds did not raise a question of law of general significance to the administration of justice, and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of a commercial real estate agreement based on a 50 per cent lost chance of closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, the date of assessment, and the use of a discounted cash flow methodology.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the amortization of capital expenditures and directed a new trial solely on the issue of recovering certain management expenses.

The appellant suffered a fractured ankle after slipping on an icy municipal sidewalk.

He failed to give the required 10-day notice to the municipality under the Municipal Act, 2001, only providing notice months later after consulting a lawyer.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no reasonable excuse for the late notice and no gross negligence by the municipality.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant's severe injury, medication, and resulting depression constituted a reasonable excuse for the delay.

Furthermore, the municipality's failure to salt the sidewalks for nearly 34 hours after becoming aware of dangerous conditions amounted to gross negligence.

The corporate appellants owned a commercial property that was severed in 2000.

In 2001, amendments to the Municipal Act imposed a new taxation scheme on 'eligible properties', including those that were subdivided or subject to a severance.

The appellants sought a declaration that the amendments did not apply retrospectively to their 2000 severance, arguing they had vested rights to the previous favourable tax treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'eligible property' operates retrospectively to ensure tax fairness and that the appellants had no vested right to the continuance of the previous tax scheme.

The Ontario Review Board ordered an independent psychiatric assessment for an accused and directed the Attorney General to pay the costs.

The Attorney General successfully applied to quash the funding order.

The Board appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board lacks jurisdiction under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code to order the Attorney General or any other party to pay for an assessment, and that the Board must bear the costs through its own budget.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that the respondent Merali was not a 'franchisor's associate' under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge's factual finding that Merali controlled the franchisor rendered him a franchisor's associate.

Consequently, Merali was declared jointly and severally liable with the other respondents for payments owed under s. 6(6) of the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board finding him unfit to stand trial due to an untreated mental disorder and delusions.

The appellant argued that the Board's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons were sufficient for appellate review and its conclusion was not unreasonable based on the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, specifically the victim's description of the perpetrators' accents and the continuity of a durag found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on how they could use the victim's statements and fairly reviewed the evidence concerning continuity.