Peter Milligan

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying 32 of its natural gas gate stations as industrial rather than commercial properties.

The Board had found that adding odourant to natural gas constituted 'processing' under the Assessment Act regulations.

The Divisional Court clarified that the test for leave to appeal where the standard of review is reasonableness is whether there is reason to doubt the reasonableness of the decision, rather than its correctness.

Finding that there was reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Board's interpretation of 'processing' and that the issue was of sufficient importance, the Court granted leave to appeal.

The applicant church sought a declaration that its single-building complex, which housed both a place of worship and a religious school, was exempt from property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The respondent assessment corporation argued that the school portions were taxable because the school was operated by a separately incorporated entity.

The court found that the church and the school formed a single patrimony, with the church controlling and dominating the school's operations.

The court held that the exemptions for a place of worship and a non-profit educational seminary applied to the school-use areas, granting the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board, which classified their properties offering extended stay accommodations as hotels under s. 17(2) of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court applied the test for leave to appeal, finding that while the question of law was important, there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation.

The plain language of the statute clearly caught the subject properties within the definition of a hotel.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board (ARB) to the Divisional Court.

The ARB had classified a condominium unit used as a sign shop by the respondent as commercial rather than industrial under O. Reg. 282/98.

The court found that the ARB's decision was based on findings of fact regarding the specific property and did not raise a question of law of sufficient importance to merit the attention of the Divisional Court.

The court also found no reason to doubt the correctness of the ARB's decision.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent municipality could not recover approximately $2 million in unbilled property taxes from 2001 to 2007.

The municipality discovered calculation errors during a s. 331 review and sought to collect the back taxes.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 359 of the Municipal Act, 2001 applies to limit the municipality's recovery of undercharged taxes to the current and previous tax years, even for 'eligible properties' undergoing a s. 331 review.

The corporate appellants owned a commercial property that was severed in 2000.

In 2001, amendments to the Municipal Act imposed a new taxation scheme on 'eligible properties', including those that were subdivided or subject to a severance.

The appellants sought a declaration that the amendments did not apply retrospectively to their 2000 severance, arguing they had vested rights to the previous favourable tax treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'eligible property' operates retrospectively to ensure tax fairness and that the appellants had no vested right to the continuance of the previous tax scheme.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision that directed MPAC to bring a complaint to correct palpable errors in the assessment roll for two severed parcels.

The Board limited the complaint to apportioning the existing $773,000 assessment between the parcels, precluding MPAC from seeking an increased current value assessment of $1,650,000 due to MPAC's delay and resulting prejudice to the taxpayer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly and reasonably exercised its discretion under section 40.1(b) of the Assessment Act.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that their land, which was severed in 2000, constituted 'eligible property' for the 2001 taxation year under the Municipal Act.

The appellants argued that the relevant statutory definition, which came into force on January 1, 2001, should only apply to severances occurring after that date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application of the definition to a 2000 severance was implicit by the necessary operation of the municipal tax regime, as 2001 was the first year taxes could be determined on the newly severed parcels.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that corrected an error in the assessment roll regarding a severed property.

The property had been inadvertently omitted from the roll, and the Board used its discretion under s. 44(1) of the Assessment Act to rectify the error, triggering s. 33 to assess the omitted property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of law and confirming that the limitation period for complaints under s. 40(2) does not apply to properties erroneously left off the assessment roll.