Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge gave improper advice prior to his re-election of mode of trial as a self-represented accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly explained that a jury trial would be more complicated and make it more difficult for the judge to provide necessary guidance compared to a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence and dismissed the appeal.

However, the Court strongly urged Correctional Services Canada to expedite the classification procedure and ensure the appellant's medical needs are promptly met and continuously monitored in an appropriate security level.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order awarding $3,950 in costs to the respondent and making findings on a defamation issue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reducing the costs award to $1,000 to reflect the respondent's limited success on the motion.

The Court also set aside the motion judge's findings on defamation, agreeing with the appellant that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to make such findings on that type of motion.

The appellant was rendered a tetraplegic after diving into shallow water at a provincial park and striking his head.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was contributorily negligent, failed to prove he hit a sandbar rather than the lake bottom, and that the sandbars were not a hazard under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made fundamentally inconsistent findings on factual causation, disregarded relevant expert and eyewitness evidence, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the absence of previous injuries at the park.

The young person appealed findings of guilt on two counts of sexual assault involving two child complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, considering collusion, and applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately scrutinized the evidence and properly rejected collusion.

Although the trial judge erred at the second step of the W.(D.) analysis by asking if the appellant's evidence 'could not reasonably be true', the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding the Crown's case was overwhelming and the rejected evidence could not have left a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the evidence did not support a finding of lack of consent, there were inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence, and the trial judge erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the evidence of lack of consent adequate, the treatment of inconsistencies proper, and the finding of a position of trust supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to refuse a motion for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly grappled with the central issue of the complainant's lack of consent and reasonably accepted expert evidence regarding forced sexual intercourse.

The court concluded the reasons were sufficient and the verdict was supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision dismissing its application to force a unit owner to remove a hot tub from his exclusive use common element backyard patio.

The application judge found that the hot tub was not an 'addition, alteration or improvement' under s. 98(1) of the Condominium Act requiring board approval.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, agreeing that the hot tub did not change the structure of the property or increase its value, and was analogous to a barbecue or patio furniture.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sex-related offences.

At trial, the judge stayed the proceedings because a portion of the complainant's preliminary inquiry testimony was lost due to a defective recording tape, finding a breach of the accused's s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by applying the Carosella test instead of the La test for lost evidence.

Since the Crown provided a satisfactory explanation for the loss, the accused had to establish actual prejudice, which he failed to do given the availability of the complainant, full disclosure, and alternative means to explore inconsistencies.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received disability benefits until January 1997.

In January 2000, the respondent insurer sent a letter refusing further weekly benefits, outlining the dispute resolution process, and enclosing relevant sections of the Insurance Act.

In 2007, the appellant sought to amend his statement of claim to include a claim for income replacement benefits.

The motion was dismissed on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

On appeal, the court held that the insurer's letter constituted a valid refusal that triggered the limitation period, as it adequately informed the appellant of the dispute resolution process.

The appellants, representing unionized and non-unionized former employees of Nortel, appealed a decision dismissing their motions for directions to compel Nortel to pay severance, termination, and retirement benefits during its CCAA restructuring.

The appellants argued that the payments were protected under s. 11.3(a) of the CCAA as compensation for ongoing services, and that the CCAA stay could not override provincial Employment Standards Act obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the payments were for past services and that the doctrine of federal paramountcy allowed the CCAA stay to suspend the immediate payment obligations under the provincial legislation to facilitate the restructuring.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal declined to admit fresh evidence, finding it added nothing of substance.

The Court agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that there was a sufficient basis to grant the peace bond, though noting it would have been prudent for the trial judge to hear a summary of the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing the respondent had the ability to pay a fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the respondent lacked the ability to pay based on the record.

At the Crown's request, a $1,600 victim surcharge was quashed.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to support a finding of manslaughter and in her ruling regarding choice of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis and conclusions on both grounds.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the parties were to share a lottery prize equally based on their established practice and relationship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact regarding a central phone call and the parties' confirmatory conduct were entirely open to him and reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the lower court's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant abandoned its appeal on consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appeal abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent fixed at $3,500.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing issues with service and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion for fresh evidence, finding there was an ample basis for the motion judge to conclude the appellants were properly served and noting they had not requested an adjournment.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that acquitted the respondent of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The appeal judge had found insufficient evidence that the respondent's breath sample was received 'directly' into the approved instrument as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision does require the sample to be received directly into the instrument, but found there was ample circumstantial evidence from the breath technician to support the trial judge's conclusion that this requirement was met.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.