Stephen T. Goudge

TCR Holding Corporation amalgamated with several subsidiaries, inadvertently including one that had guaranteed a promissory note to the appellants.

Upon discovering the mistake, TCR applied to set aside the amalgamation.

The application judge granted the order, finding the inclusion was an inadvertent mistake and the appellants would receive a windfall if the amalgamation stood.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's exercise of equitable jurisdiction to relieve against mistake and set aside the amalgamation.

The appellants, who were each found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on consent, appealed their verdicts.

They argued that the Criminal Code violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to mandate an inquiry into whether an accused's consent to an NCRMD finding is voluntary and informed, similar to the inquiry required for guilty pleas under section 606(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter challenges, finding no violation of fundamental justice or equality rights.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' individual arguments regarding the reasonableness of their verdicts, fitness to stand trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding whether a letter sent by its counsel constituted a proper tender to stop the running of interest and entitle it to a mortgage discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the tender was defective because it was not an unconditional offer to pay and the proposed costs were to be held in trust for the appellant rather than the respondent.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application to vary a consent custody order to seek joint custody and an equal parenting schedule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to increase the father's weekday contact rather than imposing an equal parenting schedule, noting the judge properly considered the relevant factors including enhancing contact between the child and the father's new family.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent mother sole custody of their youngest child, with no access for the father or the older siblings.

The trial judge also issued a restraining order against the father and awarded the mother full recovery costs of over $320,000 due to the father's bad faith and persistent disobedience of court orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the father had alienated the older children from the mother and that a no-access order was necessary to protect the youngest child's best interests.

The restraining order and costs award were also upheld.

The appellant appealed from a judgment dismissing his action against the respondents on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to adduce evidence capable of raising a genuine issue for trial.

The Court also agreed that the action was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The respondents were convicted of voting in a voting place where they were not entitled to vote and furnishing false information under the Municipal Elections Act.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the convictions, finding the Crown failed to prove the voting subdivisions and election officials were properly established under the Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the Crown did not need to prove the establishment of voting subdivisions for these specific charges, and that the written delegations to election officials were sufficient.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding her conviction for assaulting an elderly patient.

She argued the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of workplace pressures to explain a Crown witness's delay in reporting the assault, and by failing to properly apply the reasonable doubt standard.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, noting the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) standard and considered the totality of the evidence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant condominium developer appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for failing to disclose sufficient information regarding an HVAC equipment lease in a disclosure statement provided to prospective purchasers.

The trial judge held that the failure to include the lease term, total cost, interest rate, and purchase option price violated s. 52(5) of the Condominium Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the disclosure statement accurately disclosed the existence and first-year cost of the lease, which was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements.

The failure to provide further details was not a material omission, and the condominium corporations did not suffer a loss in reliance on the statement.

The young person appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was not clearly disproportionate to the offence and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's determination that the sentence served the purposes and goals of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellants, commercial tenants, were locked out by their landlord for rent arrears.

To regain entry, they signed minutes of settlement and a promissory note guaranteeing the landlord's lawyer's fees.

When sued on the settlement, the appellants brought a third party claim against the lawyer for economic duress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the third party claim, finding that the lawyer's routine conduct in advancing her client's position did not constitute the illegitimate pressure required for economic duress.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that statements he made to police should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the statements were taken in violation of s. 10(b).

However, the Court held that even if the statements were excluded, the verdicts would necessarily have been the same, as the appellant was the sole occupant of his own car, and a loaded gun was found on the back seat underneath his coat.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the restitution order made at trial following a conviction for fraud.

The trial judge found the amount of fraud was at least $15,645, which was justified by the evidence.

However, the trial judge made an arithmetical error in calculating the final amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the restitution order to $10,845.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for certiorari.

The preliminary inquiry justice had discharged the respondent on a charge of first degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal held that the justice's sufficiency determination, even if arguably incorrect, did not constitute a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol content.

The self-represented applicant argued the trial judge erred in relying on statutorily compelled statements.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, noting the issue was not raised below, lacked an evidentiary foundation, and the trial judge made no improper use of the statements.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a fist fight at a football game.

He argued the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment to obtain a transcript for a section 11(b) Charter application, and in failing to apply the principles of R. v. W.(D.) when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the denial of the adjournment.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's reasons suggested she believed the Crown witnesses simply because she disbelieved the defence witnesses, contrary to the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant applied to amend a municipal by-law schedule to permit a second adult entertainment parlour location.

The City refused the application because the proposed location abutted a residential property, contrary to the by-law.

The appellant appealed, alleging bad faith, misinterpretation of 'residence', and procedural unfairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no bad faith, agreeing the abutting property was a residence despite being unoccupied during renovations, and concluding a full hearing would not have changed the outcome.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident action sought to bifurcate the trial of liability and damages issues, to be heard by different juries.

The plaintiffs, who had also served a jury notice, opposed the motion.

The Master dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.

The Superior Court set aside the Master's order, but the Divisional Court restored it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to bifurcate a trial where a valid jury notice has been served, absent the consent of the parties, as it would infringe the statutory right to have issues of fact tried by a single jury.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed an order directing that electronic images of the hard drives of two computers seized from her be sent to France pursuant to warrants issued under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The appellant argued the warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the issuing judge's conclusion that the appellant's common-law spouse was likely communicating with other members of a terrorist plot using the seized computers.