Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed an order finding that the respondent had met his obligation to cooperate under the minutes of settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's reliance on the respondent's accountant's evidence regarding the risk of filing a false tax return.

The court also upheld the motion judge's costs order.

The appellants successfully sued the respondents for damages from a motor vehicle accident.

Prior to trial, the respondents' insurer twice refused the appellants' requests to participate in mandatory mediation under the Insurance Act, claiming the injuries did not meet the statutory threshold.

The trial judge awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the insurer's refusal was a genuine available position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that participating in mediation is a mandatory statutory obligation with no exceptions.

The Court increased the trial costs award by $40,000 as a remedial penalty for the insurer's failure to mediate.

The appellant, who suffers from a delusional disorder and believes he is the rightful King of Canada, appealed a decision upholding the Consent and Capacity Board's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued that the test for capacity under section 4 of the Health Care Consent Act was unconstitutionally vague and that the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory test was not vague and had been defined with reasonable precision by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable, as the appellant's mental condition prevented him from recognizing his illness and appreciating the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and inducing breach of contract arising from the peremptory removal of the respondent from a military aerospace consulting project.

The Court of Appeal clarified the elements of intentional interference with economic relations and inducing breach of contract, adopting the House of Lords' approach in OBG v. Allan.

The court held that unlawful means for intentional interference must be directed at a third party and not directly actionable by the plaintiff.

While the trial judge erred in using defamation directly actionable by the plaintiff as unlawful means, the court upheld liability based on a conspiracy against a third party and breach of contract.

The court also confirmed that inducing breach of contract requires an actual breach, not mere frustration.

The appeal was dismissed and the damages awards were upheld.

The appellant appealed a decision setting aside his bankruptcy discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the issue of standing was not raised below and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The court also upheld the admission of fresh evidence and agreed that there were grounds to set aside the discharge under s. 158(j) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision, arguing errors of fact regarding credibility findings and the treatment of a family physician's opinion, as well as an error in principle regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were available on the record and that he was not bound to accept every aspect of the medical opinion.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Simplified Procedure would not have been appropriate given how the defence was conducted.

The appellant appealed on the basis that the trial judge proceeded with the trial in her absence without inquiring into why she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant had stated she could not go through a trial, lacked resources for a lawyer, felt the proceedings were a charade, and voluntarily decided to leave.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot, suffering a broken ankle.

She commenced actions against the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor more than six years after the fall.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing both actions, finding the discoverability rule did not apply to extend the limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the property owner, as its identity could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against the maintenance contractor, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the appellant could have reasonably discovered its identity.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment ordering joint custody of the parties' two children, arguing the parents could not communicate, there was a history of domestic violence, and the order lacked a dispute resolution mechanism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had an evidentiary basis to conclude the parties could effectively communicate once court orders preventing contact were lifted.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the domestic abuse allegations or the access schedule.

The appellant operated a business arranging hotel accommodations for sports teams, receiving commissions from the hotels but no remuneration from the teams.

He was charged with acting as an unregistered travel agent under the Travel Industry Act, 2002.

The justice of the peace acquitted him, finding he did not sell travel services to the teams as a principal.

The Ontario Court of Justice reversed the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'travel agent' includes a person who sells travel services to consumers as an agent for the provider of those services.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his estranged spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's post-offence demeanour, improperly rejected his evidence, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence that a mark on his finger was not a bite mark.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that the fresh evidence, even if believed, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The trial judge found the termination notice was inadequate and ordered ongoing benefits.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that an inadequate notice does not entitle an insured to benefits in perpetuity; the insured must still prove ongoing disability.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the insured was no longer disabled by the fall of 1998.

However, the Court agreed that the insured's transition from part-time to full-time work shortly before the accident entitled her to a higher benefit calculation under s. 9(2) of the SABS.

The appellants, two youthful aboriginal offenders, were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the Gladue principles and erred in treating the sentencing range for home invasions as a mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding the trial judge gave insufficient weight to restorative justice objectives and the recommendations of a sentencing circle.

The court varied Jacko's sentence to two years less a day conditional, given his extraordinary rehabilitative efforts, and varied Manitowabi's sentence to two years less a day in jail followed by probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant had engaged in sexual activity with the appellant, mistakenly believing him to be his identical twin brother, with whom she had an ongoing consensual sexual relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the complainant's mistake as to identity meant she did not subjectively consent to the sexual activity.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant could not rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, as he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind.

The infant plaintiff suffered hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy during childbirth, resulting in cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs sued the hospital, physicians, and nurses for negligence during delivery.

The defendants refused to admit they owed a duty of care to the infant plaintiff, arguing that recent case law precluded such a duty.

The motion judge granted a declaration that a duty of care was owed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, affirming the well-established principle that an infant, once born alive, may sue for damages sustained as a result of negligence during labour and delivery.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) obtained a jeopardy order under the Income Tax Act to collect a tax debt from a corporation on the eve of its receivership.

The CRA garnished funds from the corporation's bank account.

The corporation was subsequently declared bankrupt.

The trustee in bankruptcy brought a motion seeking the return of the garnished funds, arguing the jeopardy order conflicted with the priority scheme in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the trustee's appeal, holding that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on the Federal Court's jeopardy order.

Furthermore, the garnishment was a completely executed process prior to bankruptcy under s. 70(1) of the BIA, and the CRA's actions did not constitute an improper Crown priority or inequitable conduct.

The parties advised the court that the matter had been settled.

On consent, the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Following a successful appeal under the Hague Convention ordering the return of a child to England, the appellant father sought costs of $15,000 for the appeal and $15,000 for the application hearing.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or $5,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs for both proceedings, fixed in the aggregate amount of $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale, balancing the need for deterrence with the relative financial situations of the parties.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order approving a settlement in the CCAA proceedings of Nortel Networks.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no procedural or substantive unfairness in the settlement.

The motion judge had carefully balanced the various interests at stake and made no demonstrable error.