Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant was dismissed without cause from his employment as a senior vice-president and part-owner of the respondent company.

The trial judge awarded 5 months' pay in lieu of notice and fixed the share repurchase trigger date at the end of the notice period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased the notice period to 9 months, finding the trial judge overemphasized short service and underemphasized the character of employment and availability of similar employment.

The Court also allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the share repurchase trigger date was the date of termination, not the end of the notice period.

Finally, the Court adjusted the trial costs order, finding that a second settlement offer revoked the first.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the Crown's closing remarks to the jury resulted in an unfair trial.

The appellant contended that the Crown inappropriately invited the jury to put themselves in the position of a victim, commented on the complainant's demeanour, and offered unproven facts regarding the complainant's mother's feelings of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that while some of the Crown's comments were inappropriate and best left unsaid, the trial judge's balanced and fair charge to the jury was sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of domestic abuse against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to warn the jury against propensity reasoning regarding the multiple counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence on each count was admissible context for the others and that a limiting instruction would have required explaining the proper uses of the evidence, which would have operated against the appellant's interest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the global sentence was fit given the aggravating domestic context.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury at birth in 2001.

The plaintiffs brought a timely action against several health practitioners.

In 2009, the plaintiffs' medical expert advised counsel of concerns regarding the infant's postnatal care, prompting a motion to add new defendants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the claims were not discoverable before January 1, 2004, and were therefore statute-barred under the new Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claims were discoverable before January 1, 2004, because a reasonable person acting as litigation guardian would have retained competent counsel to review the hospital records obtained in 2002.

Consequently, the former limitation period applied, which suspended the limitation period for minors, meaning the proposed claims were not statute-barred.

The appellant, a lawyer, retained the respondent law firm to assist her at a trial.

The respondent's initial estimate of costs was $50,000, but the final accounts exceeded $150,000.

The assessment officer found the accounts reasonable, noting the work was done at the appellant's behest, and the Superior Court dismissed the appellant's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, finding no error in principle in the assessment officer's conclusion that the accounts were reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his nieces and nephew from two separate trials.

In the first trial, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury on the risk of innocent collusion between the young complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

The Court also found the Crown's closing address was highly inflammatory and improperly suggested the absence of a proven motive to fabricate meant the complainants were telling the truth.

In the second trial, the trial judge erred by applying issue estoppel to prevent the appellant from challenging the nieces' similar fact evidence based on the first jury's verdict.

Both appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding when he knew of the allegations and failed to address all evidence concerning recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was not unreasonable and noting the trial judge properly relied on independent evidence from a social worker to reject the recent fabrication claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his failure to testify to bolster the Crown's case, contrary to R. v. Noble.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not use the failure to testify as evidence to strengthen the case, but merely noted there was no other explanation for an otherwise overwhelming case.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving without insurance under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

He had previously failed to attend court due to language difficulties and was unsuccessful in reopening his case.

The appellant presented new evidence, confirmed by the Crown, that he was actually insured at the time he was stopped.

The Crown conceded the appeal, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, entering an acquittal and ordering the remission of any fine paid.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal after failing to comply with a previous order requiring him to bring a motion for an adjournment by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment to ensure fairness, as the appellant was in the process of retaining counsel.

The adjournment was granted on strict conditions, including the payment of $8,673.39 in costs by a specified date, failing which the respondent could move to dismiss the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, arguing his arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest based on confidential informer tips and surveillance.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2).

The appellant also appealed his six-year sentence, seeking an adjustment to avoid deportation consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that immigration consequences cannot justify an unfit sentence.

The appellant insurers appealed an order requiring them to pay 90 per cent of the respondents' defence costs under a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy.

The dispute centered on whether Endorsement 3 of the policy applied to allocate defence costs for 'Hybrid Proceedings' that involved both covered and uncovered conduct, despite the claims not being made during the 2001 policy period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the policy's definition of 'Claim' was not time-limited and that Endorsement 3 applied to allocate 90 per cent of the defence costs to the covered loss.

The appellant franchisee appealed an order appointing a receiver over its business.

The franchisee argued that the franchisor had forgiven its debt for unpaid royalties and advertising contributions through two letters, and that the application judge erred in considering PST arrears not pleaded in the notice of application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the letters were merely proposals requiring acceptance, which never occurred.

The court also held that the PST default was properly considered as it was raised in supporting affidavits without causing prejudice, and rejected new arguments regarding jurisdiction, waiver, and estoppel.

The appellants appealed an order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the claims fell within Rule 17(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, establishing a presumption of jurisdiction simpliciter based on a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court also deferred to the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario was the convenient forum, noting the location of parties and witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim under s. 37 of the Criminal Code by focusing solely on the complainant's injuries.

The incident, captured on video in a holding cell, showed the appellant provoking the complainant and then punching him once in the face, causing serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the video evidence and the injuries to determine that the force used by the appellant was excessive in the circumstances.

The appellant suffered a severe brain injury after being assaulted by an intoxicated patron outside a pub.

He sued the patron and the pub, relying on the civil liability provisions of s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

At trial, the jury found the patron 100% responsible and dismissed the claim against the pub.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that liability under s. 39 requires reasonable foreseeability of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 39 requires a risk assessment and is breached only if a patron is over-served to the point where it is reasonably foreseeable they might injure another person.

The appellants and respondents acted as co-listing agents for a property and signed an agreement stating that 'any clients from open houses will be shared'.

A client met at an open house later purchased two other properties through the appellants, generating approximately $325,000 in commissions.

The respondents sued for half the commissions and succeeded at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the clause unambiguously required the agents to share clients introduced through the open house, which implicitly included sharing the resulting commissions.

The appellant, a real estate broker, created a website that provided the public with direct access to the Toronto Real Estate Board's (TREB) MLS Database.

TREB suspended the appellant's access without notice, arguing he breached the Authorized User Agreement (AUA).

The trial judge found the appellant breached the AUA by not confining his use of the database to exclusive and internal use, and that TREB was justified in suspending access without notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the AUA and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, two Dutch companies, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to set aside service ex juris and stay the wrongful dismissal action against them.

The Court of Appeal applied the Van Breda test and found that the Ontario courts had jurisdiction over both foreign defendants.

The court held that the foreign parent company was a necessary and proper party and that the foreign foundation holding the employee's shares had a real and substantial connection to Ontario because it withheld the share sale proceeds to the potential benefit of the North American subsidiaries' counterclaim.

The appeal was dismissed.