Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant requested an adjournment of the appeal, which was denied because the appellant had known for five months that new counsel was needed and a previous order made the appeal peremptory.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's judgment and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds collected by a receiver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the funds collected by the receiver never lost their character as trust funds because they were not co-mingled with pre-receivership funds and remained identifiable.

The cross-appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 191.0.1(3) was also dismissed, as the provision imposes obligations on persons in Ontario arranging carriage of goods.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for libel arising from statements published on a personal website and posted on third-party websites about an interior designer.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by applying a 'completely true' test instead of a 'substantially true' test, and erred in applying the doctrine of fair comment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly stated and properly applied the 'substantially true' test, and correctly concluded the defence of fair comment failed because the underlying facts were not true.

The appellant corporation sued three of its former directors and its secured lender for breach of duty leading to its bankruptcy.

The defendants successfully moved for an order requiring the corporation to advance their legal expenses incurred in defending the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the corporation's by-laws, read in conjunction with s. 136 of the Business Corporations Act, made the advancement of legal costs mandatory for the former directors.

The court also upheld the finding that the loan agreement required advancement for the secured lender, and that the motion judge did not err in ordering payment prior to assessment under the Solicitors' Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims against the respondent physicians and hospital arising from her involuntary committal in a psychiatric wing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment solely because the appellant failed to provide an expert opinion establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's claims included allegations of failure to follow statutory procedures under the Mental Health Act, which do not necessarily require expert medical opinion to be established.

The appellant appealed an order granting charging orders over settlement funds in favour of his former solicitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reasons and noting that any claim regarding the solicitor removing himself from the record without just cause could be addressed by the assessment officer.

The solicitor's cross-appeal regarding the motion judge's decision to award no costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed their sentence, arguing that the global sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence entirely fit given the appellant's substantial criminal record, the seriousness of the fraud offences, and the multiplicity of breach of probation offences.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the action was essentially about a promissory note to which the respondent was not a party, as the loan was made to a company and her husband.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's findings on two factual issues in a bifurcated medical malpractice trial: whether the appellant doctor recommended a drug to the respondent, and whether a medical note accurately recorded a meeting.

The trial judge found against the appellants on both issues, relying on expert forensic evidence suggesting the note was added to the file later.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's treatment of the expert evidence or her decision not to address equivocal evidence from other doctors.

The costs award for the bifurcated proceeding was also upheld.

Gary McHale laid a private information alleging three individuals committed a crime.

A justice of the peace received the information.

Before the pre-enquete hearing under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code could begin, a Crown Attorney intervened and withdrew the charges.

McHale successfully applied for mandamus in the Superior Court, which directed the pre-enquete to proceed.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's common law authority to withdraw a private information does not crystallize until the justice determines to issue process at the conclusion of the pre-enquete.

The respondent entered into a Tax Refund Agreement with Grant Forest Products Inc. (GFPI) to purchase income tax refunds.

GFPI failed to deliver the required transfer document before seeking CCAA protection.

The motion judge applied the equitable maxim that equity considers done what ought to be done, declaring the transfer had taken place.

The appellant, representing secured lenders, appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the maxim to cure GFPI's breach and that doing so did not inequitably rewrite the contract or create an unlawful preference.

The mother brought the child from England to Canada for a vacation and subsequently refused to return.

The father applied under the Hague Convention for the child's return.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that returning her to England would create an intolerable situation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in determining habitual residence by focusing on the mother's intentions and post-retention facts.

The Court also found the application judge set the threshold for an 'intolerable situation' too low.

The appeal was allowed and the child was ordered returned to England.

The appellant appealed an order approving a settlement by an Interim Receiver.

The appellant argued there was no evidence to sustain the motion judge's findings under the Soundair principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence in the Interim Receiver's reports that no assets beyond certain Swiss accounts were locatable or realizable, and that there was a 60% chance of success in related California litigation.

The court concluded the settlement was the best that could be achieved in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding compensation for services related to ATM machines, interest on loans, and the application of the Partnership Act.

The appellant also brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a sentencing hearing transcript of a fact witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the fresh evidence would not affect the trial judge's conclusions.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's findings on compensation, interest, and partnership.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, challenging the trial judge's order to sell a taxi plate.

The appellant argued that no party had requested the sale, called evidence on it, or made submissions regarding it.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge denied the appellant a fair hearing by ordering the sale on his own motion without notice or reasons.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the order for sale, with costs awarded to the appellant.

The self-represented appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error, unreasonableness, or miscarriage of justice in the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat.

The court noted that the appellant's request for an outpatient assessment could be raised at her next annual review.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, holding that the appellant's arguments focused on factual findings and alleged misapprehensions of evidence.

The court concluded that the appellant failed to raise a question of law of importance beyond the individual case.

The appellant appealed his convictions under the Highway Traffic Act, arguing his modified 1976 Chevrolet pick-up truck was exempt as a 'self-propelled implement of husbandry'.

The vehicle had been modified with a diesel engine, four-wheel drive, snow tires, and a heavy hitch for towing irrigation equipment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the modifications did not objectively transform the essential character or function of the vehicle for a specific use in farming, but merely made it better suited for general farm use.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment ordering the return of a $250,000 deposit on a failed commercial lease for a sports dome facility.

The respondents had terminated the lease because the facility was not completed by the required date and lacked heat, water, and fire safety access.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the termination clause, finding no ambiguity that would require a trial.

The Court also affirmed that partial summary judgment was appropriate under Rule 20 to resolve the discrete issue of the deposit return, even if it effectively determined liability for the main action and counterclaim.