Sheilagh O’Connell

This decision addresses a motion by the respondent mother seeking enforcement of a costs order against the applicant father as support enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The court analyzed whether legal costs awarded or consented to in family proceedings can be designated as support enforceable by FRO, focusing on whether the costs arose "in relation to the issue of support or maintenance" as required by the statute.

The court found that the underlying trial primarily concerned parenting issues, with minimal focus on child support, and that the mother failed to provide evidence that the legal costs related to support.

Consequently, the motion to enforce costs as support was dismissed, though the mother was permitted to bring an alternative enforcement motion under Rule 8 of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the habitual residence of the children be deemed Toronto, Ontario, and that the Ontario Court of Justice assume jurisdiction over parenting issues.

The motion also sought orders for decision-making responsibility, primary residence, a non-removal order, and supervised parenting time for the father.

The father had unlawfully retained the children in Pakistan, leading to Habeas Corpus proceedings there where the Pakistani High Court ordered the children's return to the mother and their passports, deferring the jurisdictional issue to their family court.

The Ontario court found overwhelming evidence that the children's habitual residence was Toronto, Ontario, and assumed jurisdiction, granting the mother temporary sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence, a non-removal order, and supervised access for the father.

The applicant sought full recovery costs ($20,621.08) arising from successful parenting motions.

The respondent, who was largely unsuccessful on the motions, requested costs be fixed at $3,500.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including unilaterally changing the parenting schedule after the mother's death and involving police, amounted to bad faith or at least unreasonable behaviour.

While finding bad faith, the court reduced the applicant's claimed costs to $10,000, finding the original claim excessive but the hourly rate reasonable.

The respondent was ordered to pay $10,000.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought to withdraw life support for a critically ill infant in its temporary care without court authorization, believing it had the authority under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The infant died after life support was withdrawn, but before an emergency court hearing could proceed.

The court, at the parties' request for future guidance, ruled that a children's aid society cannot withdraw life support for a child in its temporary or interim care without explicit court authorization, especially in the absence of parental consent, emphasizing procedural fairness and judicial oversight in such profound decisions.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

The applicant mother sought a temporary ex post facto order to relocate with the child to St. Catharines, Ontario, and modify the father's parenting time.

The respondent father opposed the relocation and sought the child's immediate return to Toronto.

The court found the mother improperly relocated the child without court authorization and that she failed to establish compelling circumstances for the move.

The court ordered the child's return to Toronto or the Greater Toronto Area by January 31, 2023, and established a temporary parenting schedule, emphasizing the importance of the child's relationship with the father.

The applicant mother sought full recovery of legal costs ($26,559.53) for a motion concerning the child's enrollment in French Immersion, which settled before a hearing.

The respondent father opposed costs, arguing the matter settled early and the mother's litigation tactics were unreasonable, or sought costs himself.

The court found the mother was successful on the main issue but both parties acted unreasonably in their approach to the dispute and costs.

The court significantly reduced the mother's claimed costs due to disproportionality and unreasonableness of time claimed, ultimately ordering the father to pay $5,000.00.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the applicant mother to strike the respondent father's pleadings for failure to provide financial disclosure in a child support matter.

The court awarded the mother $9,000 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable monthly, and declared the award enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

While the mother was successful, the court found her counsel's time claimed somewhat excessive and noted her failure to serve a formal Rule 18 Offer to Settle, which precluded full cost recovery.

The father's unreasonable conduct and willful refusal to provide disclosure were significant factors in the award.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion for final orders regarding the child E., including joint custody to the father and paternal grandmother, decision-making authority to the father, and discretionary supervised access for the mother.

The mother opposed, seeking joint custody and generous unsupervised access.

The court applied the Hryniak framework for summary judgment, with the caution required in child protection cases (Kawartha principles).

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's untreated mental health issues, history of instability, and failure to engage with services.

The court granted the Society's requested orders, finding them to be in the child's best interests, and dismissed the mother's opposing requests.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a final order that the child, D.B., was in need of protection, placement in extended society care with no access for adoption planning, and statutory findings regarding identity.

The respondent mother opposed, arguing for a trial and the child's return.

The court found overwhelming evidence of risk to the child due to the mother's untreated mental health issues, anger, and unstable living situation, and her inability to engage with services.

The motion was granted, finding the child in need of protection and ordering extended society care with limited, non-physical access for the mother.

This decision addresses a third-party records application brought by the young person accused, Q.F., under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code, seeking production of the complainant J.P.'s therapeutic records and prior police occurrence reports in a sexual assault case.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding that the accused failed to establish that the records were 'likely relevant' to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness, and that their production was not 'necessary in the interests of justice'.

The court emphasized that mere assertions or speculative claims are insufficient to overcome the high expectation of privacy associated with such records.

The applicant sought access to police records concerning a youth (W.C.) under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) after being struck by a pellet from a BB gun.

The police had investigated but laid no charges, opting for extrajudicial measures.

The court found that the police records constituted records of extrajudicial measures under section 119(4) of the YCJA, which prohibits access to such records for individuals like the applicant.

Even if not considered extrajudicial measures, the records were inaccessible under the YCJA's statutory framework, as section 123, which allows access after certain periods, did not apply to records where no charges were laid and thus no access period was defined.

The court emphasized the YCJA's principles of youth privacy and diminished moral blameworthiness.

The application was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) sought leave to withdraw its protection application concerning three children (G., Y., L.) after two years of litigation.

The father (M.H.) opposed the withdrawal, citing ongoing protection concerns related to the maternal aunt's (L.M.) care and alleged parental alienation.

The maternal aunt supported the withdrawal, having initiated a private Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) application for sole decision-making responsibility.

The court dismissed the CAS's motion to withdraw, finding serious ongoing protection concerns, potential prejudice to the father and children in a private domestic proceeding, and that withdrawal would usurp the court's function to determine if the children are in need of protection.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding concerning her grandchild, R. The Children's Aid Society and the mother opposed the motion, while the father supported it.

The court applied the legal principles for adding a party under subrule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, considering the child's best interests, potential for delay, necessity to determine issues, viability of the grandmother's plan, and legal interest.

The court found that the mother had a viable plan supported by the society, adding the grandmother would cause undue delay and expose the child to further conflict, and the father could adequately present the grandmother's plan as a witness.

The motion was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the costs of an urgent motion brought by the father to reinstate parenting time, which was resolved by consent.

The father sought full recovery of costs, arguing the mother's non-compliance necessitated the motion.

The mother sought her own costs or that each party bear their own, arguing the motion was unnecessary and she was more successful as counselling was agreed upon.

The court found the father was more successful in reinstating parenting time, which the mother had unilaterally suspended in breach of a prior order.

However, the father also behaved unreasonably by not informing the mother about a counselling session with the child.

Considering both parties' unreasonable conduct and offers to settle, and the disproportionate legal costs, the court ordered the mother to pay the father $3,500.00 in costs.

The accused brought a certiorari application seeking to quash a committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry, arguing that the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by refusing a requested adjournment after counsel was discharged.

The reviewing court examined the procedural history, including numerous adjournments and opportunities afforded to the accused to retain counsel.

The court held that the preliminary inquiry judge acted within jurisdiction and exercised appropriate control of the proceedings.

There was ample evidentiary basis for committal and no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness.

The application to quash the committal was dismissed.