Rosalie Silberman Abella

A young person convicted of sexual assault appealed on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable, arguing the trial judge illogically accepted selective parts of the accused's evidence while rejecting others due to intoxication.

The majority held the verdict was reasonable, finding the trial judge provided sound reasons for accepting some portions of the accused's evidence while rejecting others.

The appellant also challenged the constitutionality of s. 37(10) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which denies young persons the automatic appeal rights available to adults under s. 691 of the Criminal Code.

The majority upheld s. 37(10) as consistent with ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, while Abella J. (with Karakatsanis and Martin JJ.) found it to be an unjustified breach of s. 15.

The appeal was dismissed, with Côté J. dissenting on the reasonableness of the verdict and declining to address the constitutional questions as moot.

Three police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for misfeasance in public office, alleging Crown prosecutors mishandled stay applications brought by two accused persons who claimed the officers assaulted them during an arrest.

The majority held that prosecutorial immunity bars misfeasance claims by police officers against Crown prosecutors, as allowing such claims would fundamentally undermine prosecutorial independence and objectivity and imperil the accused's right to a fair trial.

The majority found that the mutually independent relationship between police and prosecutors is incompatible with a regime of legal accountability running from prosecutor to police.

In dissent, one justice would have dismissed the appeal, finding four policy reasons why prosecutorial immunity should not apply to deliberate and unlawful prosecutorial conduct causing serious harm to police officers facing findings of brutality, and that the high liability threshold for misfeasance adequately guards prosecutorial independence.

The appellant Crown appealed acquittals of the respondent, a United States citizen and member of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville Confederated Tribes, who was charged under British Columbia wildlife legislation after hunting elk in the traditional Sinixt territory in British Columbia.

The majority held that on a purposive interpretation of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the expression 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the modern-day successors of Aboriginal societies that occupied Canadian territory at the time of European contact, even if those groups are now located outside Canada.

Applying the Van der Peet test, the Court found the respondent was exercising a constitutionally protected Aboriginal right to hunt for food, social and ceremonial purposes within the Sinixt ancestral territory in British Columbia.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, with Moldaver and Côté JJ. dissenting on the grounds that s. 35(1) does not extend to Aboriginal groups located outside Canada and, in any event, that continuity had not been established.

The appellant was convicted of internet child luring after initiating contact in an internet chat room with an undercover police officer posing as an underage girl, proposing a meeting for sex, and being arrested at the meeting place.

The appellant applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that the officer had provided him with the opportunity to commit the offence.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that no opportunity had been provided, and the majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld that conclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of Justice Miller of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Three provincial appellants challenged the constitutionality of the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, which established minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency operating as a backstop to provincial pricing systems.

The courts below were divided, with the Saskatchewan and Ontario Courts of Appeal upholding the Act while the Alberta Court of Appeal struck it down.

A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court held that the Act's pith and substance is the establishment of minimum national standards of greenhouse gas price stringency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and that this matter falls within Parliament's jurisdiction under the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good government power.

The majority further held that the fuel and excess emissions charges are constitutionally valid regulatory charges rather than taxes.

The appeals by the Attorneys General of Saskatchewan and Ontario were dismissed and the appeal by the Attorney General of British Columbia was allowed, with Côté J. dissenting in part and Brown and Rowe JJ. fully dissenting.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal quashed the respondent's convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, finding them inconsistent with an acquittal on sexual assault arising from the same conduct.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that a legal error in the trial judge's jury instructions — misdirecting the jury that the 'force' required for sexual assault differed from the 'touching' required for the other two offences — materially bore on the acquittal while leaving the convictions untouched, thereby reconciling the apparent inconsistency.

The majority restored the convictions, set aside the acquittal, and entered a stay of proceedings on the sexual assault charge pursuant to s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

Brown and Kasirer JJ. dissented in part, arguing that the only available remedy on a Crown appeal from a jury acquittal is a new trial, and that the majority's framework invites improper speculation into jury deliberations contrary to the scheme of the Criminal Code and the Court's prior decision in R. v. J.F.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal overturned terrorism convictions and ordered a new trial on the basis that the jury was improperly constituted due to a jury selection error.

The trial judge had erred by refusing to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers, instead imposing static triers against the respondents' preferred procedure.

The Supreme Court confirmed the jury was improperly constituted but held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code can apply to cure jury selection errors.

The Court interpreted 'jurisdiction over the class of offence' to refer solely to the statutory jurisdictional capacity of the trial court to try the relevant class of offence, not to whether the jury was properly constituted.

Finding no prejudice to either respondent because the static triers procedure was a Parliament-sanctioned method and was implemented with care and attention, the Court restored the convictions and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant waste contractor alleged that the respondent municipal district breached a contractual duty of good faith by reallocating waste from a more distant disposal facility to a closer one, thereby preventing the appellant from achieving its target operating profit ratio for 2011.

The majority held that the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith requires exercise of discretion in a manner connected to the purposes for which the discretion was granted, and that exercising it unreasonably — meaning in a manner unconnected to those purposes — constitutes a breach.

The majority found that the respondent's reallocation was guided by legitimate objectives of maximizing efficiency and minimizing costs, and was therefore not unreasonable.

The concurring minority agreed the appeal should be dismissed, emphasizing that the standard of review was correctness given the statutory right of appeal, and that good faith cannot be used to create unbargained-for obligations.

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with costs.

A young person charged with second degree murder elected trial before a superior court judge and sought judicial interim release before a Queen's Bench justice, who declined jurisdiction on the basis that the provincially designated youth court held exclusive authority.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that a superior court justice deemed a youth justice court judge under ss. 13(2) or 13(3) of the YCJA has jurisdiction over pre-trial applications including judicial interim release, because 'the proceeding' in those sections encompasses all steps taken after election, not merely the trial.

The Court further held that s. 33(8) of the YCJA, which grants release authority to 'a youth justice court judge', does not qualify that term to exclude s. 13(1) provincially designated youth court judges.

Accordingly, jurisdiction over judicial interim release is concurrent between the superior court and the designated youth justice court, a result Parliament intended to provide flexibility and accessibility, particularly for Indigenous youth in rural areas.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a jury's convictions of the respondent for indecent assault and gross indecency on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The sole issue was whether inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony — as between his police statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial evidence — were so significant that a conviction based on his evidence was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The majority held that the inconsistencies, while troubling, did not render the jury's verdict unreasonable, as the complainant offered an explanation (that counselling had improved his memory) and the jury was entitled to accept it after thorough cross-examination and a comprehensive, unchallenged jury charge.

The majority further held that the Crown was not required to adduce further evidence or expert evidence regarding the role of counselling in refining memory.

The convictions were restored; Brown and Rowe JJ. dissented, substantially for the reasons of Justice White below.

The appellant was convicted at trial of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime based primarily on identification evidence from an undercover buy officer and a surveillance officer.

The Alberta Court of Appeal majority affirmed the conviction, while a dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge should have conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the identification evidence and reviewed the video and photo herself.

The Supreme Court of Canada majority dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority, adding that the combination of the buy officer's evidence, the surveillance officer's evidence, and defence counsel's concession regarding the person arrested provided sufficient admissible evidence to support the conviction.

One judge dissented and would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed as of right on questions of law following the Quebec Court of Appeal's majority decision setting aside a manslaughter conviction of a police officer and ordering a new trial.

The majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in law by denying the accused's motion for disclosure of third-party records that met the threshold of likely relevance for full answer and defence.

The trial judge further erred in her treatment of evidence crucial to the accused and in her assessment of expert testimony concerning the accused's conduct as a police officer.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, with two justices dissenting on both the disclosure and expert evidence issues.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The appellant contractor brought an action for breach of contract after the respondent condominium corporations exercised a contractual termination clause following months during which the respondents knowingly misled the appellant into believing the agreement would not be terminated.

The majority held that the duty of honest performance, as formulated in Bhasin v. Hrynew, precludes active deception and applies to the exercise of all contractual rights, including termination rights; the respondents breached that duty by failing to correct the false impression they had created, which was directly linked to performance of the contract.

A concurring minority agreed on liability but differed on the measure of damages, holding that the duty of honest performance vindicates the reliance interest rather than the expectation interest.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the respondents' conduct did not materially contribute to the appellant's mistaken belief and did not constitute the active dishonesty required for a breach of the duty of honest performance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's award of damages was reinstated.

A forest products company challenged the right of a state-owned electricity distributor to invoke a price adjustment clause in a 1926 power supply contract, arguing that the distributor was not a party to that contract.

The majority held that a 1965 bilateral contract between the distributor and the original contracting party effected a temporally limited assignment of the 1926 contract, with the assigned party's advance consent validly given in the original agreement.

As a result, the distributor was entitled to pass on to the forest products company the taxes and charges levied upon it by provincial legislation as increases in the cost of electricity generated from water power.

The dissent maintained that the trial judge had committed no reviewable error in finding that the 1965 contract created a mandate rather than an assignment, and that the Court of Appeal should not have intervened by analyzing the contract on a theory never advanced at trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after the trial judge dismissed his application under s. 276.1 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity.

The Alberta Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in dismissing that application, but the majority applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b) to affirm the conviction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered the complainant's evidence supplemented.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the trial judge's error did not lead to a miscarriage of justice and fell within the curative proviso, as the remaining evidence was otherwise overwhelming and a conviction was inevitable.

The Court also expressly declined to endorse the majority's application of s. 683(1), a remedy neither party had sought before the Court of Appeal and which all parties before the Supreme Court urged it to reject.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that ordered a new trial after the trial judge made a factual error regarding the year the accused underwent sexual offender treatment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence had an impact on the conviction and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge's error regarding the specific year of the sex offender treatment did not have any material impact on the trial judge's overall assessment of the similar fact evidence or the accused's credibility when the trial judge's reasons were considered as a whole, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant insurer denied coverage to a corporate policyholder that suffered losses arising from a phishing scheme in which funds were fraudulently transferred from the policyholder's bank account, which included a line of credit.

The insurer argued that the transferred funds belonged to the bank rather than to the policyholder, as the funds came entirely from the line of credit.

The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the loss was covered by the insurance policy because the policyholder was the owner of the transferred funds.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision, dismissing the appeal.

The Court further clarified that the result would not have differed even had the policyholder's account been in positive balance.

The appellant Crown appealed a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a conviction for sexual assault on the basis that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the credibility of the accused compared to the complainant.

The Supreme Court declined to decide whether uneven scrutiny constitutes an independent ground of appeal or a separate and distinct error of law.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment that would have warranted intervention on appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of Appeal to address the remaining grounds of appeal not considered by the majority below.